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Come senators, Congressmen 
Please heed the call 
Don’t block at the doorway 
Don’t block up the hall 
 
For he that gets hurt 
Will be he that has stalled 
There’s a battle outside 
And it’s ragin' 
 
It’ll soon shake your windows 
and rattle your walls 
For the times they are a – changing 
 
Bob Dylan – from his song, “The times they are a – changing” 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
Abstract 
Xenophobic hostility is not an unfamiliar concept – it is practiced all over the world, also in 
South Africa. Defined by the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) as a 
deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state, it constitutes a violation of 
the human rights of a targeted group, threatening the very principals upon which the young 
democracy is modelled on. What distinguishes xenophobia in South Africa from the rest of 
the world is its violent manifestation. In this country xenophobia is more than just an 
attitude, it is a violent practise, fuelled by racism, intolerance, ignorance and incapacity to 
deliver on developmental expectations. 
The 2008 xenophobic attacks in major centres in South Africa stunned the local and 
international communities, causing researchers to rush in search of answers. Just as the 
furore turned into complacency, on 17 November 2009, 3000 Zimbabwean citizens living 
in the rural community of De Doorns in the Western Cape were displaced as a result of 
xenophobic violence. Reasons for the attacks vary, with some blaming the contestation for 
scarce resources, others attribute it to the country’s violent past, inadequate service 
delivery and the influence of micro politics in townships. 
In assessing the reasons for the attacks the study claims that the third tier of government 
in terms of its Constitutional developmental mandate fails to properly engage with 
communities on their basic needs; that its inability to live up to post-apartheid expectations 
triggers frustration into violent xenophobic action. The De Doorns case offers valuable 
insight into the nature and scope of the phenomenon in rural areas, highlighting local 
government’s community participation efforts in exercising its developmental responsibility 
and dealing with the issue of xenophobia.  
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Opsomming 
Xenofobie is nie ’n onbekende verskynsel nie, dit kom reg oor die wêreld, ook in Suid-
Afrika voor. Gedefinieer deur die Suid Afrikaanse Menseregte Kommissie as ’n diep 
gesetelde afkeur aan vreemdelinge deur die inwoners van ’n gasheer land, 
verteenwoordig dit ’n skending van menseregte en hou dit ’n bedreiging vir die jong 
demokrasie in. Xenofobie in Suid-Afrika word gekenmerk deur die geweldadige aard 
daarvan. Hier verteenwoordig dit meer as ’n ingesteltheid, dit is ’n geweldadige uiting van 
gevoelens, aangespoor deur, rassisme, onverdraagsaamheid, onverskilligheid en die 
onvermoë om aan ontwikkelings-verwagtinge te voldoen. 
Die 2008 xenofobiese aanvalle in die stedelike gebiede van Suid-Afrika het die land en die 
wêreld diep geraak en ’n soeke na oplossings ontketen. Op 14 November 2009 word die 
gerustheid na die 2008 woede erg versteur toe 3 000 Zimbabwiërs in De Doorns in die 
Wes-Kaap deur xenofobiese geweld ontheem is. Redes wat aangevoer word wissel vanaf 
mededinging vir werksgeleenthede tot die land se geweldadige verlede, onvoldoende 
dienslewering en die invloed van mikro politiek in woonbuurte. 
Met die oorweging van redes vir die aanvalle maak die studie daarop aanspraak dat die 
derde vlak van regering in terme van sy Konstitusionele ontwikkelings-mandaad gefaal het 
om na behore met die gemeenskappe rondom hul behoeftes te skakel, dat die regering se 
onvermoë om aan die post-apartheid verwagtinge te voldoen frustrasie in xenofobiese 
geweld laat oorgaan het. Die De Doorns geval bied waardevolle insig in die aard en 
omvang van xenofobiese geweld in landelike gebiede en lê klem die plaaslike regering se 
hantering van openbare deelname in terme van sy ontwikkelings verpligtinge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, leaving 60 people dead and 
thousands displaced in its wake, sent shock waves through the country, Africa and across the 
globe. For almost 15 years, since the birth of democracy, South Africa was hailed as an 
example of racial reconciliation – a beacon of hope for many of its own as well as those who 
supported the country through its struggle for freedom.  Fellow Africans were stunned - how was 
it possible that the very people who accommodated and cared for South Africans during the 
dark years of apartheid could all of a sudden become the enemy? 
South Africa is not new to xenophobia. It is a characteristic of global society where people 
migrate all over the world to flee from persecution or in search for a better life. While outbreaks 
of xenophobic violence on foreigners occurred repeatedly since the early 1990s, the May 2008 
attacks were especially alarming, not only for their intensity and spread over the country but 
also for the attention the attacks attracted. 
Just as normality returned to the townships, on 14 November 2009 disaster struck, leaving 3000 
Zimbabwean migrants living in the rural community of De Doorns in the Western Cape Province 
of South Africa displaced and forlorn. Hope has turned into despair for thousands of Africans 
who came to South Africa in search of a better life. It seems that “Ubuntu” (togetherness), one 
of the county’s main branding initiatives, projecting South Africans as a caring, peace-loving 
nation is nothing more than a public relations ploy to boost the “Rainbow Nation” concept. 
Reactions were strong with newspaper headlines evoking sympathy, disappointment and 
disgust. The Argus “Hate rocks Cape dorp” (2009: 1), Cape Times “My heart is bleeding” (2009: 
1), Die Burger “Xenophobie-sweer bars” (2009: 1) painted a grim picture of prejudice, 
intolerance and ignorance. 
While the attacks of May 2008 were restricted to urban areas, the November 2009 attacks took 
place in rural Hex Valley, a major table grape producing area in the Western Cape Province of 
South Africa. In comparison to well-resourced urban areas, the attacks had a devastating effect 
on the De Doorns community in terms of scope, capacity and resources. The question now 
arises whether this shift in location, from urban to rural, signals the beginning of a new trend 
that can lead to an increase in xenophobic activity. The fact that violence continues to date, is 
reason for great concern that warrants urgent investigation. It is evident that initial research, 
focussing on material and socio-economic conditions did not adequately explain the violence. 
According to a research report by the Forced Migration Studies Programme titled, May 2008 
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violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: Understanding causes and evaluating 
responses.” early analyses of the xenophobic attacks failed to account for many historical and 
socio-political underlying causes as well as specific factors that triggered the violence in some 
areas and not in others”. The country struggles with the question why dislike and frustration 
turned into violence. What are the conditions and factors that caused xenophobic attitudes to 
translate into violent attacks in urban and now in rural South Africa? 
This study seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on causes of xenophobia in 
South Africa, focusing on the De Doorns case – its unique circumstances and approach to the 
challenge. To understand the reasons that triggered the attacks and the excessive violence that 
accompanied the attacks, it is necessary to understand the specific nature of xenophobia in 
South Africa. 
The manifestation of Xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa is characterised by its violent 
nature. Despite a miracle transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, prejudice, intolerance 
and violence continue to plague contemporary South Africa.  Xenophobic violence is so intense 
in South Africa and part of the country’s “culture of violence” that it is framed as pathology by 
Bronwyn Harris, former Project Manager at the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (2002: 169). Stimulated by a host of unresolved tensions stemming from a legacy 
of racial division, a challenging transition process and socio-economic hardship, xenophobia 
poses a real threat to democracy, making a mockery of one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world. 
Hypotheses of xenophobia provide insight into the drivers of frustration but do not explain what 
actually transform this frustration into violent action. In the South African context, research has 
identified a lack of political will by government to address the issue, and negative profiling of 
foreigners as the main contributors, while also blaming service delivery issues and local political 
infighting as aggravating influences that fuel xenophobic violence. 
In terms of the Constitution, local government has a developmental responsibility, meaning that 
the basic needs of the community must enjoy priority (RSA, 1996). The Local Government 
White Paper defines developmental local government as, “local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their 
social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives” (RSA, 1998a). 
Developmental responsibility goes hand in hand with community participation, which in terms of 
the Constitution and other legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act, 2000 is an essential 
element of developmental local government. Communicating with communities as equals or 
partners in governance is the corner stone of developmental local government. 
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With xenophobia alive and well in post-apartheid South Africa, challenging the country’s 
constitutional values, threatening peace and stability, the question now arises whether the 
manner in which government exercises its developmental mandate creates an enabling 
environment for xenophobic tendencies to turn into violence. Extreme poverty, feelings of 
deprivation, service delivery protests and unbridled corruption can be an indication that local 
government is failing in its developmental responsibility. One can argue that government in 
neglecting its developmental responsibility (communicating to the community and improving 
their lives) provides the necessary catalyst for frustrated communities to resort to xenophobic 
violence. 
1.2 RATIONALE  
27 April 1994 signalled the end of oppression and the dawn of a new era of hope for South 
Africa and the Continent. Democracy replaced apartheid, modernisation made place for a new 
developmental path, based on the participation of communities in governance. Government 
opted for a bottom-up approach with local government, the tier of government closest to the 
people, now legally mandated in terms of the Constitution to promote social and economic 
development. 
While the root causes of xenophobia are complex and varied, research identifies the role of 
government as vital in any effort to find a sustainable solution.  Government has a legal, moral 
and developmental obligation to combat xenophobia. Although black foreigners are profiled as a 
threat, the real issue is one of economic deprivation and communication, of the poorest of the 
poor being left out in the cold and kept in the dark by local government’s dismal performance in 
practising developmental local government. This exploratory study examines government’s 
contribution to xenophobia, focusing on local government’s developmental responsibility, with 
specific reference to the November 2009 attacks in De Doorns. It argues that communication, 
being the very heart of participatory practises associated with developmental local government, 
plays a crucial role in stimulating xenophobic tendencies and in managing xenophobic 
situations. Government, especially local government has been accused of not effectively 
communicating and engaging with residents on a variety of issues ranging from service delivery 
to sensitising locals about foreigners. Government communication is invariably part of the 
problem but also part of the solution.. 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Although prosperous from a production point of view, the scenic Hex River Valley is plagued 
with typical developmental problems such as poverty (income inequality), HIV/AIDS, TB and 
unemployment. Survival is an on-going struggle for 90% of the population. Aggravating the 
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plight of the local people is an influx of thousands of foreign nationals from Zimbabwe, 
increasing pressure on scarce resources. Adding to the complexity of the situation is the 
involvement of labour brokers who act as intermediaries between the farm labourers and 
producers (farmers) who control the production process. 
Local government has a developmental responsibility to engage with local communities. This 
engagement should not only entail the delivery of basic services and addressing of specific 
issues, but the establishment of a conducive environment for interaction with local stakeholders 
– by building trust, assessing situations, conducting dialogue, disseminating information and 
fostering change. 
Although the majority of research on the violence of May 2008 implicated local government – 
and especially service delivery failures - in contributing towards the xenophobic attacks, little 
research is available on local government communicating to local communities in terms of its 
developmental mandate and the occurrence of xenophobic violence. 
This study will discuss communication interventions before, during and after the xenophobic 
incidents, focusing on the BVM’s approach to development communication and the application 
of strategies and principles thereof. Local government is legally obliged to follow a 
developmental approach in dealing with communities and encouraging people’s participation in 
decisions and activities that affect their lives. The study will also address the role of media in 
development communication and the local media’s involvement in the De Doorns case. 
The xenophobic crisis in De Doorns in the Western Cape in 2009 posed a development 
communication challenge for local government. Although the threat of xenophobia is a serious 
one with major consequences for the country, the goal of the study is not so much to explain the 
phenomenon, but rather to focus on how xenophobia is communicated in a developmental 
context. It is argued that local government exercising its developmental responsibility, in 
communicating with communities, can influence the outcome of development issues such as the 
humanitarian crisis in De Doorns. In view of the above, the research question can be formulated 
as: “Does government in its response to the xenophobic crisis communicate effectively in terms 
of its developmental mandate.” 
The following section will be devoted to the theoretical approach to development communication 
employed in the study – explaining the major communication directions in the development field. 
A theoretical framework anchored in development communication and theoretical perspectives 
in xenophobia will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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1.4 THEORETICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION 
Since reality in an academic sense is informed by theory, this section will concentrate on the 
main theoretical approaches that guide development communication in the modern era. The 
different theoretical models and methodologies associated with development communication 
will also be discussed in Chapter 2. 
It is necessary within the context of this study to differentiate between the various types of 
communication. For the effective application of development communication, it is essential to 
identify the different areas of communication. Different types of communication require different 
bodies of knowledge, tools and skills. This can involve one or a combination of communication 
approaches. Mefalopulos (2008: 83) identifies the following common types of communication in 
a development set-up: 
• Corporate communication 
• Internal communication 
• Advocacy communication 
• Development communication 
Although these different types of communication belong to the same family, each requires its 
own skills and set of knowledge. Since development communication is central to the study, the 
rest of this section presents an overview of the concept – its origins, meaning and the main 
development paradigms associated with the discipline - modernisation, dependency theory and 
participation communication. 
Development in its original sense referred to an emancipatory process - freeing the developing 
world from the shackles of poverty: low literacy rates, unemployment, insufficient health care 
and the like, to become more like Western, developed societies in terms of government 
systems, economic growth and educational and social levels. Development was synonymous 
with democracy and productivity. The assumption was that underdeveloped communities should 
follow suit (Mefalopulos, 2008: 6). 
Development communication has its origins in the post Second World War international aid 
programs to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. President Truman in his January 1949 
inaugural speech captured the essence of the modern understanding of development when he 
said: “We must embark on a whole new programme for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas.” (Mefalopulos, 2008: 43) The period also marked the establishment of the major Bretton 
Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, signalling the formal beginning of 
development aid to the Third World as a worldwide priority (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 47). 
According to Waisbord development theories have their roots in mid-century optimism about the 
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prospects that large parts of post-colonial Third World countries could become politically, 
socially and economically westernised. With the demise of colonialism, the question was how to 
address the disparities between the developed and underdeveloped world (2001: 1). 
There are two core development communication approaches. The dominant paradigm of 
behaviour change model seeks to resolve development problems by modernising 
underdeveloped communities, urging them to follow in the footsteps of affluent Western 
countries. According to the modernisation theory, which underpins the dominant paradigm, 
underdevelopment is due to a lack of information. Culture is viewed as a potential obstacle to 
social change. By transmitting information via the mass media from a sender to a receiver, 
through a vertical one-way (monologic) linear process of sender-message-channel-receiver, 
western values were transmitted and ideas changed, resulting in changed behaviour on the part 
of the receiver (2001: 1) 
Communication was associated with the dissemination of messages and information aimed at 
persuading audiences to change. Based on this, Everett Rogers introduced the influential 
diffusion of innovations theory of behaviour change through media centric approaches and 
campaigns. The theory entails five stages: awareness, knowledge and interest, decision, trial 
and adoption - through which an individual adopts innovations.  
According to Rogers (as cited in Waisbord, 2001: 4) development communication is a “process 
by which an idea is transferred from a source to a receiver with the intent to change his 
behaviour. Usually the source wants to alter the receiver’s knowledge of some idea, create or 
change his attitude towards the idea, or persuade him to adopt the idea as part of his regular 
behaviour”.  
Although Rogers, deriving from the media-centrism and magic bullet (strong effects of mass 
communication messages) school of thought, acknowledged the importance of media in 
creating awareness, he conceded that interpersonal relations were crucial in shaping opinion 
(Waisbord, 2001: 4). This view incorporated elements of the two-step flow model of 
communications effects according to which information and influence flow from the media to 
opinion leaders through interpersonal channels to the masses.  Media audiences, according to 
the model, rely on the opinions of opinion leaders rather than solely on the mass media (Du 
Plooy, 1997: 8).  
Following this insight the conception of the media as having a strong and direct influence on 
mass audiences started to decline. Diffusion studies maintained that both exposure to mass 
media and face-to-face interaction were crucial to effective change. From studies on how 
farmers adopted new methods, Rogers concluded that, that which motivates change is not 
economics, but communication and culture (Waisbord, 2001: 5). 
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Strong critique of the modernisation theories led to the emergence of the dependency theory. 
The theory is informed by Marxist and critical approaches that place the blame for the problems 
of the Third World on capitalist development. Dependency theorists maintained that 
underdevelopment was not an internal problem but that it was forced on developing states by 
external factors, therefore stating that problems of underdevelopment in the Third World were 
political rather than through the lack of information. Social and economic factors, namely the 
dominant position Western counties had in the global order, kept the Third World countries 
underdeveloped and politically and culturally dependent. Urban and powerful interests 
controlled the media, which were only interested in profit and transmitting entertainment and 
trivial information rather than social change. Therefore, the dissemination of information through 
mass media is not advisable, and efforts such as the development of national communication 
policies to address the social causes of poverty and marginalisation are recommended. 
Dependency theorists blamed the behaviourist, positivist and empiricist approaches of 
modernisation for focussing interventions on behavioural changes at the individual level rather 
than the social causes of poverty and marginalisation (Waisbord, 2001: 16). 
With the dependency theorists failing to provide a successful alternative for modernisation, a 
different approach emerged that is less orientated on the political-economic model and more 
rooted in the cultural realities of development, focussing on people’s participation. This new 
participatory model emphasises that participation is a value in itself, and not just a means to an 
end. The focus of development has shifted from economic growth to people’s participation and 
sustainability. In the new participation paradigm, residents are no longer mere passive targets, 
but are actively involved in development issues and activities (2001:18). The approach 
encourages the inclusion of the community into the planning and implementation of 
development projects, thus accepting ownership of the project. Communities are invited, upon 
completion of a project, to evaluate the project – analyse its success or failure, and to give their 
inputs on possible improvements. Participants are also part of decision-making and are 
beneficiaries of projects (Smith, 2003:17). 
Meaningful participation however cannot happen without communication. According to 
Mefalopulos many development programmes, while paying attention to participation, neglect 
communication, intended as the professional use of dialogic methods and tools to promote 
change. “To be truly significant and meaningful, participation needs to be based on the 
application of genuine two-way communication principles and practices” (2008:7). 
A horizontal, two-way model, which favours people’s direct and active interaction through 
consultation and dialogue, replaced the top-down, information dissemination through the mass 
media approach of development communication. This new horizontal two-way (dialogic) 
approach seeks to engage stakeholders’ knowledge and perceptions in assessing the situation 
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and in defining priorities leading to change. Although the new approach shifts the emphasis 
from information dissemination to situation analysis, from persuasion to participation, informing 
people and promoting change remain key functions of development communication. 
Participatory theories considered a redefinition of development communication necessary. 
Based on the above principles, the following definition formulated at the First World Congress of 
Communication for Development held in Rome in October 2006, captures the essence of 
development communication in the participation era: 
“…a social process based on dialog using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about 
seeking change at different levels, including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and 
skills, building policies, debating, and learning for sustained and meaningful change.” 
According to Waisbord, “communication means a process of creating and stimulating 
understanding as the basis for development rather than information transmission”. He maintains 
that “people should not be forced to adopt new practices no matter how beneficial they seem in 
the eyes of agencies and governments. Instead, people need to be encouraged to participate 
rather than adopt new practices based on information” (2001: 18). 
Communication in the developmental sense is not public relations or corporate communication; 
it is about participation and the empowerment of people. Participatory communication 
encourages participation, stimulates critical thinking, view communication as a process, rather 
than specific outcomes associated with modernisation as the main task of development 
communication. 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The study employs a qualitative approach to research because of its analytic and interpretative 
strength. In addition to content analysis, extracting meaning from books, newspapers, reports, 
minutes and official documents, the research strongly relies on fundamental field research 
techniques such as in-depth interviews, unstructured interviews and participant observation. 
Field research or participant observation allows the researcher to study the subtle nuances of 
attitudes and behaviours as well as social processes over time (Du Plooy, 1997: 105). This 
inductive approach allows the researcher to gain a close understanding of the research context 
and the meanings participants attach to events (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003: 89).  
Since the essence of the research is to study government’s response, specifically local 
government’s involvement in xenophobic situations, it is essential that the views of key role-
players in government be captured. In-depth interviews, also referred to as a, “conversation with 
a purpose (Marshall & Rossman, 1989: 82) allow participants to elaborate freely from a position 
of choice, on a very sensitive issue. 
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The fieldwork was conducted over a period of eleven months. During this time  literature was 
consulted, data was captured, documents such as minutes, policy documents, strategies and 
correspondence were located and organised, events were organised according to a road map, 
tracking the course of activities from day one, rapport was established with participants, the 
necessary permission to observe proceedings was obtained, interviews were held with key role-
players from government, content was evaluated, analysed and written down. 
A detailed explanation of the methodology utilised in addressing the research problem will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter 1 introduces the theme of the study, the reasons and research objectives. Chapter 2 is 
the literature review – a discussion of the key literary sources. It examines the current literature 
on xenophobia, providing an overview of the violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South 
Africa. The theory section explains the various xenophobia hypotheses and prejudice theories. 
To explain local government’s important developmental role and the effect it has on 
xenophobia, literature on the evolution of development communication and community 
participation in the African and South African context were also referred to. In illustrating the 
impact of external factors in stimulating xenophobic violence, attention was given to the role of 
the media and government in influencing attitudes. Legislation reflecting on Government’s 
obligation to communicate with communities and create a culture of public participation was also 
consulted.  
In chapter 3, the methodological approach is discussed. It explains the rationale for an analytic 
and interpretative research method, utilising fundamental field research techniques. Chapters 4 
and 5 are the body and main findings of the research. Chapter 4 is a detailed narrative, 
explaining the background, reasons, attacks and humanitarian response with regard to the 14 
and 17 November 2009 attacks on Zimbabweans in De Doorns. Of special significance is local 
government’s role in creating an enabling environment for xenophobic behaviour and its 
performance in managing the situation and addressing post- xenophobic challenges. Chapter 6 
is the conclusion and recommendations based on the findings. 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
The majority of studies on reasons for xenophobia in South Africa, in addition to psychological 
explanations, focus on socio-economic aspects. Government is blamed for not addressing 
critical issues such as service delivery failures, but relatively few studies focus on government 
communicating xenophobia in a developmental context. The rationale for this study is the lack 
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of academic research produced on local government’s contribution towards the problem in 
terms of its performance in communicating to communities in a developmental environment. 
The study will attempt to complement theory on the subject, contributing to the existing body of 
knowledge, explaining the nature and causes of the problem and providing guidelines for 
practical interventions. The methodological approach is qualitative in the positivist tradition 
because of its analytical and interpretative advantages. it allows the researcher to study the 
subtle nuances of attitudes and behaviours and examining social processes over time, 
contributing to a deeper understanding. It is also flexible in the sense that the research design 
can be modified (Babbie, 1998: 303).   
Development communication in the modern context has moved from a diffusion perspective to 
participation. In practical terms it means that stakeholders’ needs and rights to be informed 
about development issues are extended to play an active part in decision-making that affects 
their lives. From a developmental local government perspective, it means that government must 
actively engage with communities on issues that affect their lives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literary review is organised according to the main themes emanating from the research 
problem. It forms the foundation of the research in the sense that it assists in developing a 
better understanding and insight into existing research and the trends that have emerged. The 
literature review includes both primary and secondary sources In addition to academic sources 
(theses, studies and articles), popular sources – internet websites, books, newspapers, journals, 
NGO reports and government documentation were extensively explored. 
An explanation of the relevant theories, methodologies and strategies in development 
communication that assist in an analysis of the main focus of the thesis, constitutes the first part 
of the literature review. The content will include a discussion of key terminology, historical 
background, theoretical underpinnings of development, the role of media and the 
methodological process associated with development communication. The second part of the 
literature review consists of: 
• A discussion of theories explaining the phenomenon, definitions and hypotheses of 
xenophobia. The violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa, its root causes 
and structural and historical factors such as the legacy of apartheid, nationalism and 
institutional discrimination are also contained in the literature study. 
• A discussion of the third tier of government’s new developmental role in democratic South 
Africa. 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION – A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The following section provides an overview of the main theoretical frameworks on the role of 
communication in the development context - key terminology, historical perspective, modes and 
models of development communication, theoretical underpinnings, practical implications and the 
methodological process are discussed. 
Although the study relied on the work done by various authors, the literary contributions of 
Melkote and Steeves, Waisbord and Mefalopulos are of special significance for their theoretical 
insights and practical applications. 
2.2.2 Key terminology 
This section provides some basic definitions of terms frequently used in development 
communication. 
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Information and communication – Although the two concepts are closely related, information is 
not communication, rather one of the outputs of the latter. While communication is an open 
process where people can communicate with each other, information uses messages to change 
attitudes, behaviour and knowledge. The difference between the two concepts is not only a 
matter of theoretical models – one-way vertical flow versus two-way horizontal flow but also of 
scope with individuals who are receivers and transmitters at the same time in the 
communication models. (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41).  
Participation – Participation can vary from passive participation where people are only informed 
on matters to self-mobilisation where people form part of the process. The World Bank identified 
the following types of participation: information sharing, consultation, collaboration and 
empowerment. Participation is about sharing and an exchange capable of influencing decisions. 
For the best results it is desirable that dialog between sender and receiver(s) take place from 
the assessment phase of a project. Participation means that people have a right to have their 
voices heard and to play an active part in the decision-making process (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41). 
Consultation – Although closely related to participation and communication, consultation is not 
an even process, since control of decision-making rests with the few that is in charge of the 
consultation. Though the main scope of consultation is listening, information does not flow freely 
from stakeholders, but is rather conceived as a feedback on predefined topics intended for 
experts. The nature of consultation is to inform stakeholders on new information. It does not 
intend to change specific behaviour at the outset (Mefalopulos, 2008: 41). 
Capacity building – Capacity building is associated with developmental communication aspects 
such as training, education, participation and empowerment. The purpose is to enhance 
knowledge and skills, both at an individual and organisational level. Knowledge transfer and 
formal training is not the only means to build capacity. It can also be achieved through learning-
by-doing and dialog (Mefalopulos, 2008:41). 
Empowerment – Dialogue is the means to achieve empowerment. Participation through dialogic 
two-way development facilitates the exchange of knowledge, empowering people to participate 
actively in actions and decisions that affect their lives. By engaging marginalised stakeholders in 
decision-making development communication not only reduces poor people’s capacity 
deprivation but also empower them. Empowerments is only possible if community members 
through participatory interventions critically reflect on their experiences and understand the 
reasons for success and failure (Mefalopulos, 2008: 42). 
Dialog – According to Mefalopulos, “Dialog, in the context of development communication, 
should be considered as the professional application of interactive methods and techniques to 
engage stakeholders in exploring the situation and uncovering risks and opportunities that can 
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benefit the development initiative and make it more successful and sustainable” (2008: 43). 
Dialogic approaches guarantee that stakeholders have their voices heard and that project 
priorities are aligned with people priorities (2008:42). 
2.2.3 Development communication – a historical perspective 
In order to place the De Doorns crisis in the right context, key aspects of the three theoretical 
approaches that dominate the field of development communication – modernisation paradigm, 
dependency theory and the participatory paradigm - were discussed in chapter 1. This section 
offers a more in-depth view on the historical evolution of development communication from 
modernisation to participatory communication, focussing on the dominant paradigm. The 
research relied on the works of Melcote and Steeves, Du Plooy, Sparks and Smith. 
The origins, principles and applications of modernisation should be viewed within the historical 
context of the post-war (Second World War) years, also known as the Cold War period. This 
period saw the political emancipation of most of the third world countries from colonisation, and 
the establishment of the major Bretton Woods institutions, , signalling the formal beginning of 
development aid to the Third World as a worldwide priority (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 47). 
United States President Truman, a driving force behind the Marshall Plan to help reconstruct 
war-torn Europe after the Second World War, also proposed the 1949 Point Four program of 
assistance to Third World countries. The Plan aimed to alleviate suffering via capital investment 
(Melkote & Steeves, 2003:51). Unfortunately, Western scholars, who persuaded Third World 
countries to adopt them without adapting them to their specific socio-cultural circumstances, 
branded the earlier views on development and development communication as universally 
applicable. 
The period directly after the Second World War was concerned with the effects of propaganda. 
The influence of the mass media on audiences was seen as direct and strong (Du Plooy, 
1997:7). People concerned with propaganda recognised the media’s developmental role in 
fostering modern attitudes and believe for significant change. This was the period during which 
the dominant paradigm of development communication (modernisation), grounded in the neo-
classical economic theory, promoting capitalist economic development, came into being 
(Sparks, 2007:3). 
The hierarchical top-down dominant paradigm considers industrialisation the main route to 
successful economic growth as practiced in North America and Western Europe. Third world 
countries were encouraged to invest in industrialisation. Deriving from the positivist tradition, 
development performance was measured by quantitative indicators such as gross national 
product and per capita income.  Communication from a modernisation perspective was viewed 
as a persuasive tool to sell development ideas and associated technologies to target audiences 
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(Melkote & Steeves, 2003:38). Qualitative empirical science was accepted as the dominant 
scientific methodology (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:100). 
Notwithstanding the positive effect of the critical perspective, the theory and practice of 
development communication are still being influenced by the modernisation-orientated biases of 
the period termed the First Development Decade of the 1960s. The function of the United 
Nations agencies during this period, in promoting technological transfer from the developed 
North to the Third World, was also instrumental in underdeveloped countries discarding their 
traditional ways in favour of the proven success of western technological innovation. This 
orientation with its top-down approach is referred to as the pro-innovation bias (Melkote & 
Steeves, 2003: 54). To achieve these development goals the transfer of capital and technology 
were not enough, it had to be complemented by the communication of knowledge and skill. The 
Third World had to be persuaded and motivated by communication programs to let go of their 
traditional ways of doing things and adopt the new way. The pro-persuasion bias was necessary 
because the Third World was not inclined to submit to radical change (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 
54). To strengthen the pro-persuasion bias, two new biases, the pro-mass media bias and 
related pro-literacy bias were introduced to create a climate of acceptance of change in the 
Third World. Advocates of this model believed that literacy and mass media could be utilized to 
smooth out the negative effects of traditionalism on change.  The models were aimed at 
creating widespread awareness by the mass media, and interest in the innovations promoted by 
the development agencies. It was believed that these two biases would lead to the passing of 
traditional society (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 58). The in-the head psychological constraints to 
development bias goes a step further in persuading hard –headed opponents of innovations in 
the Third World to relinquish their resistance against innovations. The psychological blocks of 
the peasantry must be overcome by the radical modification of a traditional mind-set as a 
precondition of conversion to accepting good innovations. In this sense development 
communication under the modernisation framework is often viewed as a process of persuasive 
marketing (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:60). 
After realizing that many of earlier development projects had not given enough attention to the 
communication constraint, scholars of development communication during the 1970s began to 
focus factors that could make projects more relevant to the needs of vulnerable groups. This 
resulted in the conceptualisation of communication as a dynamic support to projects and 
activities. This view, termed development support communication is utilized to bridge the gap 
between technical expertise and the recipients of knowledge (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 62). 
The modernisation perspective of development was followed by a critical phase (dependency) 
when international communication structures were criticised for the continued subordination of 
developing countries to the benefit of developed countries. Whilst a modernisation perspective 
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for instance assumes that a Western model of economic growth is universally desirable, critical 
perspectives challenge the economic and cultural expansionism and imperialism of 
modernization and advocates political and economic restructuring to produce a more even 
distribution of awards in society (Melkote & Steeves, 2003:34). During this period the media 
served the interests of imperialism, giving rise to the imperialism paradigm. The dominant 
paradigm was criticised for its top down approach, which was motivated by the assumption that 
the experts (western countries) know what is best and designed communication programs to 
transmit their knowledge to the people to be developed. The critical alternative rejects marketing 
models that aim to spread Western technologies and values arguing for political and economic 
restructuring. This view of accommodating the needs of communities is known as the 
participatory paradigm. Liberation theology supports this view, stating the purpose of 
development as liberation from oppression. People have the ability to determine their own 
destiny and capacity to develop themselves, but are restricted by internal and external 
pressures to do so. Liberation from oppression through development differs from the 
modernisation and critical perspectives in that its goals are primarily spiritual and not economic, 
although material realities are not ignored (Melkote & Steeves, 2003: 35). 
The participatory approach in development communication is a relatively new (dating back from 
the early 1970s) and innovative means to achieve development in communities (Smith, 
2003:14). It differs from the traditional in that it practices a horizontal approach to 
communication and assumes that the communities that are targeted for development knows 
best what their needs are (Smith, 2003:17). 
2.2.4 Theoretical underpinnings of development communication 
Mefalopulos categorises development communication into two broad families: diffusion and 
participation. The diffusion model rooted in the modernization paradigm uses communication 
media and methods to persuade people to change. The participatory approach is based on the 
two-way communication model that involves and empowers people in the assessment, design 
and implementation of development initiatives (2008: 58). To assist in understanding the 
applications of the two models it is necessary to be familiar with the theory that informs the 
models. 
Diffusion approaches believe that by inducing change in individuals’ attitudes and behaviours, 
progress can be achieved. Ontologically the assumption is that by using scientific methods 
reality will be revealed. Epistemologically, the researcher is expected to detach himself or 
herself from the object of the study, ensuring objectivity. Methodologically quantitative methods 
in line with the positivist/scientific dogma are preferred to get to the truth. A consequence of this 
approach is that if one party has the truth, all other parties with different perspectives must be 
wrong. 
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Participatory approaches acknowledge that there can be different constructions of the same 
reality. No single party has the ultimate truth; rather there are a number of realities that often 
need to be reconciled through communication. Ontologically reality is socially constructed based 
on agreement among individuals or groups of individuals through dialog. There is not 
necessarily one true reality, but several constructions/interpretations of a specific reality. In a 
dynamic situation such as De Doorns during the crisis, farmers for instance perceived reality 
differently from farm labourers. Different views need to be reconciled and the focus shifted to 
the specific problem. Epistemologically the researcher is not divorced from the issue 
investigated. For the best results, the researcher should be part of the context in which the 
investigation takes place (Mefalopulos, 2008:58). In the De Doorns case, local government in its 
developmental capacity should have been an active actor, through consultation and dialog in 
the communication process. From a methodological point of view, a number of qualitative and 
quantitative methods can be applied according to the required needs. 
The differentiation between diffusion and participation is more than a theoretical exercise; it 
implies a number of practical consequences in the daily operations of development projects. 
The explanation addresses two basic factors that should be present in any development 
initiative, namely stakeholders’ needs and rights to be informed and to have their voices heard 
and play an active role in initiatives and decision-making. Mefalopulos defines and contrasts 
diffusion and participation according to their scope, with diffusion identified with monologic 
communication and participation with dialogic communication (2008: 64). 
The monologic mode is a one-way communication mode based on the transmission model and 
has two applications: communication to inform and communication to persuade. Communication 
to inform is a linear transmission of information from a sender to many receivers. It is used to 
raise awareness and provide knowledge on specific issues. In communication to persuade the 
dissemination of information is regarded a temporary stage to be reached in a longer process 
aimed at achieving behavioural changes. A communication approach closely associated with 
the persuasion approach, is strategic communication (2008: 65). 
The dialogic mode is associated with the participatory paradigm of horizontal two-way 
communication aimed at creating a constructive environment for stakeholders to participate in 
activities that impact on their lives. It has two applications: communication to access and 
communication to empower. Communication to access serves as a research and analytical tool 
to investigate issues of a wide variety. Dialogic communication stimulates participation in 
identifying, exploring and assessing key issues, opportunities and risks of both technical and 
political nature in communities. Communication to empower is the use of the dialogic feature of 
communication to build the capacities of groups, in particular the most marginalised, and 
address issues of poverty and social and economic backlogs. Dialogic communication is more 
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than an effective problem-solving tool. It can create stability, build confidence and address 
issues related to poverty by engaging the poorest of the poor. Mefalopulos  refer to Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen who highlights how poverty goes beyond lacking sufficient income to 
address basic needs, claiming that poverty is also about capabilities, deprivation and social 
exclusion. By including the poor in the assessment of problems and engaging them in 
processes, the dialogic mode can address and reduce a key element of poverty namely social 
exclusion (2008: 55). 
Although the dominant paradigm in the 1970s lost some of its appeal, the notion that the 
diffusion of information and innovations could solve problems of underdevelopment still 
prevailed. Approaches such as social marketing, health promotion and health education and 
entertainment education carried forward the premises of diffusion of innovation and behavioural 
change models. 
Participatory, media advocacy and social mobilisation approaches criticized the modernisation 
paradigm because it promoted a top-down ethnocentric and paternalistic view of development. 
Because of their participatory characteristics, media advocacy and social mobilisation warrants 
further discussion. 
Media advocacy, defined as the strategic use of mass media to advance social or public policy 
issues, stimulates debate and promote responsible coverage of health issues (Waisbord, 2001: 
34). Advocacy requires the mobilisation of resources and people in support of specific issues 
and policies to influence public opinion and decisions. It entails the organisation of information 
for dissemination through interpersonal and media channels in order to gain political and social 
acceptance of certain issues. In the participation tradition media advocacy focuses on the needs 
of communities to gain control to transform their environments. This approach is not solely 
concerned with media issues but also mobilises grassroots and media actions to address power 
inequalities, which give rise to health problems. Advocacy consists of a large number of 
information activities such as lobbying with decision makers; holding seminars, rallies and news-
making events; ensuring regular media coverage and obtaining endorsement from known 
people (2001: 25). 
Social mobilisation is defined as a process through which community members become aware 
of a problem identify it as a high priority for community action and decide on steps to take action 
(Waisbord, 2001: 26). It starts with problem assessment and analysis at community level and 
takes action on chosen courses. Strategic allies at all levels representing a wide range of 
support activities are involved in the process. Communities are empowered by interventions in 
the sense that they take direct control over their lives and environment. 
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2.2.5 Media 
There can be little doubt that the media are instrumental in increasing knowledge and 
influencing attitudes and behaviour. However, in the new horizontal two-way flow model of 
development communication, people are part of the process leading to change. In this 
perspective media are no longer the central element in development communication, but one of 
the tools to use according to circumstances. Although the one-way linear model lost part of its 
pervasive dominance, it is complemented by a model where the sender is at the same time the 
receiver and vice versa. The focus now shifts from media to people and persuasion to 
participation. 
Mefalopulos distinguishes between two levels of media: mass media that uses print media, 
radio and television campaigns to influence behaviours and bring about change, and community 
media, mainly using radio and theatre to give voice to communities (2008: 60). In a local 
context, community radio with its hands-on approach and knowledge of the environment is often 
more empowering and influential than television and other forms of the commercial media. 
Notwithstanding the growing popularity of television and information and communication 
technologies, community radio remains a useful medium to enhance meaningful civic 
engagement in especially poor and marginalised communities such as De Doorns in the Breede 
Valley of the Western Cape. 
2.2.6 Methodological framework for development communication programmes 
Backed by extensive experience in the development field, Mefalopulos, a World Bank official 
with a profound knowledge of communication in operations, proposes a four phase 
methodological process to guide communication programmes. The first phase is the research 
phase and consists of a communication-based assessment. It identifies and analyse 
stakeholders’ risk, opportunities and needs. The second phase, strategy design select and 
design communication approaches, messages and learning systems. The third phase is 
implementation. Communication activities such as training, media design and production, and 
information dissemination are prepared and executed according to the agreed strategy namely 
and plan of action. The fourth phase is monitoring and evaluation (2008: 29). 
2.2.7 Conclusion 
It is clear that the two dominant approaches in development communication, diffusion and 
participation, although different from an ontological, epistemological and methodological 
perspective, are not in opposition to each other, and that elements of both can be integrated to 
include more interactive ways of communicating. 
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In a developmental environment such as De Doorns, participatory approaches will be best 
suited to gain the confidence and address the specific communication needs of the largely 
marginalised community. After the initial assessment phase, other models can be combined 
with it. 
Since the body and the major part of this study, concentrates on the De Doorns experience the 
author searched for similar studies. Although various research was done on the 2008 incidents 
of xenophobia, only two reliable studies that address some aspects of the De Doorns case 
could be found. A background brief by Jean Pierre Misago of the Forced Migration Studies 
Program at the University of the Witwatersrand titled Violence, labour and displacement of 
Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape and report titled Sour grapes by Jan Theron offered 
valuable information on the subject of study. Monitor reports by Black Sash on humanitarian 
aspects also contributed to the study. Case studies on collective violence titled, The smoke that 
calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in the new South 
Africa produced by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Society, 
Work and Development Institute as well as a research report titled, May 2008 Violence against 
foreign nationals in South Africa: understanding causes and evaluating responses by FMSP and 
CoRMSA served as major sources to obtain a background on the subject. However, although 
case studies offer valuable information, the problem with consulting case studies is that it tends 
to influence later research. Each case has its own unique characteristics and dynamics. 
2.2 KEY CONCEPTS 
To understand local government’s involvement in xenophobia, it is necessary to explain the key 
concepts that impact on- and influence government performance and decisions. What is 
xenophobia? What is the nature of xenophobia in South Africa? Does it differ in its manifestation 
from xenophobia elsewhere in the world? It is necessary to understand local government’s 
developmental role in post- apartheid South Africa to explain the high level of frustration in 
communities. Explaining the concepts xenophobia, development, developmental local 
government and community/ public participation will place the research in the right context. 
2.3 XENOPHOBIA 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section starts with defining the concept. It then explores some of the theories of prejudice 
that give rise to xenophobia and ends with an explanation of the phenomenon in the South 
African context, focussing on the different hypotheses and the violent nature of xenophobia in 
terms of its representation by the media and the mechanisms of nationalism (“post apartheid 
project”). 
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2.3.2 Definition 
Xenophobia, also described as “new racism” or “cultural racism” must not be confused with 
racism, it differs from the latter in that cultural rather than racial differences become the basis of 
exclusion (Crush & Ramachandran) The term “xenophobia” is defined as, “a strong feeling of 
dislike or fear of people from other countries” (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 2006). 
According to the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary xenophobia is a “fear and hatred of 
strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign” (1993). The South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in a joint statement with civil society, defined the 
phenomenon as the “deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (South 
African Human Rights Commission 1998). In the definitions the words, dislike, fear and hatred 
projects a negative attitude towards foreigners. 
For Crush, xenophobia represents highly negative perceptions and discriminatory practises 
against foreigners (non citizens) on the basis of their foreign nationality (2009: 6). Although this 
behaviour affects all categories of foreigners, different migrant groups may have different 
experiences, depending on their status and the degree of thread they present to the in-group. It 
is not a natural response by native populations to the presence of foreigners, rather a social and 
political phenomenon that contributes to the marginalisation of migrant groups in social and 
national settings. The phenomenon is what Crush terms “crucially linked,” to nation-building and 
nationalism, in particular its aggressive form (2009:6).   
According to Harris xenophobia in South Africa is more than a fear or dislike of foreigners, it is 
rather violent activity brought on by intense tension (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 170). Valji concurs 
with Harris’ view that xenophobia is more than the usual explanations and states that, “patterns 
of xenophobic hostility thus constitute a violation of the human rights of a targeted and 
identifiable group that undermines the very values upon which this new democracy is premised” 
(2003: 1). In the light of the violent practise associated with xenophobia in South Africa, Harris 
argues that the dictionary definition of xenophobia be reframed to incorporate practise. 
Xenophobia is more than a fear for foreigners, “it is a violent practise that results in bodily harm 
and damage” (2002: 170). Xenophobic sentiments are certainly not unique to South Africa, it is 
practised all over the world. The distinctiveness of xenophobia in the country however, rests on 
the high levels of intolerance and the widespread hostility in attitudes. 
The demise of apartheid and the rise of the “New South Africa” as a global role player of note 
have seriously influenced migration patterns in the Continent and focused the attention on 
contentious issues such as development, nation building, nationalism and the country’s culture 
of violence. This new developments attracted the attention of prominent scholars (e.g. Harris, 
2000; Palmary; 2002; Valji, 2003; Neocosmos, 2006). These xenophobic related issues are also 
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discussed in popular literature and the media and will form part of the assessment since they 
reflect the opinion of non-academics and ordinary citizens. 
The two authors Bronwyn Harris (Xenophobia: a new pathology for a new South Africa) and 
Nahla Valji (Creating the nation: the rise of violent xenophobia in the New South Africa – 
unpublished masters thesis) produced ground-breaking research on the manifestation of the 
phenomenon in South Africa. Both these authors, cited regularly by researchers in the 
humanities, have done research for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
gaining invaluable experience in the field of xenophobia. Before further exploring the 
contributions of Harris and Valji it is necessary to review some of the more general theories of 
prejudice as background to the various hypotheses and violent manifestation of the 
phenomenon in South Africa. Xenophobia is not only explained in terms of social and economic 
factors, a psychological explanation for instance, that supplements the sociological approach, 
was introduced by Tshitereke (Harris, 2002: 171). 
2.3.3 Theories of prejudice 
Central to theories of prejudice is the identification with groups and the influence of group 
membership on the identity of the individual. Social psychologist Henri Tajfel, principal 
proponent of the social identity theory, argues that people build their identities from their own 
group membership. People have an inbuilt tendency to categorise themselves into one or more 
in-groups, developing a part of their identity on the basis of membership of that specific group 
and enforcing boundaries with other groups (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971: 149-178). 
Social identity theory suggests that people relate to groups in such a way as to maximise 
positive distinctiveness with groups, offering both identity and self-esteem. Positive social 
identity can be achieved by comparing the in-group with a relevant out-group. This will lead to a 
derogation of the out-group. The theory assumes that inter-group comparisons are related to 
the degree of someone’s in-group identification – the higher the importance of the in-group for 
the members, the stronger the inter-group differentiation will be (Tajfel et al., 1971). 
Dimensions of social identity commonly experienced, such as class, gender, political affiliation 
and ethnicity also presents “psychosocial fault lines” as is evident in contemporary political 
discourse on inequality and diversity (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 139). The theory provides a 
persuasive psychopathological explanation for the manifestation of social groups and the nature 
of relations between them (Hook & Eagle, 2002: 139). Based on a series of experimental 
studies Tajfel concludes that in-group chauvinism reflects intrinsic individual needs for positive 
self-identity, claiming that categorisation alone, even when allocated arbitrarily, may be 
sufficient to create awareness of membership in separate and distinct groups (1978: 35). 
According to Ellison and de Wet the psychopathological manifestation of social identity depends 
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upon the, “essentialisation of in-group chauvinism, ethnicised conflict and unbridled competition 
evident in the authentication of social identities as racialised ethnic categories” (Hook & Eagle, 
2002: 147). 
Tajfel and others have shown support for the idea that people are willing to see their group as 
better in some way than other groups. Tajfel replicated his experiment with a variation to prove 
that his findings were reliable. The theory also helps to explain a wide range of social 
phenomena such as the role of patriotism (manifested for instance as chauvinism) as a 
predictor of xenophobia. Not all forms of patriotism necessarily lead to out-group derogation. 
People can also gain a positive social identity (Mummendey, Klink & Brown, 2001: 160). The 
social identity theory, although a major contributor to understanding group dynamics, does not 
take into account other factors that might be influencing behaviour. The theory doesn’t explain 
why there are individual differences in the level of prejudices shown.  
Lincoln Quillian argues that the focus on individual characteristics and relations omits an 
important source of dominant-group prejudice namely the perception by the dominant group that 
an outside group threatens their group’s prerogatives (1995: 586). This view is an expansion on 
Blumer’s description of prejudice as a response to threats to established group privileges, which 
are not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members (1958: 3-7). Quillian 
proposes that collective threat is a function of the numerical size of the subordinate group in 
relation to the dominant group and economic circumstances. From a group threat point of view 
prejudice is conceptualised as a largely collective phenomenon in which inter-group relations 
affect individual attitudes. 
Theories of racial prejudice are characterised by their individual and group affiliation. Literature 
on individual-level theories of racial prejudice distinguishes between: social-psychological 
approaches, studies of individual correlates of prejudice and self-interest based theories 
(Quillian, 1995: 587). According to Quillian none of these theories provide a complete 
explanation of prejudice. They actually do little to explain the variations in prejudice across 
different regions and time periods (1995: 588). Prejudice causes the most damage when a 
dominant national or racial group institutionalises discrimination. This reasoning is evident in the 
works of Harris and Valji, where in the South African context, the manifestation of prejudice into 
nationalism and nation building give rise to institutionalised discrimination against perceived 
thread from “the other”. 
A core assumption of the social identity theory is that people generally view themselves and the 
groups to which they belong in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986: 7 – 24). Since national 
belongingness can contribute to a person’s identity, it can be assumed that if people identify as 
a member of their nation they attempt to evaluate favourably the nation to which they belong. 
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Positive feelings towards one’s in-group, when expressed as nationalism may directly contribute 
to out-group rejection, even hostility. Rupert Brown in an article titled Nationalism and 
patriotism: National identification and out-group rejection, asks the question whether positive 
feelings towards one’s own nation is acceptable or whether they should be regarded as harmful 
and avoidable (2001:160). He attempts to address the question by investigating the social 
psychological background of an association between a positive evaluation of one’s own nation 
and rejection of foreigners. 
To understand the desirability of a positive feeling towards one’s own nation on the one hand 
and the derogation of foreigners as a consequence of this feeling on the other hand, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the concepts nationalism and patriotism – or good patriotism 
and bad patriotism (nationalism). The works of Schatz, Staub and Lavine offers a contemporary 
view of this phenomenon. The authors differentiate between blind and constructive patriotism. 
Blind patriotism is defined as “an attachment to country characterised by unquestioning positive 
evaluation, staunch allegiance and intolerance of criticism” (Schatz, Staub & Levine, 1999:151). 
Constructive patriotism on the other hand is defined as “an attachment to country characterised 
by support for questioning and criticism of current group practices that are intended to result in 
positive change” (Schatz et al., 1999). Blind patriotism has a negative connotation evident in 
political disengagement, nationalism, perceptions of foreign threat, superiority attitudes and 
chauvinism whilst constructive patriotism is associated with political involvement – efficiency 
and knowledge. Nationalism, the bad manifestation of patriotism, is inherently related to out-
group derogation, whereas patriotism relates positively to own group, independent of out-group 
derogation, implying feelings of belongingness, responsibility and pride (Brown, 2001: 160). 
Schatz, Staub and Lavine offer valuable insight into inter-group relations and the development 
of patriotic feelings and nationalist tendencies. However, the research also has some limitations. 
Although the samples in their research covered the target area and included a variety of ethnic 
groups, all participants were college students. The inclusion of non-student samples in future 
research will increase the external validity of the present findings. It will also be useful if the 
study can be replicated in other countries than the United States. Additional research to 
generalise more broadly from the present findings and to examine the origins of patriotic 
orientations will enrich the field of study (Schatz et al., 170). Nevertheless, the work of authors 
Schatz, Staub, Lavine and Brown contributes significantly to understanding the violent 
manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa, why Harris termed the phenomenon as pathology. 
The preceding review of theories and hypotheses that influence xenophobic behaviour provides 
background for investigating the phenomenon in the South African context, serving as a 
theoretical framework for the works of contemporary authors such as Harris, Valji, Crush and 
others. 
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2.3.4 Xenophobia in the South African context 
Hypotheses of xenophobia 
Harris describes xenophobia based on three hypotheses, namely, the “scapegoating 
hypothesis”, the “isolation hypothesis”, and “the biocultural hypothesis” (2002:170). 
Scapegoating hypothesis 
The scapegoat hypothesis, emerging through sociological theory, locates xenophobia within the 
context of South Africa’s transition from an authoritarian state to a democracy (Harris, 2002: 
171). Heightened expectations are linked to limited resources, unequal distribution of wealth 
and increasing poverty. Expectations are not realised, leaving people disillusioned and 
frustrated. This is ideal circumstance for xenophobia to prosper and for people to create a 
“frustration scapegoat” to blame for their on-going deprivation and poverty (Tshitereke, 1999: 4). 
Tshitereke supplements the sociological interpretation of xenophobia with a psychological level 
of explanation, conceptualising xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation. 
Relative deprivation can be described as a general sense of feeling deprived of something to 
which a person or groups feels entitled to. This in turn leads to feelings of frustration and 
resentment (Pillay, 2008: 12). There is a close link between the relative deprivation and the 
social identity theory in the sense that both theories rest on social comparison. This inevitably 
leads to the derogation of the out-group, which in this thesis represents the Zimbabweans at De 
Doorns in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. 
Isolation hypothesis 
The isolation hypothesis has “foreignness” at the heart of hostility towards people from foreign 
countries. It views xenophobia as a consequence of the country’s seclusion from the 
international community, brought on by apartheid (Harris, 2002:172). During the isolation period 
foreigners represented the unknown to South Africans. With the opening of the country’s 
borders during the transition period, South Africans were brought in direct contact with 
foreigners – the unknown. This interaction between South Africans and the unknown creates 
space for possible hostility. According to Morris, “when a group has no history of incorporating 
strangers it may find it difficult to be welcoming” (1998: 1125). His research with Congolese and 
Nigerians reveals that inadequate education and the isolation of South Africans during apartheid 
explains the hostility towards foreigners. Intolerance towards foreigners is ascribed to the 
creation of strict boundaries between citizens as well as between South Africans and other 
countries. 
According to Barbali the isolation hypothesis is flawed in that it assumes that South Africans did 
not have contact with the unknown. She states: 
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This hypothesis is arguably flawed in that it assumes that South Africans did not have contact 
with people of different races or ethnicities until 1994, creating the idea of absolute enslaving by 
the colonial and apartheid governments. My research participants explained xenophobia in 
South Africa as being caused by the isolation of the apartheid period. Apartheid did however 
create powerful ideologies of difference and promoted stereotypes and it is possible that this 
has encouraged a biased/ stereotyped perception of foreigners as criminals and carriers of 
disease. The particular model of Mouride migration found among Senegalese migrants in Port 
Elizabeth, which emphasises tolerance and cosmopolitanism, has meant that Senegalese have 
not been the targets of migrant stereotyping by local people who generally perceive Senegalese 
migrants positively (Barbali, 2009: 21). 
It must also be acknowledged that the isolation hypothesis does not explain why the unknown 
produces anxiety and why this automatically results in aggression (Harris, 2000: 173). 
Biocultural hypothesis 
The biocultural hypothesis explains xenophobia in terms of the visible “otherness” of foreigners. 
Physical biological characteristics and cultural differences such as bearing, skin colour, clothing 
styles and inability to speak an indigenous language are markers that promote xenophobia 
between nationals and foreigners, indicating whom to target (Harris, 2000:173). Even the 
contrast in skin colour serves to categorise people in South Africa, with persons with a lighter 
skin associated with socio-economic privilege and a darker skin with criminality and poverty 
(Valji, 2003: 16). According to Barbali, Senegalese dress in casual western style clothing which 
makes them not visibly different, contributing to their positive experiences as migrants in Port 
Elizabeth (2009: 21). 
Although these theories and hypotheses provide insight into xenophobia they do not explain 
why black foreigners as the out-group excite violence and hatred in South Africa. For Harris the 
answer lays in the manner in which the phenomenon is represented by social institutions such 
as the media and in the mechanisms of nationalism (2002: 175). 
 
 
Media representation of xenophobia 
The revival of democracy since the mid 1990s and consequent liberation- and expansion of 
media influence in Africa led to an increase of journalism and its potential to play a democratic 
role on the Continent. Professionalism, development- and civic journalism approaches of the 
media all describe the democratic role of journalists in a different way. Earlier theories however, 
possess some limitations in relation to their application (with some elements catering for first 
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world- and others for third world circumstances) and rapidly changing technology. A theory, 
relevant to South Africa in a Third World milieu – to suit the new democratic challenges, was 
needed. Berger filled the gap with a theory of four ideal roles of democratic journalism that 
incorporates most of the political – democratic functions found in the other theories (Berger, 
2000: 81-99). 
In their liberal role, journalists act as protectors of citizen rights and as watchdog over 
government. Journalists, in their social democratic role fulfil a guide-dog function as neutral 
educators instead of political agents. In this role journalists encourage the public to be informed 
and knowledgeable. This role links with development journalism in the sense that it provides 
educational information to redirect social backwardness and promote development goals 
(Barratt, 2006: 44). The neo-liberal role involves the journalist as neutral referee or mirror of 
society with a democratic duty to diversity and pluralism. Journalists challenge prejudice and 
offer alternatives to their audiences (Barratt, 2006: 45). In exercising their participatory role 
journalists encourage the participation of civil society, also embracing the non-elite and the 
uninformed (Barratt, 2006: 44-45). 
With regard to reporting on the xenophobic attacks in South Africa the question can be asked 
weather journalists are neutral, unbiased, informative and unprejudiced? 
According to Crush current media discourse contributes to the set of stereotypes of foreigners in 
the country (2000; 109). The media do not only disseminate information to the public but also 
reproduce ideologies and discourses that support specific relations of power, creating and 
informing perceptions in the process (Smith, 2010: 2). Important is the manner in which 
perceptions are created. The way in which information is framed and presented to the public is 
of paramount significance. Various newspaper reports quoted by Harris (2002:175) represent 
the Continent and African people in a derogatory and negative manner, divorcing South Africa 
from the rest of Africa and linking Africans to chaos, disorder and criminality. Media articles are 
crafted in such a way that the African foreigner is profiled as a disease, threatening the South 
African society. According to Crush (as cited in Smith 2010:2), “several research studies have 
shown how the media has actually reproduced xenophobic language and statements, time and 
time again. The media has certainly been complicit in encouraging xenophobic attitudes among 
the nation”. A research report by the Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the 
Witwatersrand titled, May 2008 violence against foreign nationals in South Africa: 
Understanding causes and evaluating responses, states that the media played an important, if 
unintentional role in triggering/ influencing violence in areas such as Masiphumelele, Du Noon 
and Diepsloot. Respondents in these affected areas believe that the violence was triggered by 
what people learned in the media about attacks in other areas (Misago, Monson & Polzer, 2010: 
175). Media coverage of xenophobia and xenophobic violence in the post-2008 period will be 
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discussed in Chapter 4. The analysis will focus on media coverage of the De Doorns case as 
well as the perceived 2010 World Cup violence. With regard to De Doorns, regional newspapers 
such as Cape Times, Argus, Die Burger, local community newspapers – Worcester Standard 
and Valleier and the reporting of community radio station, Valley FM were studied. 
In a country where racist language is considered illegal, xenophobic stereotyping and imagery 
produced by the media seem perfectly acceptable. Media analyses  is a critical first step to 
address the problem but needs to be followed up with systematic and coordinated education for 
journalists and editors (Crush, 2009: 82). Although journalists are confronted by complex 
challenges in a new democracy, irresponsible reporting damages the media’s attempts to 
advance the democracy in terms of Berger’s four ideal roles of democratic journalism and put 
media freedom at risk. It also strengthens the case of proponents of the dreaded secrecy bill. It 
can also be argued that the effect of the post-apartheid project is clouding journalists’ 
judgement and serves as reason for not performing their democratic role to the fullest extent. 
Xenophobia as pathology 
Although the hypotheses identified by Harris provide reasons for xenophobia they do not 
interrogate the term itself. To better understand the phenomenon it is also necessary to 
consider the social relations and identities that are reproduced in the term itself (Harris, 2002: 
177). The way xenophobia is represented in the media is important. In media headlines quoted 
by Harris two striking features emerged. Firstly xenophobia is presented as something negative 
and unwanted that must be eradicated from South African society. Secondly the term is 
described with the same language and images that are used to describe foreigners in 
xenophobic language (Harris, 2002: 178). Just as the media derogates African foreigners, 
xenophobia is projected as a contaminant in the South African society. Pathologised by 
metaphors of “disease”, “floods” and “laager mentality” in the media, xenophobia is portrayed as 
something abnormal and unhealthy, separate from the normal, healthy South Africa. Harris 
states: 
By pathologising xenophobia, the phenomenon is effectively quarantined from the healthy New 
South Africa; it is isolated from the ideals that comprise the discourse. Similarly, the 
pathologising of xenophobia serves the African Renaissance discourse. This discourse 
underplays nationalism and does not allow for hostility towards African foreigners. As pathology, 
xenophobia is neatly separated from the healthy objectives of the African Renaissance. 
Xenophobia is represented as pathology and something to be cured to guarantee the 
harmonious co-existence of the New South Africa and the South African Renaissance. 
Culture of violence 
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Since xenophobic behaviour is not unique to South Africa, what then distinguishes such 
practices? To understand the complexities around the manifestation of xenophobia in South 
Africa, the country’s “culture of violence” offers some insight. During the years of apartheid 
social interaction was governed through violent means. In an authoritarian situation where 
political rights were suppressed, resistance was met with violent retribution. This practice 
resulted in the “legitimisation” of violence in the country and although violence is no longer of a 
political nature in contemporary South Africa, the legacy of apartheid according to Harris, 
normalised the phenomenon (2000: 180). In South Africa a situation developed where the use 
of violence has become almost normal behaviour instead of deviant, where violence is regarded 
as an acceptable response in managing conflict and achieving justice and material goals (Valji, 
2003:15). Apartheid has set the course for a culture of violence in South Africa and although the 
form of violence may have changed from political to criminal, violence is still practised as the 
dominant means to solve problems in South Africa and as such has been normalised as a 
legacy of apartheid (Harris, 2002:180). It is against this background of violence that xenophobia 
in South Africa must be conceptualised. 
However, it must be mentioned that at the time of this research (De Doorns case study) the 
country already celebrated 17 years of apartheid free democracy. Model C (former white racial 
group) schools in the Breede Valley Region for instance are almost totally integrated. In De 
Doorns where the youth were confronted about their allegiance towards countries that 
harboured and supported South Africans during the apartheid years, it was clear that not even 
the mention of what apartheid did to people could persuade them to welcome the displaced 
Zimbabweans back into their communities. Although the isolation caused by apartheid definitely 
contributed towards creating “the other,” after 17 years of democracy the question can be 
asked, to what extent the phenomenon can be held responsible for the present-day culture of 
violence? Since the end of apartheid there have been numerous opportunities where South 
Africans associated with foreign nationals from Africa on a wide variety of issues, at different 
levels of society. Another possible consequence of apartheid, contributing to a culture of 
violence is the effect that the struggle left on the psyche of people. Young people were 
confronted by issues such as liberation before education and forced into civil disobedience, 
even violence by desperation and the promise of a free South Africa. For many, liberation did 
not result in a better life and the struggle for economic survival continues. It can be argued that 
people, even today, are plagued by their violent protest that was forced on them by apartheid 
and are enticed into using violence means to serve their purpose. It can be argued that the 
system corrupted both the oppressor, who exerted power and violence to maintain apartheid 
and the oppressed that were forced to use civil disobedience and violence to defeat apartheid. 
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Both mechanisms of fostering the nation-building concept prioritising According to Valji the myth 
of the “Rainbow Nation” (with violence conveniently side-lined) has a top-down approach, 
presenting a myth of peace that attempts to reconcile the in-group while setting them up against 
the “other.” Valji quotes Gronin as writing that: 
“Allowing ourselves to sink into a smug rainbowism will prove to be a terrible betrayal of the 
possibilities of real transformation, real reconciliation and real national unity that are still at play 
in our contemporary South African reality.” 
2.3.5 Conclusion 
In this section xenophobia is defined and explained in terms of what is generally understood by 
the phenomenon as well as its violent manifestation in the South African context. Since 
xenophobia is sensitive to group dynamics and the harbouring of feelings of prejudice, a 
theoretical explanation of the different theories of prejudice that impact on the phenomenon 
followed the definition. The different hypotheses of xenophobia, grouped by Harris into the 
scapegoating hypothesis, the isolation hypothesis and the biocultural hypothesis offer different 
levels of explanation of xenophobia within contemporary South Africa. 
Xenophobia in South Africa cannot be fully comprehended without referring to its violent nature. 
To understand why African people are targeted and explain the violent expression of 
xenophobia it is necessary to refer to what is termed the post-apartheid project, explaining 
xenophobia as pathology in terms of the “New South Africa” and “Renaissance” discourses. 
2.4 DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION 
The research problem focused the research on literature that explain the concept of 
development (communication), its evolution and application in the present South African 
context. First development is defined and explained in terms of its process and outcomes, 
followed by a historical snapshot of community communication – the move away from 
modernisation, to embrace participatory communication, with specific reference to the role of 
local government. 
2.4.1 Development 
The concept of development has undergone significant change since the end of the Second 
World War. The works of scholars such as Melkote, Steeves, Kingsbury, Remenyi, McKay and 
Hunt were consulted in gaining a background and explaining the paths by which development 
has come to be understood as a people-centred process, intimately linked to governance 
issues. This review focuses on the evolution of development based on the principal that people 
seek a better life. In this regard according to Kingsbury et al. development has a service role to 
ensure that the importance of good governance and human rights issues be maintained and 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
utilised to entrench poverty alleviation on the development agenda (2004: 22). This service role 
of development is central in the current xenophobia discourse in South Africa where 
government is accused of failing communities in service delivery, giving rise to frustration that 
boils over in xenophobic behaviour. 
Considering the central role of people in contemporary development thinking, the concept can 
be defined as, “a process of growth towards self-reliance and contentment by which individuals, 
groups and communities obtain the means to be responsible for their own livelihoods, welfare 
and future” (Kingsbury et al., 2004:25). Although development means different things to different 
people and relatively few studies of development communication bother to define the concept, 
Melkote and Steeves support the notion that development means improving the living conditions 
of society (2003: 34). Development as a vehicle to improve the lives of people at grassroots 
level however, was not acknowledged by modernisation and its investment driven development 
strategies. In Africa economic thought was moulded along the concept that every person had a 
right to food, shelter, clothing and protection. It was rooted in the norm that “what happens to 
one, happens to all.”  The work of society as Africans understood it was organised to be done 
jointly. According to Mutharika this practise still forms the foundation of the African civil society 
today and should constitute the basis of development initiatives (1995: 9). Colonialism and its 
modernisation ally maintained that Africans are incapable of ruling themselves and could 
therefore not develop any economic thought. For Mutharika the answer for Africa’s 
underdevelopment lies in, “the theory of collective self-reliance through economic co-operation 
on a regional basis (1995: 14). The establishment of democracy in South Africa in 1994 placed 
great emphasis on development, with initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) catering for the basic needs of people at grassroots level. 
Development (empowerment) of third world countries in the post-Second World War period up 
to the 1970s was viewed as synonymous with economic development. The welfare of the 
people of recipient states was neglected in favour of economic growth, arising from the transfer 
of technology from advanced areas to technologically and economically underdeveloped areas 
(Kingsbury et al., 2004: 25). The focus on basic needs in development planning resulted in 
renewed emphasis being given to programmes providing basic needs to the poor in rural 
communities. Unfortunately increased priority to basic needs in development planning 
deteriorated into the rhetoric of welfare (defining the needs of the poor in welfare terms) which 
diverted the attention from boosting the productivity of impoverished communities. Policies 
directed at the poor portrayed a paternalistic attitude, obscuring the truth, confusing charity with 
development assistance, education with knowledge and poverty with ignorance (Kingsbury, 
2004: 33). At the beginning of the development decade of the 1970s development was still 
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paternalistic and elitist orientated, side-lining poor people from the process that was supposed 
to benefit them – reducing them to second-class citizens in their own countries of birth. 
 During the 13 years Robert McNamara served as president of the World Bank, 1968-1981 the 
importance of placing poverty reduction at centre stage in development gained some 
momentum (Kingsbury, 2004:31). It is only since 1980 that the link between poverty and 
development received the explicit attention of development practitioners and mainstream 
academic literature. Role players now realise the value of participatory development in planning, 
problem solving and program implementation (Kingsbury, 2004:26). 
2.4.3 Community participation – a South African perspective 
Since the thesis focuses on the link between development communication and xenophobia in 
the South African context the following section will briefly discuss the different phases of the 
development of community participation in South Africa on the basis of relative literature. 
A largely dormant pre - 1976 period was followed by an active 1977-1983 period, with the death 
of political activist Steve Biko in September 1977, signalling the need for community 
organisation and mobilisation at grassroots level as well as community control with the 
emphasis on “power to the people.” During this period the United Democratic Front (UDF) was 
established to mobilise the community against the apartheid regime – giving a voice to the 
people (Williams, 2006:199). 
During the 1984-1989 period, the involvement of communities in the struggle against “apartheid” 
gained momentum with international cultural and sports boycotts contributing to accelerated 
change. Media such as Bush Radio in Cape Town also contributed to the struggle putting 
pressure on government. This pressure on government by civil society activism during the 
1980s (Horwitz, 2001:4) led to the legalisation of liberation movements and the beginning of 
consensual politics of negotiation during the period 1990-1994. These negotiations resulted in 
the drafting of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994 and the 1996 
Constitution of South Africa. The former was the result of community participation and the latter 
entrenched the public’s right to participate in local government planning (Williams, 2006:199). 
The 1996-2000 period and beyond is characterised by the establishment of various types of 
development partnerships and the promulgation of legislature that promote public participation, 
emphasising local government’s role as implementing agent. 
Since the establishment of democracy in South Africa local government has undergone far 
reaching change. The country’s second democratic election held on 5 December 2000 has 
ended the transition phase of post-apartheid local government and initiated a new era in 
municipal governance, generally referred to as developmental local government.  Local 
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authorities are now expected to play an increasingly prominent role in growth and political 
emancipation in South Africa. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 
recognises local government as the “key site of delivery and development” which is central to 
the “entire transformative project of post-apartheid South Africa” (RSA, 2005). 
Since a case study offers a new (fresh) perspective on a subject and because of the restricted 
scope of a 50% thesis an extended account of the development of community participation in 
the local government context is not feasible. However, it is important to explain local 
government’s developmental obligation in terms of the relevant legislation that regulates 
community participation, the cornerstone of developmental local government. 
The essence of the new democracy is the right of the citizenry to participate in governance. The 
Constitution of South Africa provides for democratic and accountable government for local 
communities and encourages the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
matters of local government (RSA, 1996). In terms of Section 152(1) of the Constitution local 
government must strive towards achieving the following objectives: 
• To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities 
• To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner 
• To promote social and economic development 
• To promote a safe and healthy environment, and 
• To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government 
From the above discussion it is clear that meaningful developmental local government cannot 
be achieved in the absence of community participation.   
Complementing the constitutional obligations, the Municipal Systems Act (Section 16 (1)) 
stipulates that municipalities “must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements 
former representative government with a system of participatory governance” (RSA, 2000). 
Communities, according to the Act have the right to contribute to the municipality’s decision-
making processes. Section 6 (2a) guarantees that the administration of a municipality must, “be 
responsive to the needs of the local community” (RSA, 2000).  Article 17 of the Act allows for 
local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality (RSA, 2000). The White Paper 
on Local Government provides for municipalities to develop mechanisms to ensure citizen 
participation. It stipulates that citizens must participate in the development of policy and the 
monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and its implementation (RSA, 1998a). Of special 
significance is the provision in the Systems Act that makes it compulsory for communities to 
participate in the formulation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). Section 23 (1) (b) 
stipulates that municipalities must undertake developmentally orientated planning to give effect 
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to its developmental duties as required by section 153 of the Constitution (RSA, 2000). Other 
legislation such as the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 and the Municipal Property 
Rates Act, 2004 also make provision for local authorities to consult with communities. 
The above legal framework does not only guide and protect the right of communities to 
participate in local government. It also makes provision for the involvement of local communities 
in the development, implementation and review of the municipalities’ Performance Management 
System. The Municipal Systems Act highlights the importance of communities to be involved in 
the development of the municipalities’ key performance areas and to assist in the setting of 
performance targets for municipalities. The foregoing explanation illustrates local government’s 
pivotal role in the advancement of participatory governance, highlighting the importance of 
community participation in realising developmental goals. 
In explaining xenophobia, its meaning and reasons for its violent manifestation, popular sources 
complimented academic sources. Media reports, articles in journals, research reports and case 
studies were explored for their contemporary value. Case studies assisted with the how and 
why of the xenophobic attacks, offering an in depth view of the causes, triggers and relations 
associated with the violent manifestation of the phenomenon in South Africa. It also informs the 
present discourse on violence in the country offering practical insight into the problem. Eleven 
case studies on the conditions and causes of the 2008 violence conducted by the Forced 
Migration Studies Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand were reviewed (2010: 48-
164). The case studies also include sites that were not affected by the violence. The following 
case studies were analysed: Itireleng and Atteridgeville in Pretoria, Diepsloot and Sectors 11 
and V of Alexandra in Johannesburg, Ramaphosa and Madelakufa 1 and 11 in Ekurhuleni, 
Masiphumelele and Du Noon in the Western Cape and Motherwell in the Eastern Cape. The 
Atlantic Philanthropies Report: South African Civil Society and Xenophobia, analysed 14 case 
studies written by some of South Africa’s leading social and political scientist as well as civil 
society activists offering a balanced view of the phenomenon (2010). 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
In this section development communication, its evolution and application in the South African 
context is explained. A historical perspective is offered, tracing the stages of development 
communication from modernisation, the critical aspects of development, the First Development 
Decade with its persuasion biases (communicating innovations by destroying traditional life in 
the Third World countries), to participatory communication involving beneficiaries in decision 
taking. It also offers insight into the development of community participation in South Africa and 
profile the most important legislation that impact on community participation. 
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After attaining democracy government opted for a developmental path for South Africa to 
redress the imbalances of the past. The third tier of government was entrusted with the 
responsibility to champion economic and social development in South Africa in partnership with 
communities, civil society and business, to improve service delivery and address the real needs 
of communities. To fully appreciate the participatory approach to development communication 
and local government’s role as implementing agent it is important to trace the evolution of 
development communication from its the modernistic top-down approach of industrialisation to 
participatory communication that embrace people, consult them, make them part of governance. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Living in South Africa and working for local government can be a rewarding but bitter-sweet 
experience. Progressing from the dark days of apartheid where the oppression of the majority 
and a total disregard of human rights were the order of the day, South African society has 
entered an era of hope with high expectations of a better life for all. Local government, 
champion of delivery in the New South Africa, has the challenging task to transform 
expectations into feasible outcomes. 
Although political liberation of the masses was obtained, the social and economic realities of 
apartheid continue to haunt South Africans with many still living under the poverty line. 
According to Gordon, economic uncertainties give rise to internal struggles in society, “over the 
rights of access and the processes of redistribution of economic resources” (2010: 5). Limited 
access to economic resources creates frustration which in turn, due to unfulfilled expectations 
following the political emancipation of South Africa, triggers xenophobic violence. The above is 
in line with Tshitereke’s view that, 
In the post-apartheid epoch, while people’s expectations have been heightened, a realisation 
that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and indignation are at their peak. 
People are more conscious of their deprivation than ever before… This is the ideal situation for 
a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root and flourish. South Africa’s political transition to 
democracy has exposed the unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the country (1999: 
4). 
This statement, made in 1999, even today captures the essence of the problem, namely the 
creation of expectations and an inability to deliver. Local government in terms of policy and 
legislation is at the coalface of development, entrusted with the responsibility to turn around the 
plight of the poor through participatory communication (involving communities in governance) 
and the implementation of development and service delivery programmes. Literature on 
reasons for xenophobia identifies local government as key to resolving the matter. In order to 
complement the existing body of knowledge on the reasons for xenophobic violence and to 
determine local government’s possible share in triggering xenophobia, the author opted to 
research the case of De Doorns in the Western Cape of South Africa. The De Doorns case is 
unique in terms of locality and scope in relation to the 2008 attacks which occurred mostly in the 
urban areas of the country. In this sense, the study may also contribute to the identification of 
new trends. In comparison with Alexandra in Johannesburg where 300 people were displaced in 
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2008, 3 000 of an estimated 8 000 Zimbabweans living in the small rural community of De 
Doorns were displaced during the attacks on 14 and 17 November 2009. In a small rural town 
with a permanent population of approximately 13 000 the magnitude of the problem can be 
appreciated. 
Of significance is the local municipality’s approach to its developmental mandate, the impact of 
the phenomenon on the finances and infrastructure of the area, the interplay between 
government institutions, and government and community, the effect of NGOs on the 
reintegration process, the presence of labour brokers and the reaction of the local community, 
especially the principal employer in the area, namely the Hex Valley Table Grape Association, 
as well as the sports fraternity and the Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square communities 
from where the violence originated. 
Although there are some similarities between the De Doorns case and the country-wide 
outbreak of xenophobia in 2008, like the violent nature of the attacks and the state of poverty in 
affected areas, there are also wide-ranging differences. The setting of the attacks, in the rural 
community of De Doorns, is vastly different from the incidents during May 2008, which 
predominantly took place in urban areas. While the impact of the violence in urban areas was 
restricted to a specific neighbourhood, the violence experienced in Stofland in De Doorns 
affected the whole of civil society in De Doorns. Although the extent of the violence in De 
Doorns compared favourably with many of the bigger settlements in the metros during the 2008 
xenophobia, the Breede Valley Municipality had to cope with far less resources, which added to 
the pressures facing the local government. 
3.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The research problem and units of analysis determined the methodology and the appropriate 
mode of observation. Traditionally evaluation methods have been divided into two broad 
families – quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative, following the scientific method is rooted 
in the positivist tradition. It favours quantitative analysis to measure the results of an intervention 
accurately and scientifically. The qualitative mode argues that human nature is to complex and 
unpredictable to be measured in strict quantitative terms. It is therefore grounded in a different 
epistemological perspective based on an approach that values the social construction of reality. 
According to the qualitative perspective, social change needs to be measured from the 
individual’s perception and point of view, rather than from the numbers of project outputs, which 
are often incapable of accounting for the richness and complexity of social dimensions such as 
empowerment, freedom and happiness. According to Leedy the methodology is quantitative if 
the data is numerical and qualitative if the data is verbal (Du plooy, 1997: 33). Although 
according to Babbie the difference between the two types of research is measurement and 
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interpretation, Leedy points out that the nature of the data and the problem for research dictate 
the research methodology (1997: 33).  The creative and open-ended nature of qualitative 
research makes it harder to be as precise about how to gather and interpret as quantitative 
research allows. In qualitative research, there are fewer strict rules to determine whether its 
being done appropriately or whether the data are being interpreted correctly (Babbie, 
1998:299).  
The study adopted qualitative research methodology for its analytic and interpretive advantages 
in an attempt to determine to what extent local government exercised its developmental 
mandate in dealing with the civil unrest in the De Doorns case. The study set out to determine 
local government’s performance against the backdrop of a specific case, namely the De Doorns 
case in the Breede Valley Region of the Western Cape. 
According to Yin, a case study is an empirical inquiry using multiple sources of evidence to 
investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context (1989: 23-25). A case study 
differs from other studies in the sense that the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident. In the De Doorns case, data collecting techniques included the study of 
documents, in-depth interviews, unstructured interviews and direct observation. 
3.2.1 Documents 
The study of documents provided background on the focus area, highlighting the current reality 
with regard to demographics, social trends, employment trends, basic service provision, 
housing, employment opportunities and levels of poverty. Documents such as council minutes, 
the integrated development plan (IDP), Reintegration Task Committee minutes and internal 
communications (mostly e-mail) assisted in building a picture of the events leading up to the 
attacks, the causes of the outburst, local government involvement in the humanitarian response 
and the reintegration process. From this information a roadmap was constructed that displays 
the course of events in chronological order. Research, monitoring and media reports provided 
valuable information on a variety of aspects such as leading causes and triggers of xenophobic 
attacks, conditions in the camp and the role of labour brokers and NGOs. The study Sour 
Grapes by labour practitioner Jan Theron on indirect employment in the Hex River Valley served 
as a valuable source for the research. A research report by Jean Pierre Misago of the Forced 
Migration Studies Programme (RMSP) titled Violence, Labour and the Displacement of 
Zimbabweans in De Doorns, Western Cape shed valuable light on the causes for the attacks. 
Monitor reports by a team from the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, 
Black Sash and Oxfam also lent valuable insight into the humanitarian response to the violence 
in De Doorns. 
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Permission to access internal resources was obtained from the municipal manager, Mr Allen 
Paulse. 
3.2.2 Field research 
Observation 
Field research is a social research method that involves the direct observation of social 
phenomena in their natural settings (Babbie, 1998:305). In conducting the research, observation 
and in-depth and unstructured interviews were adopted as field research methods. The author 
was involved in the process from the outbreak of the xenophobic violence on 14 November 
2009 to the closing of the safety camp on 17 October 2010, initially in the role of observer-as-
participant and later as participant-as-observer in attending Reintegration Task Team (RTT) 
meetings. During community meetings and visits to the safety camp and affected areas he 
assumed the role of onlooker as observer. 
Although the author was familiar with the BVM representative on the Reintegration Task Team, 
the presence of representatives from various other government institutions and role players 
warranted that rapport be established with the latter. The author was introduced to the Task 
Team by the BVM representative, Mr. Manfred van Rooyen, and the necessary permission was 
gained to observe the activities of the Committee. In his role as observer, the author observed 
the following activities: 
• Meetings of the first multi-sector Xenophobia Crisis Committee established directly after 
the xenophobic incidents 
• Meetings of the multi-sector RTT which replaced the Xenophobia Task Team 
• Meetings of the Reintegration Committee that replaced the Reintegration Task Team 
• Meetings of the Breede Valley Municipal Council 
• Stofland ward committee meeting 
• Stofland community meeting 
• Members (producers / farmers) of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association 
• Meeting of Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana and De Doorns community 
• Meetings with the Board of Directors of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) 
• Meetings of Operation Check-Out 
• Meetings with the Zimbabwean camp committee. 
In addition to attending and observing meetings, permission was gained from the Reintegration 
Task Team to visit the camp site where the activities of the displaced and the mood in the camp 
as well as the security and camp conditions were observed. 
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Interviews 
Interviews are qualitative tools to gain knowledge or to probe specific issues. The value of the 
methodological tool is that it can be structured in different ways. It can be in the form of free 
discussions around a specific topic. It can be in-depth discussions with specialists in their fields 
of knowledge or it can be semi-structured discussions with a pre-determined list of questions for 
open –ended and closed ended questions providing answers that are easier to analyse, 
compare and contrast. Since the study focuses on local government’s developmental 
responsibility and its performance in managing xenophobic situations it was decided to 
concentrate the fieldwork on the contributions of government officials who spearheaded the De 
Doorns case. It was decided not to re-invent the wheel by conducting surveys and focus group 
discussions on the reasons for xenophobia but rather to observe developments and obtain the 
views of key individuals who were not only involved in managing the xenophobic situation at De 
Doorns, but who also distinguished themselves in community work. In addition to observing the 
process (attending meetings and visiting the safety sight and affected communities) and 
reviewing correspondence, minutes of meetings and reports compiled by various organisations, 
semi-structured in-depth interviews as well as unstructured interviews were adopted in the De 
Doorns study which stretched over a period of eleven months. 
The interviewing process guided by Babbie’s description (1998: 292), included the following 
stages: First the purpose of the interviews and the concepts: xenophobia, developmental local 
government and development communication, to be explored, were clarified. The process to 
accomplish the purpose of the interviews, including ethical considerations was then finalised, 
followed by the actual interviews. The interviews were tape-recorded and the data transcribed. 
The information was then analysed, determining its meaning in relation to the purpose of the 
study. The reliability and validity of the information were checked by comparing the content of 
the different interviews and by cross-checking it against municipal documentation, minutes of 
the Reintegration Task Team and notes made during the interviews and observations. 
3.2.3 Key research participants 
Since the purpose of the study was to evaluate local government’s performance in exercising its 
developmental mandate with regard to the De Doorns case, it was decided to focus the 
research on the contributions of government officials serving on the Reintegration Task 
Committee. The participants in the in-depth interviews were from various spheres of 
government representing the Breede Valley Municipality, the Department of Social 
Development and Provincial Community Development Workers. The following key participants 
were identified for the interviews: 
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• Manfred van Rooyen – Manager: Performance Management System at the BVM. Mr. Van 
Rooyen also served as IDP (Integrated Development Plan) manager at the Breede Valley 
Municipality. At the time of the interview, he was the convenor of the Reintegration Task 
Team. 
• Caesar Sauls – Deputy Director at the Department of Social Development in Worcester. 
Mr. Sauls is an experienced development practitioner who represented the Department at 
the safety sight in De Doorns. 
• Ashraf Kafaar – CDW coordinator for the Cape Winelands District. Mr. Kafaar headed the 
CDW presence at the camp. 
• Elsa Jordaan – Councillor at the BVM and Executive Director of the Hex Valley Table 
Grape Association. Cllr. Jordaan represented the HTA on the Reintegration Task Team. 
All forms of social research raise a wide range of ethical issues. The author informed all 
participants on the purpose of the interviews and that he intended to use the information for his 
Maters degee. The participants gave their permission and agreed that the interviews be 
recorded. Transcriptions of the recordings have been made and discussed with the participants. 
A copy of the recordings is in the possession of the author.  
3.3 CONCLUSION 
A case study, although informed by a theoretical framework in terms of a literary study, is 
predominantly the discovery of exciting new phenomena within their real-life context. Although 
there is sufficient material on the theory of xenophobia, namely the nature, origin, different 
hypotheses and various case studies on the phenomenon in an urban context, relatively little 
research has been done on xenophobic violence in rural communities, especially key 
agricultural areas. Since most of the case studies focus on the perceptions and experiences of 
perpetrators and victims, it was felt that the views from government officials and observations of 
government activities during the humanitarian response to the attacks would provide valuable 
information. Monitor reports of the situation also offered valuable insight. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DE DOORNS CASE STUDY 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
The most striking feature of De Doorns in the Breede Valley of the Western Cape is its scenic 
beauty. Majestic mountains, fertile valleys, vineyards and well-cultivated farms with stately Cape 
Dutch style homesteads captivate the soul. 
De Doorns forms part of the Breede Valley Municipal (BVM) area consisting of the towns of 
Worcester, De Doorns, Rawsonville, Touws River and the Matroosberg rural area. The town lies 
at the centre of the Hex River Valley, geographically bounded by mountains on either side of the 
Hex River, approximately one and a half hours’ drive from Cape Town, just off the N1 and 35 
kilometres from Worcester, the commercial centre of the Breede Valley. The Hex River Valley is 
a self-contained area devoted to the production of a single product, namely table grapes. 
De Doorns, with an estimated population of 13 000 souls, is the biggest producer of table 
grapes (17 million cartons per annum) in the Southern Hemisphere (South African Fruit, 2007), 
offering an estimated 8 000 employment opportunities in peak season. During November, 
preparations for the season begin. December, or groendruiwetyd as it is popularly referred to by 
the locals, is the beginning of the season. This is the most labour-intensive part of the 
production process and entails the removal of underdeveloped berries from the bunch. This is 
done over a period of six weeks. The grapes are then picked and packed over a period of three 
months, finishing towards the end of May. The vineyards are pruned in July/August, making the 
Hex River Valley season one of the longest in the Breede Valley area (Jordaan, 2010). The 
table grape industry and agriculture-related activities are the main economic drivers in the Hex 
Valley area. The HTA (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) represents the farmers in the area. 
All exporters of table grapes are compelled to register with the South African Table Grape 
Industry (SATI) (South African Table). Bordering on De Doorns are three informal settlements, 
namely Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square, located in Ward 2 of the BVM.  
The tranquil rural town is a hive of activity during the harvesting season with thousands of farm 
labourers in the vineyards and on the farms – picking, sorting and packing the juicy berries for 
the export market. However, this idyllic appearance belies a more sinister side of the area and 
its people – a side in sharp contrast with the Municipality’s vision of “a unique and caring Valley 
of service excellence, opportunity and growth”. Poverty, unemployment, political tension, class 
formation and labour inequalities contributed to unbearable frustration which manifested itself in 
xenophobic violence on 14 and 17 November 2009.  
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The population in the area is mixed. Traditionally, it comprised of white farmers and Coloured 
farm workers. Lately, there is also a strong presence of Xhosas and migrants from Lesotho, 
staying in a settlement known as Maseru, as well as a large contingent of Zimbabwean foreign 
nationals. Respondents related that prior to 2007, apart from minor individual conflicts, there 
were no major tension among the different population groups (Jordaan, 2011). The influx of 
Zimbabweans, however, put pressure on the population composition in the area. In addition to 
threatening the dominance of the Coloured and Xhosa population groups, the increase in 
numbers also put employment opportunities under pressure and intensified the struggle for 
scare resources and housing. 
Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square, from where approximately 3000 Zimbabweans were 
displaced, accommodate the poorest of the poor in this “rich” agricultural region. Initially, the 
cause for the outbreak of the violence was identified as employment related and later service 
delivery shortcomings. The reasons, however, are more complex and the incident cannot be 
attributed to only one or two reasons. 
De Doorns represents the first large-scale displacement of foreign nationals since May 2008. 
The context in which the De Doorns case happened is unique in terms of the 2008 outbreak of 
xenophobia. In contrast to mainly densely populated black urban areas the outbreak of 
xenophobic violence in De Doorns spent itself in rural surroundings with a mixed population 
composition. The incidents occurred within three kilometres of the predominantly white town. 
The Zimbabweans work on farms owned by white farmers, alongside predominantly permanent 
and seasonal Coloured workers. After the incident, the internally displaced Zimbabweans were 
accommodated in a safety camp located on a sports field in the town, utilised by mainly 
Coloured and white sportsmen. In contrast to the May 2008 violence, which only subsided after 
two weeks, the unrest in De Doorns took place over a four-day period. The physical attacks 
were launched on two separate days.  
In the De Doorns case, the perpetrators were mainly Xhosas and the victims almost 100% 
Zimbabweans who work as labourers in the agricultural industry, whereas the 2008 attacks 
were directed at all foreign nationals regardless of their nationality, age, gender and categories 
of employment. It is also safe to say that the conflict in De Doorns was not influenced by 
incidents elsewhere. The attacks, informed by its own unique set of dynamics, occurred 18 
months after the 2008 violence.  
Considering the size and capacity of De Doorns, the impact of the violence on resources, 
infrastructure and the economy of the community percentage wise outweighs many of the 
incidents that occurred in the urban areas during the 2008 outbreak. The economies of rural 
farming areas are much more vulnerable to xenophobic activity than those of urban centres. In 
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De Doorns, where labour plays such an important role, labour unrest can severely disrupt the 
local economy and lead to job losses. The capacity of the local government also came under 
severe pressure. The potential economic, social and political effect of protest on municipalities 
cannot be underestimated. 
One aspect that the De Doorns case shares with the others is the violent manifestation of 
protest and xenophobia. The case study explores the circumstances and reasons that 
encouraged the outbreak of xenophobic violence on 14 and 17 November 2009. It focuses on 
the role of the Reintegration Task Team (RTT), the commitment of leadership and local 
government’s developmental obligation to encourage public participation by involving the 
community in governance and the effectiveness thereof. 
4.2 THE VIOLENCE - FIELD OF NIGHTMARES 
The media’s controversial coverage of the 2008 xenophobic attacks and portrayal of foreign 
nationals was severely criticised for being unbalanced and anti-immigrant, even for fuelling 
xenophobia. In an appraisal of contemporary research on the media’s coverage of xenophobia 
and xenophobic violence prior to and including May 2008, Matthew J. Smith (2010: 2) finds that 
the studies have shown that the media has uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and 
statements that encouraged xenophobic attitudes among the population. Tabloid newspapers 
such as the Daily Sun constantly labelled foreign nationals as aliens and repeatedly flagged the 
violence in headlines as war on aliens, fuelling racist prejudices in the process (Harber, 2008: 
1). Media coverage of the violence of communities lashing out at suspected criminals often 
stops just short of celebration (Wasserman, 2008: 1). 
Media reports at the break of the xenophobic attacks in De Doorns, in contrast to 2008, 
provided a balanced view of the events. The word aliens never featured, the victims were 
referred to as Zimbabweans, displaced people, refugees and foreign nationals in a sympathetic, 
unbiased way. The headlines impress upon the reader the horror of the attacks and evoke 
feelings of disgust towards the perpetrators and sympathy for the victims. 
According to a research report produced by the Forced Migration Studies Programme, the 
media played a significant role in influencing violence in townships during the 2008 attacks. 
People tend to react to what they see and read in the media about attacks in other areas 
(Landau, Misago & Polzer, 2010: 176). Since the attacks in De Doorns were launched 
approximately 18 months after the 2008 xenophobic violence, the possible influence of media 
reports can be regarded as minimal or none. Coverage of xenophobic violence in the local 
media during the period May 2008 to November 2009 was almost non-existent. Articles in the 
local community newspaper, Standard, appeared on 22 May 2008 (Smit, 2008), 5 June 2008 
(Schröder, 2008: 2) and 14 August 2008 ( Schröder, 2008: 2). 
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Headlines such as “Hate rocks Cape dorp” (Prince, 2009: 1), “Bid for peace as 2 500 refugees 
forced out of homes” (Prince, 2009: 2) and “My heart is bleeding” (Mjekula, 2009: 1) depict the 
heartbreak, disappointment, lost, hopelessness and extreme violence that characterised the 
incident.     
The caption with a picture in the Argus of 18 November 2009 says “Field of nightmares”, 
brilliantly depicting the gloomy mood of the Zimbabweans in the safety sight at a sports field 
hours after the second attack. 
4.3 EARLY WARNING SIGNS 
“Come Senators, Congressmen 
Please heed the call 
Don’t block at the doorway 
Don’t block up the hall 
For he that gets hurt 
Will be he that has stalled 
There’s a battle outside 
And it’s ragin’” 
With the words of his 1960’s protest song, “The times they are a-changing”, folk singer Bob 
Dylan urges the political elite to listen to the people. Did the Breede Valley heed the call? Were 
there any warning indicators pointing to the possible eruption of xenophobic violence in the Hex 
Valley? De Doorns is not an island; what happens in Worcester, the commercial centre of the 
Breede Valley, will eventually filter down to the Hex Valley and De Doorns area. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to search wider for signs and to include Worcester and the two other 
towns of the BVM, Rawsonville and Touws River, as well as the Matroosberg rural area. With 
regard to Rawsonville and Touws River, no evidence of any service delivery or xenophobia 
related incidents that might have encouraged the De Doorns xenophobic violence, could be 
found. 
In Worcester in the residential areas of Zweletemba and Roodewal, incidents of violence 
against Somali businessmen were recorded. In Roodewal, a Somali shop was ransacked and 
looted in February 2008. On 7 March the same year in the predominantly black township of 
Zweletemba, furious residents vented their anger on Somali shopkeepers. Local SAPS 
spokesperson Captain Mzikayise Moloi passed the incidents off as crime related (Smit, 2008: 
2). In De Doorns, according to Elsa Jordaan, Executive Chairperson of the HTA, minor incidents 
of prejudice against foreigners was detected as early as 2007. During November 2007, a 
blockade of the N1 might easily have spilled over in violence against foreign nationals. Theron 
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quoted a community leader saying that, “Tonight someone has just to say ‘I’ve had enough of 
these Zimbabweans’. A Zimbabwean living here told me ‘We are afraid’” (2009:20). An incident 
in February 2009, when the ex-boyfriend of a Xhosa girl burned down the shack where her 
Zimbabwean lover took refuge, killing eight people, sparked robust police action against “illegal” 
Zimbabweans (Jordaan, 2011). The BVM representative on the RTT, Manfred van Rooyen, 
viewed the incident as a case of social conflict rather than xenophobia related (Van Rooyen, 
2011). There were also incidents of people from Stofland complaining about the housing 
shortages in the informal settlement (Maritz, 2008: 2). On 18 November 2008 protesters from 
Stofland complaining about service delivery blocked the N1 at De Doorns(Fula, 2011). 
According to Misago, it was a known fact that tensions were building up and that meetings were 
held to plan the attacks. However, councillors and the police did not intervene to prevent an 
escalation of the tension into violence (2009). 
Although these indicators did not necessarily trigger the xenophobic attacks in November 2009, 
it can be argued that the Municipality’s failure to address these concerns encouraged the 
residents of the informal settlements to take matters into their own hands. Although the 
executive mayor of the BVM at the time, Cllr. Charles Ntsomi, served for a couple of meetings 
on a forum established in the aftermath of the May 2008 attacks, the BVM failed to react 
proactively on the warning signs (Schröder, 2008: 2). With the exception of some discussions 
with other role players on the issue of xenophobia in the period following the 2008 outbreak 
(Smit, 2008: 2), the research revealed no proof (minutes, programmes, media statements) of 
any action initiated by the Municipality since mid-2008 to publicly denounce xenophobia or to 
sensitise the public around aspects of this phenomenon. Council also failed to implement 
contingency plans to cater specifically for xenophobic violence. Of significance is the station 
commander of SAPS in De Doorns, Supt. Desmond van der Westhuizen’s remark in the media 
that the outbreak of xenophobia was not a once-off incident, but an annual occurrence. He was 
quoted on saying that “it’s a thing with a history” (Xenophobia attack, 2011). This was also the 
case with the attack in 2008. Investigations showed that the violence was not as spontaneous 
as originally thought. It was rather the culmination of a long festering unease and impatience 
with the increasing number of foreigners competing with locals for the same scarce resources. 
The social unrest in De Doorns is not a sudden and unexpected crisis - the signs have been 
there for some time. Even though the local government has been referring to the current 
problems in the Hex River Valley as unexpected, the truth is that it could easily have been 
foreseen. 
Government did not heed the call. 
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4.4 THE CRIME SCENE: THE NATURE AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE 
On Saturday 14 November 2009, the small rural community of De Doorns in the beautiful Hex 
River Valley was stunned by the eruption of xenophobic violence. Attacks in Ekuphumleni 
displaced 68 Zimbabwean nationals – 60 adults and eight children (Gerber, 2009: 1). According 
to Mr Stalin Mkombo, a leader figure in the Zimbabwean community, the trouble began in the 
early hours of Saturday when people who had been drinking at a shebeen (pub) stoned the 
homes of Zimbabweans (Mjekula, 2009: 1). 
On Tuesday, 17 November 2009, the next offensive by locals from the informal settlements 
Stofland and Hasie Square displaced approximately 3 000 Zimbabweans. People were forced 
from their homes and prevented from going to work (Robertson, 2009: 1). The displaced initially 
sought protection at the De Doorns police station and a nearby municipal building. On 18 
November they were moved to a sports field as their numbers increased. 
The attacks in Ekuphumleni were brutal, with residents armed with sticks and stones racing 
through the informal settlement, tearing down shacks as police fired rubber bullets and used 
stun grenades to disperse the crowd (Prince, 2009: 1). On 17 November, scores of locals drove 
out an estimated 3 000 Zimbabweans from Stofland and Hasie Square, accusing them of 
stealing their jobs. Many women with small children were seen walking from Stofland to a 
municipal hall about a kilometre away. “My heart is bleeding”, cried one the mothers whose 
children had nothing to eat since early that morning (Mjekula, 2011: 1). The attacks on 17 
November was not so severe but resulted in wide-scale disruption, robbing Zimbabweans of a 
home and opportunity to earn a living. At a community meeting held on 23 November 2009, the 
displacement of foreign nationals on Tuesday, 17 November 2009 was viewed as justifiable 
eviction from property that belong to community members, rather than a criminal act (Igglesden, 
2009: 6). 
In a migration policy brief prepared for the Forced Migration Studies Programme, Jean Pierre 
Misago relates that, “inconsistent and indecisive responses by the police are another reason 
why many observers, particularly the victims, believe in the complicity of the local authority” 
(2009: 10). According to witnesses, the police acted swiftly and decisively to curb the violence in 
Ekuphumleni on 14 November. Yet, their response on 17 November was ineffective. 
Apparently, the police turned a blind eye to the destruction and looting of property and 
encouraged perpetrators to chase the Zimbabweans away but not to beat anyone (2009).  
Braam Hanekom of the refugee rights organisation PASSOP (People Against Suffering, 
Suppression, Oppression and Poverty) is of the opinion that the police acted too slowly and that 
they could have prevented the eviction of thousands of Zimbabweans by raising their profile 
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over the weekend. Manfred van Rooyen, BVM representative on the RTT, quoting police 
reports, said: 
“It was a peaceful march of Zimbabweans taking their belongings from Stofland. There 
were only 12 structures demolished, not burned down or violently taken down. The 
Zimbabweans with the police monitoring them, walked towards available transport 
almost peacefully leaving the area” (2011). 
This view is in sharp contrast with that of PASSOP and the observations of journalists. 
However, to the credit of the police it must be said that no deaths, rapes and cases of serious 
injury were reported. 
The attacks targeted only the Zimbabwean section of the community notwithstanding the fact 
that people from the Sotho and Coloured racial groups also reside in the affected areas. Two 
shops managed by Congolese and Cameroonian nationals had been closed during the unrest 
but were not looted (Igglesden, 2009: 3). This supports findings that the attacks were targeted. 
Only one case of mistaken identity was reported. Prince Mongwe, a South African citizen from 
Shangaan descent, said he was told that he looks like a Zimbabwean and should leave the 
area. His girlfriend, who speaks Xhosa, probably saved his life but he lost all his possessions in 
the process (Prince, 2009: 1). According to Ashraf Kafaar, Regional Coordinator of the 
Provincial CDW Programme in the Breede Valley and member of the RTT, the reason why 
Sothos were not attacked can be attributed to the fact that the Zimbabweans compete in the 
same market as the locals and are therefore regarded as soft targets (2011). Although some of 
the Sothos also work on the farms their numbers make them less conspicuous. Van Rooyen 
agrees with the view that the contestation for job opportunities is one of the main reasons why 
members of other population groups were not attacked. That is also why he is of the opinion 
that the De Doorns case is not classical xenophobia (2011). While the South Africans deny that 
the evictions are xenophobic, the Zimbabweans insist that xenophobia is the motive (Mjekula, 
2009). 
This section, up to now, identified the scene of the violence, described the intensity of the 
attacks, explained the racial complexity and alluded to the possible complicity of authorities. But 
who are the perpetrators and what do they look like? 
A community meeting held at the Hex Valley People’s Centre on Tuesday, 12 January 2009 
provided valuable insight on the profile of the perpetrators. The meeting was convened to 
persuade the residents of Stofland to allow the Zimbabweans back into the informal settlement. 
At the meeting, for the first time since the outbreak of the violence, another reason other than 
the contestation for scarce resources emerged. After hearing from the floor that the violence 
was also prompted by service delivery issues, Executive Mayor Charles Ntsomi announced 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
48 
 
certain service delivery interventions in Stofland. A contractor had been appointed to install taps 
and sewerage for 577 plots to be financed from a R25 million provincial grant. People from 
Hasie Square and Ekuphumleni who have been living below the flood line for years will now be 
moved to Stofland (Mjekula, 2009: 4). 
At that stage the councillor for Ward 2, Mpumelelo Lubisi, followed by a large contingent of 
predominantly young people, entered the hall. Although chairs were still available, they 
remained as a group at the back. When Cllr. Lubisi walked to the podium, from the cheers at the 
back, is was clear who his supporters were. The mood of the meeting then changed. Everything 
Lubisi said was cheered and when the Mayor, a Home Affairs official and Ms. Monique Ekoko, 
Senior Regional Officer of UNHCR, responded they were heckled and shouted down. There 
was no doubt that this group opposed the reintegration of the Zimbabweans. Ekoko tried to 
impress upon them the moral obligation South Africans have towards Africans who supported 
the country during its struggle for freedom. She was shouted down and the meeting dispersed 
in chaos (Meeting with Stofland community on the reintegration of displaced Zimbabweans, 
2009. Personal observations during meeting of 12 January, Hex Valley People’s Centre). Ekoko 
later remarked that it was significant that the greatest opposition against reintegration came 
from the youth. She said that there is a need for better education on the country’s historic 
connection with African countries (Robertson, 2010: 2). 
Eye witness reports confirm that there was a noticeable presence of youth among the mob that 
chased the Zimbabweans out of the township. Among the 25 people arrested and charged for 
public violence was a 17-year-old boy (Mjekula, 2009). The women led trade union Sikhula 
Sonke whose members were intimidated by young people while staying over in Stofland 
(Pekeur, 2010) also confirmed the involvement of youths in the attacks on 14 and 17 November 
2009. The participation of the youth in leading attacks, engaging with the police, threatening 
people and destroying property is not a new phenomenon but nevertheless a worrisome one. 
Research has shown that many of the youth participating in collective violence are unemployed, 
poor and see no prospect of a change in their circumstances (Von Holdt et al., 2011: 2). 
Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square are certainly no exceptions. 
4.5 CAUSES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF XENOPHOBIA IN DE DOORNS 
South Africa, and De Doorns, is not unique when it comes to harbouring xenophobic feelings. 
Even Switzerland experienced a bout of xenophobia in the 1970s. At the time Swiss 
psychologist Carl Jung put it down to geography. “Mountains tend to restrict the horizons of the 
mind” he once told Time Magazine (“Switzerland, a bout of xenophobia”, 1974). 
According to research there is a clear distinction between discriminatory attitudes against 
foreign nationals, which is a common phenomenon throughout the country, and instances of 
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collective violence, occurring only in specific locations. Although attitudes created by historical 
factors, such as the legacy of apartheid, may inform actions to a certain extent, they do not 
explain why dislike turns into xenophobic violence in certain places at certain times (Misago, 
Monson & Polzer, 2010: 9). This section of the research will focus on the distinctive 
circumstances of De Doorns in determining the causes that prompted discriminatory 
perceptions and attitudes into full-scale collective violence. 
From the onset it is clear that the violence that happened cannot be understood independently 
of the poverty and unemployment in the informal settlements of Ekuphumleni, Stofland and 
Hasie Square. The presence of large-scale poverty and unemployment in these areas 
generates dissatisfaction among the locals, some of who are prepared to do anything, even 
resort to crime and violence to ensure their own survival. 
Poverty and unemployment are not unique to De Doorns. In various case studies these 
characteristics seem to have placed significant emphasis on people’s origins – also in the case 
of De Doorns. According to research conducted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation and the Society, Work and Development Institute: 
“In a context where significant numbers of people have to compete for jobs and opportunities, 
knowing where one’s competitors come from has become important. This is because knowing 
where one’s competitors come from allows for the creation of a polarity between insiders and 
outsiders, which then serves to provide grounds for discrimination” (Von Holdt et al., 2011: 93). 
From all the reasons produced as justification for the violence two main themes emerged. 
According to Van Rooyen, “the main issues are the economic contestation for job opportunities 
during season and the opportunistic element that exploits the issue to further their own aims 
and to contest the 2011 local government elections” (2010). Important aspects to consider 
under contestation for scarce resources is the competition between groups of labour brokers 
operating in the Hex River Valley area and claims of poor service delivery. 
4.5.1 Competition for limited resources 
These sections deals with the claims of South Africans living in the affected communities that 
Zimbabweans steal their jobs and are paid lower wages. Labour practices in the Hex Valley, 
specifically the role of labour brokers in fostering collective violence against Zimbabweans, are 
also addressed. 
Zimbabweans are accused of stealing jobs, working for lower wages and not participating in 
struggles for better working conditions. Most of the media reports reflect on these accusations 
(Mjekula, 2009: 1; Prince, 2009: 2; Gerber, 2009: 1; Robertson, 2009: 1). In responding to the 
claims from local people that there are no jobs, Van Rooyen stated: 
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“Six thousand people, mostly South Africans, are ordinarily employed permanently on the farms 
outside the season. With the commencement of the season 9000 positions become available on 
the farms. In De Doorns the unemployment figure during off season is 40%. The figure for the 
whole of the Breede Valley area varies between 18% and 21%. The new season creates 
expectations of work for these poor people” (2010). 
However, farmers deny claims that there are no job opportunities for locals, maintaining that 
there is enough work for everyone who wants to work during peak season when 17 000 jobs are 
available. It should be noted that in the early and later phases of the season less work is 
available (Jordaan, 2010). According to Agri Western Cape, the 125 plus farms in the Hex 
Valley need about 14 000 workers during peak season (Misago, 2009: 8). With an estimated 
population of 13000, De Doorns can only offer work to a working-age population of less than 6 
000, meaning that the locals are not able to satisfy the demand for labour. Farmers are obliged 
to recruit workers from neighbouring towns Worcester and Touws River during harvest time. 
According to Agri Western Cape’s statistics of seasonal workers, far more locals are currently 
employed on farms in the Hex River Valley than Zimbabweans. The figures are as follows: 
South Africans from the De Doorns area – 5701; South Africans from surrounding towns – 849; 
Zimbabweans – 1558; and Sothos – 630. A total of 5 337 predominantly South African 
permanent workers (Misago, 2009: 8) also work in the Hex Valley. 
However, despite the employment statistics, the number of Zimbabweans in the Hex River 
Valley by far exceeds 1 558. Unofficial estimates put the number at 8 000 (Sauls, 2010; Gerber, 
2009: 1). The number of Zimbabweans displaced by the attacks alone is quoted by sources as 
between 2 500 and 3 500 (Gerber, 2009: 1; Prince, 2009: 2; Mjekula: 1; Misago, 2009: 2). This 
and the practice of farmers to pick up truck loads of Zimbabweans in the informal settlements to 
work on the farms can create the illusion among locals of being swamped by an influx of 
foreigners, bound on stealing their jobs and wives (Sauls, 2010). Although these feelings were 
also recorded during the 2008 countrywide outbreak of xenophobia, research conducted by the 
Forced Migration Studies Programme could not find any substantive evidence that a mass influx 
of migrants triggered the violence (Misago, Monson & Polzer, 2010: 168). However, the 
situation in De Doorns, being a small rural community, is somewhat different than that in the 
bigger urban centres. According to Van Rooyen, “In a small geographic space it is a fairly high 
number of foreign nationals. This is a huge presence in a small rural community. It is in your 
face on a daily basis” (2010). 
If only 1 558 Zimbabweans are employed on the farms where do the rest come from? The large 
number of Zimbabweans is attributed to a demand for labourers and farmers assisting migrants 
to obtain asylum papers from a Home Affairs satellite office in De Doorns. Ms. Jordaan 
explained: 
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“Farmers who wanted to register (get asylum papers) their illegal Zimbabwean workers 
in the Cape Town office of Home Affairs could not take them by bus since it is illegal to 
transport Zimbabweans without their asylum papers. The farmers at that stage were 
faced with a dilemma since the demand for workers exceeded the supply due to the 
following reasons: the negative effect of AIDS on the supply of local workers, 
urbanisation, increased production (from 2000 boxes per hectare in a season a few 
years ago to the present 6 000 boxes) and an increase of serviced agricultural land, 
from 2 500 hectares to 4 000 hectares. To address the problem and to avoid employing 
illegal workers the HTA reached an agreement with Home Affairs that Zimbabwean 
workers be registered locally, first by means of a mobile office, later via an office based 
at the Hex River Post Office. The process included the following: Farmers bring their 
workers to the HTA office in town where they get a letter of support which they take to 
the office of Home Affairs where the registration process takes place. At some stage it 
was brought to Association’s attention that the process is being manipulated and that 
others who do not work on farms were also receiving their asylum papers at the Office. 
The arrangement was then made that only when the farmer himself or his foreman 
accompany the Zimbabwean workers, a permit will be issued. But even this 
arrangement could not prevent others from also registering. When some of the local 
labour brokers approached the HTA with a plea to employ local people, the HTA 
immediately called for the closure of the Home Affairs office (2010).” 
Although Manfred van Rooyen, the BVM representative on the RTT, acknowledges that 
Zimbabweans have to apply for asylum papers at a Home Affairs office, he criticises the 
presence of Home Affairs in De Doorns, blaming the HTA for not consulting with the authorities. 
He said: 
“Zimbabweans are part of a special dispensation as asylum seekers. They cannot be 
repatriated. There is an international agreement which states that if Zimbabweans are 
caught without the necessary papers they have 30 days to go to the nearest Home 
Affairs  office where they can apply for the necessary documentation. The Municipality 
has no involvement in this sudden influx of foreign nationals to the region. The HTA 
should have had the foresight to discuss this issue with the Municipality, Department of 
Labour and the Department of Home Affairs before the start of the season. The HTA on 
its own applied for a point in the Valley where Zimbabweans could apply for asylum 
papers. That also contributed to the greater numbers who went there to register” 
(2010). 
Contributing to fears with regard to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants is the large number of 
family members that accompany the workers. This trend can intensify feelings of prejudice and 
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in geographically congested areas such as Stofland, Ekuphumleni and Hasie Square put 
additional pressure on municipal infrastructure and services. This needs to be investigated 
(Sauls, 2009). This development can be interpreted as a move to permanently settle in the area. 
Normally in the past, labourers at the end of the season returned to Zimbabwe to visit their 
families. 
While statistics indicate that Zimbabwean farm workers are by far in the minority compared to 
South Africans, the claims of locals that the Zimbabweans steal their jobs may have some merit. 
Apart from seasonal work, casual work on farms during the December school holidays provided 
income for the working-age youth of the area. The increase of Zimbabweans has severely 
affected this traditional source of income for households in the Hex River Valley (Robertson, 
2009: 1; Sauls, 2009; Igglesden, 2009: 5). Although this aspect was not highlighted in previous 
research on the attacks, it can be argued that the threat triggered a disillusioned youth’s 
participation in the violence. This situation, it can be argued, also offered opportunity for others 
to exploit the youth’s anger to enhance their own course. The fact that the attacks took place 
about two weeks before the commencement of the school holidays supports this point as a 
possible contributing factor to the violence. 
The reason why so many Zimbabweans are employed in De Doorns is really simple – there is a 
demand for seasonal labour. But then, why are Zimbabweans preferred to the locals for 
employment in the vineyards? According to Misago, the reasons offered “reflect prevailing 
stereotypes about South Africans versus foreign workers, specifically that South African workers 
lack the dedication required for long and physically strenuous work during the harvest season” 
(2009: 8). The Executive Mayor for the Breede Valley, councillor Charles Ntsomi, comments as 
follows, “The farmers say that South African workers do not go to work on Monday. On payday 
they do not work because they are getting their grant” (Mjekula, 2009). The remark about 
workers not going to work on Mondays alludes to absence from work due to ill discipline and 
problems with alcohol abuse. Although farmers complain about this alleged practice they are to 
a great extent responsible for this situation. For decades the so-called dop system of payment 
of alcohol to farm workers as part of their conditions of service was practised by farmers in the 
Hex Valley and neighbouring areas (Falletisch, 2008: 55). According to Sauls, safety nets for 
workers with alcohol-related problems is in place. Farmers must consult with the Departments of 
Social Services and Health on these matters (2009). In addition to being highly educated 
compared to the locals, the Zimbabweans are also regarded as good workers (Theron et al., 
2009:26). In view of the above, according to Theron it is hardly surprising that Zimbabweans are 
resented as taking away jobs from the local community (2009: 27). Case studies on the May 
2008 violence revealed that some employers prefer hiring foreign nationals because they are 
more skilled, more hardworking and less troublesome (Misago et al., 2010: 166). 
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There is also a belief among locals that Zimbabweans are preferred because they work for 
lower wages. The locals maintain that this undermines demands for higher wages and as a 
result farmers hire Zimbabweans at the expense of South Africans. This claim that 
Zimbabweans are working for lower wages is denied by the HTA (Jordaan, 2010). This aspect 
will form part of the discussion on labour practices. 
In their response to why Zimbabweans were attacked rather than locals engaging with 
employers to address their labour concerns, South African labour brokers replied that 
Zimbabweans were attacked because they did not want to participate in a strike on 17 
November 2009 to demand wage increases from farmers (Misago, 2010: 9). Zimbabweans 
denied any knowledge of the strike plans. 
4.5.2 Employment and labour practices. 
The first reports after the attacks alluded to illegal labour practices by farmers and labour 
brokers. Farmers were accused outright of paying lower wages to Zimbabweans. The 
accusations are based on locals claiming that foreign nationals are accepting lower wages. The 
accusations were made notwithstanding confirmation by farmers as well as Zimbabweans that 
all seasonal workers are paid the same wages (Jordaan, 2010; Misago, 2009: 9). 
Home Affairs Deputy Minister Malusi Gigaba at a press briefing following the outbreak of the 
violence in De Doorns said that the incident was not motivated by xenophobia but that the 
violence was caused by a contravention of the Basic Employment Act by certain farmers in the 
area. He maintained that when foreign nationals are exploited by their employers they become 
vulnerable to attacks by the local people (Gabara, 2009). 
Membathisi Mdladlana, Minister of Labour, was also quick to accuse farmers of underpaying 
workers. He said on SABC News that farmers allegedly prefer to hire Zimbabweans because 
they are willing to work for less (Mdladlana visits De Doorns, 2009). Mdladlana, after 
investigations could not produce any evidence that farmers exploited migrant workers, changed 
his tune, stating that the violence was an “unintentional consequence” of Section 198 of the 
Labour Relations Act which does not clearly define temporary employment, giving labour 
brokers an opportunity to exploit it (Mjekula, 2010: 6). 
In his response, HTA Chairman De Villiers Graaff challenged the Department of Labour to 
investigate allegations about payment discrepancies. He was quoted in the media saying that, 
“any farmer or contractor found guilty of charging different rates must expect to face the full 
brunt of the law as far as that is concerned” (Prince, 2009: 2). 
Elsa Jordaan, Executive Chairperson of HTA, denied claims that farmers pay Zimbabweans 
lower rates. She said that Zimbabweans are paid the same rate as any other worker (Mjekula, 
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2009; Jordaan, 2009). On accusations related to employer-employee relations and working 
conditions on farms as well as a general lack of interest in the problems, Jordaan said that as 
an export industry, HTA needs to maintain a positive international image. As such it is in their 
best interest to address conflict in the Valley to avoid negative international reaction. On the 
contrary, HTA is very much involved in the community. To illustrate this point she referred to 
various community projects such as supporting crèches, skills training programmes for farm 
workers, improving clinics, contributing to bursary funds and programmes to combat HIV and 
substance abuse among farm workers. HTA has also initiated a very successful Farm Worker of 
the Year competition spearheaded by Ms. Jordaan (2010). 
Government’s stand on the underpayment of Zimbabwean labourers by Hex Valley farmers, 
accusing them of not paying workers the stipulated minimum wages and of not knowing how 
much their workers earn, was refuted by labour lawyer and coordinator of the Labour and 
Enterprising Policy Research Group at the University of Cape Town, Mr Jan Theron 
(Zimbabwean, 2009). Theron, in his report, substantiates HTA’s claim that Zimbabweans are 
not paid lesser wages. He said no proof of farmers failing to pay the minimum wage to workers 
could be found. An official from the Department of Labour confirmed this. The only complaints of 
underpayment of workers concerned workers employed by contractors (2009: 12). 
The wage issue focused the attention on the employment practices of farmers in the Valley and 
the role of labour brokers in providing labour for the table grape industry. 
Despite the increase in cultivated agricultural land in the Hex River Valley the number of jobs 
has fallen by 30% over a 30-year period (Theron, 2009: 3). In contrast to the decline in 
employment opportunities, informal settlements experienced rapid growth. Theron attributes this 
trend to a growth of indirect employment. This “occurs where employment has been 
externalised and workers are employed by intermediaries who in turn provide them to a user or 
a client” (2009: 3). Intermediaries have now become an integral part of the agricultural industry. 
4.5.3 Farm labour – then and now 
Although the labour process as described above has not changed much over the past 30 years, 
the manner in which labour is utilised showed significant changes. Traditionally, there are 
permanent workers who are employed full-time on a contract basis and seasonal workers who 
are employed on a seasonal basis. Permanent workers are accommodated on the farms. 
Seasonal workers who stayed on the farms were mostly the spouses or family members of male 
farm workers. However, seasonal workers must not be confused with casual workers who are 
employed for not more than three days in a week (Theron, 2009: 10). Whether the seasonal 
workers lived on or off the farm, the employer was the farmer. With the exception of the six-
week thinning season when additional workers were recruited from Worcester and Touws River, 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
the seasonal workers who stayed on the farms far outnumbered workers from elsewhere. This 
position has changed. In recent times the majority of seasonal workers do not stay on the farms. 
This is the case throughout the year. The present-day off-farm seasonal workers are engaged 
and transported to work by intermediaries. This practice put municipal infrastructure under 
severe pressure. 
4.5.4 Contractors 
Intermediaries are referred to as contractors or labour brokers in the area. Although contractors 
are supposedly more involved in supervising the activities of workers provided to a client, the 
two concepts are basically the same (Theron, 2009: 11). Labour brokers in post-1994 labour 
legislation are referred to as a temporary employment service. Ironically, labour legislation itself, 
in recognising labour brokers as the employer of the workers they procure to an employer, has 
created the legal space employers (farmers) needed to restructure the employment relationship 
by externalisation (2009: 11). Pressure is mounting on government to close down this legal 
space employers have utilised in their favour. 
Indirect employment is huge, not only in the number of contractors operating in the Valley but 
also in its influence in the community. According to sources there were at the time of the unrest 
in 2009 about 50 contractors registered as employers with the Department of Labour and 
Compensation Fund in the Valley (Theron, 2009: 16; Jordaan, 2009). This figure, provided by 
the Hex River Valley Agricultural Contractors Association, was however questioned by a 
Department of Labour official who claims that it is an exaggeration (Theron, 2009: 16). The Hex 
River Valley Agricultural Contractors Association is an umbrella body for contractors to regulate 
the activities of contractors in the Valley. According to the Executive Director of the HTA in an 
effort to streamline employment of local labourers an agreement was entered into with 
registered labour brokers. She commented: 
“An organisation, Hex Valley Contractors, was then established and a code of conduct 
approved. But the performance of these contactors, catering for the local labour 
market, were not up to standard and they were told that as long as people do not turn 
up for work, farmers will have to rely on Zimbabweans to do the work. The contractors 
could however not reach agreement on the code of conduct. At that stage only 16 of 
the original 50 registered at the HTA remained. The effort was then abandoned” 
(Jordaan, 2009). 
The number of between 60 and 80 contractors quoted by Misago can be attributed to the 
inclusion of unregistered contractors (Misago, 2009: 4). After the collapse of the association, 
with no regulatory body in place, the door opened for unregistered contractors who encroach 
upon the business of registered contractors, providing the same service at lower cost. 
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Apparently new efforts to revive the Association have been initiated (Jordaan, 2009). With the 
collapse of the Association most of the registered contractors were without work. This 
diminished the bargaining power of local contractors, putting them at risk in terms of competition 
from migrants, especially Zimbabwean contractors. 
Modus operandi of contractors 
As intermediaries, contractors liaise with both employers (farmers) and workers. As suppliers of 
labour they contact the farmers and offer their services. Contractors have their own teams of 
workers who are registered at the Department of Labour. Each team has a supervisor whose 
job it is to assemble the workers when needed. Farmers pay contractors a once-off placement 
fee of R25 and a daily rate of R5 per day per worker. The fee is for administrative expenses 
incurred with the employment and remuneration of workers as well as their transport to and from 
the farms (Theron, 2009: 17; Jordaan, 2009). 
Although farmers have their own supervisors, contractors from time to time also place a 
Zimbabwean on site to supervise workers. The mode of payment for workers is cash and no 
contracts are signed with the contractor (Jordaan, 2009). In his research Theron concludes that 
all the Zimbabwean workers were paid the going daily rate for off-farm labour of R60 (2009: 15). 
This amount is higher than the R50 per day minimum wage a permanent worker living on the 
farm is paid. A probable reason is that seasonal workers have to pay for accommodation 
(Theron, 2009). On the matter of accommodation Van Rooyen is of the opinion that: 
“Local people used their accommodation to raise income. Names have been listed of 
Zimbabweans who had a number of stands/plots which they obtained mainly illegally. 
They have no proof of ownership. It is municipal land earmarked for housing projects 
and it cannot be sold. Locals also provided accommodation at R20 to R40 per person 
per week to the foreign nationals” (2009). 
The fact that Zimbabweans occupied some property, though illegally, could have contributed to 
feelings of prejudice. 
According to Kafaar, the so-called “hotels” in Stofland where locals sub-let accommodation to 
Zimbabweans would not have led to xenophobia because the local people benefit from it. These 
“hotels” are a source of income for locals during the off-season (2009). 
From the research it emerged that the contestation for limited resources between South African 
and Zimbabwean workers, though a contributory factor, not necessary incited the violence, but 
rather competition between groups of contractors. Due to the fact that local farmers favour 
Zimbabwean workers, Zimbabwean contractors have recently been more successful than other 
contractors. This situation results in income losses for South African contractors who claim that 
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when they are affected, their communities also struggle. It is reported that contractors used their 
influence as employers and in some cases their positions as ward committee members to 
mobilise the attacks against the Zimbabweans (Misago, 2009: 5). Their influence in the 
community and backing from their teams of workers suggest that contractors could easily have 
manipulated community members and even local politicians to chase the Zimbabweans from 
the informal settlements. Although no conclusive evidence of incitement to violence could be 
found, it is suggested that the direct involvement of contractors in inciting the violence be 
investigated. 
Service delivery failures 
Although claims of poor service delivery is a common phenomenon across impoverished 
communities such as Ekuphumleni, Stofland and Hasie Square, a comparison of affected 
versus unaffected areas shows that serious service delivery problems may be worse in areas 
where violence did not break out (Masego, 2009: 172). Claims of poor service delivery, almost 
two months after the attacks, were made at a meeting between government stakeholders and 
affected communities held on 12 January 2009 at the Hex Valley People’s Centre, De Doorns.   
Although Misago in his brief did not mention service delivery as a possible contributor to the 
violence, monitor reports of Black Sash identify poor service delivery and socio-economic 
conditions in especially Stofland as a major contributor to discontent in the community. From 
complaints of residents and observations of the monitoring team the following service delivery 
concerns were identified in the informal settlements: 
• Insufficient toilet facilities - up to 10 shacks (60 to 80 people) share a single toilet 
• Lack of electricity 
• Short supply of taps – four households share one tap 
• No schools and recreational services in Stofland. 
• Lack of accommodation 
• Lack of water in Maseru 
There were also other complaints relating to education, health and social services. 
The main reason for discontent however relates to residential plots and services in Stofland. 
This was evident at the community meeting held on 12 January at the Hex Valley People’s 
Centre. Sauls remarked that claims of poor service delivery at Stofland was refuted by Mayor 
Ntsomi at a meeting with the interim representatives of the Breede Valley Organisation and at 
the said community meeting held on 12 January 2010. A scorecard of service delivery projects 
in the area distributed by the Municipality also proved the accusations wrong (2010). 
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According to Xolile Fula, Manager: Housing at the BVM, claims of poor service delivery and 
unsatisfactory housing delivery at Stofland are not justified. He stated that Stofland was 
established in 2006 to accommodate the people of Maseru and adjacent areas who lived on the 
northern side of the N1 national road opposite Stofland under dangerous circumstances against 
a hill and in a riverbed. Five hundred serviced plots were developed in 2007. A further 577 plots 
followed in 2008. The majority of the people who were moved were from Lesotho and the 
Eastern Cape.  
Although some people complained that it was just a case of moving shacks from one side of the 
N1 to the other, living conditions in Stofland are much safer and less congested. There were 
also complaints because people from the so-called danger zone were receiving priority over 
other areas. This was addressed to a great extent with the commencement of the Stofland 
Housing Project. The project makes provision for the building of 1482 houses. The first phase of 
200 houses was completed during August 2011. People on the De Doorns housing waiting list 
are beneficiaries in this project. The project, including top structures and services, amounts to 
approximately R100 million (Fula, 2010). Notwithstanding the BVM’s efforts, Van Rooyen 
believes that certain locals will continue to use service delivery to oppose reintegration (Van 
Rooyen, 2010). 
Fula is of the opinion that residents used the service delivery issue in Stofland as a scapegoat 
to justify their involvement in the xenophobic attacks. The fact that the attacks only targeted 
Zimbabweans supports the opinion that service delivery was not the real issue – it was only 
utilised to prevent reintegration. 
Involvement of local authority 
Authorities in general have been criticised for their role in the May 2008 xenophobic violence. 
The 2010 FMSP (Forced Migration Studies Programme) in its evaluation of 11 case studies 
found that in the most affected areas during the 2008 incidents, attacks on foreign nationals 
were led and organised by local leaders (Misago et al., 2010: 165). The report was critical of 
local leaders and authorities, stating that they did nothing to stop the violence. Some were even 
directly involved in the violence while others were reluctant to help foreigners for fear of losing 
their legitimacy or position (Karrim, 2009: 1). Considering these findings it seems that De 
Doorns is a classic case of the involvement of micro politics in xenophobic violence. 
Two prominent politicians of the BVM, Mayor Charles Ntsomi and Councillor Mpumelelo Poyi 
Lubisi (Ward 2), according to Misago’s research, were allegedly either directly involved in 
organising the violence or at least tolerated or indirectly supported it (2009: 6). Various other 
parties also maintain this view. The City Press reported about a councillor wearing an ANC T-
shirt who encouraged violence in De Doorns by inciting the community to destroy the homes of 
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Zimbabwean nationals. The councillor apparently told local residents not to physically harm the 
Zimbabweans (ANC behind xenophobic, 2009). Councillor Lubisi’s alleged involvement in the 
violence was covered locally and in the national press. The Mail & Guardian for instance 
reported that Councillor Lubisi was investigated for inciting a mob to attack immigrants based in 
De Doorns in the Western Cape and for allegedly blaming them publicly for the lack of service 
delivery by the municipality (Rawoot, 2011: 16). On 21 February 2010, ANC Provincial Task 
Team Coordinator Mandla Dlamini said the ANC was still investigating claims from PASSOP 
that an ANC politician and a senior municipal official were involved in, or directly responsible for, 
the attacks on Zimbabweans (Mjekula, 2010: 3). The detainees, arrested after the incidents, 
also alleged that a councillor was informed of the decision to take down the structures of 
Zimbabweans prior to the action (Igglesden, 2009: 5). The persistency of political interference is 
illustrated by the actions of ANC members who, three months after the initial attacks, planned a 
march to the refugee camp. Sikhula Sonke, a trade union representing women working on 
farms, said they were shocked when they heard local ANC members called on the residents of 
Stofland to march to the camp on Tuesday 23 February 2010 to demand that the Zimbabweans 
leave the camp (Pekeur, 2010; Mjekula, 2010: 3). 
It is believed that meetings held on 13 and 16 November 2009 with South African residents, the 
BVM (including the Mayor and Ward Councillor Lubisi), police and representatives of the HTA 
triggered the attacks on the Zimbabweans, which followed immediately after the meetings on 14 
and 17 November 2009. During the meetings some residents expressed their intention to attack 
the Zimbabweans. Although Councillor Lubisi admitted that the issue of the Zimbabweans were 
raised he apparently warned against violence (Misago, 2009: 5). Although there is not 
necessarily a link between the meetings and the attacks, the close proximity of the two created 
the impression that the authorities exploited the mood at the meetings to sanction the attacks. 
According to Jordaan the mood at the meetings were really ugly (Jordaan, 2010). Two 
possibilities are offered for the involvement of the councillor and ward committee members: 
In order to protect his position during the April 2011 local government elections, the councillor 
apparently gave in to the demands of contractors. It is also alleged that some ward committee 
members have interests in protecting their jobs as contractors. Van Rooyen alluded to possible 
councillor involvement when he said: 
“As the term of office of the current council is coming to a close opportunistic elements 
took the issue of the presence of foreign nationals and under the guise of xenophobia 
raised service delivery issues in De Doorns. There are elements in De Doorns who 
have political agendas, who want to use the xenophobia to highlight their campaigns – 
they want to contest for positions at the coming elections.” (2010). 
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Respondents accused the Mayor of complicity by omission, mainly because he learned at the 
meetings of the attacks and did nothing to stop them (Misago, 2009: 6). 
Although these allegations do not constitute evidence of misconduct, it is proof of widespread 
mistrust of officials and councillors and the need for more effective oversight and control 
measures. The key question remains why the Mayor and councillor, even if they were not 
involved at all in instigating action against the Zimbabweans, with their prior knowledge of the 
planned expulsions, did not respond to the threat of possible violence. 
The fact that the municipality did not intervene to prevent or resolve labour-related issues in the 
Hex River Valley can be perceived as a lack of power and legitimacy (Misago, 2009: 7). This 
perception can severely affect the residents’ confidence in the Municipality’s ability to govern 
and perform its developmental coordinating function in the region. It can also constitute a lack of 
political will on the part of local government to address long-standing tensions between the BVM 
and commercial farmers in the area (2009: 7). The establishment of a temporary Department of 
Home Affairs satellite office on a farm in De Doorns without the knowledge of the BVM is one 
example of a lack of municipal control. 
In an area devoted to the production of a single product, namely table grapes, by far the largest 
employer in the area and the economic lifeline of the Hex River Valley, the local authority’s 
incapability and unwillingness to address critical labour issues and consulting the community left 
the door open to collective violence and mob justice, putting the livelihood of thousands at risk. 
However, in assessing the BVM’s performance with regard to development the knife cuts even 
deeper. Since the institution of developmental local government only one local economic 
development (LED) project has been launched in the Hex River Valley. The essential oils 
project provided work for 30 people for some years. Also, public participation in terms of ward 
committees at the time of the attacks was almost non-existent. No minutes of meetings, after 
various requests, could be produced by the BVM. A public participation policy was only drafted 
in 2011. Xenophobia is also not covered or even mentioned in any ward committee minutes or 
the IDP of the Breede Valley Municipality. With regard to the involvement of ward committees 
during the humanitarian assistance phase of the crisis, Sauls remarked: 
“What is very worrisome is the absence of ward committees and councillors to help 
resolve the issue. In discussions with the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley 
Committee the lack of knowledge on local government activity in the area was evident, 
which pointed to the ineffectiveness of the communication structures of the politicians. 
Right in the beginning of the crisis the presence of councillors was noticeable at the 
steering committee meetings, but all of a sudden they were nowhere. It is almost as if 
they were told to back off and let the officials do the job” (2010). 
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Kafaar also encountered a lack of cooperation from the authorities. According to him: 
“Commitment to the problem and a lack of political will to get involved are also matters 
of concern. For instance, a sports event to bring the foreign nationals and community 
closer together to create a platform for dialog was arranged to take place on 
Reconciliation Day, 16 December 2009. It was quite disappointing when the organisers 
were told a day before the event that most of the role players were away on holiday. 
We were in the middle of a crisis with 2000 people displaced. It was important to create 
a sense of normality. Again, the political will was absent. Only the Departments of 
Social Development and Health were still involved in the camp at that stage” (2011). 
Although the political indifference encountered during the humanitarian assistance phase did 
not contribute towards the crisis, it strengthens arguments that the local authority failed in its 
developmental role. 
On national level the state is also to blame for a lack of control. The Deputy Home Affairs 
Minister, Malusi Gigaba, and the Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana, who initially 
accused the farmers of provoking the violence, were later forced to admit the involvement of 
their departments in the illegal temporary satellite Home Affairs office in De Doorns (Robertson, 
2010: 2). 
4.6 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 
The humanitarian response to the displacement caused by the attacks on 14 and 17 November 
2009 can be divided into three phases: 
• An initial phase of stabilising the situation and rendering emergency assistance. 
• A core phase of aiding the internally displaced, providing structured shelter and welfare 
and health services. 
• A closing-down or reintegration phase. 
4.6.1 Initial phase – emergency assistance 
The initial response after the first attack on 14 November 2009 was to accommodate the 
displaced at a municipal building on the outskirts of the town. The conditions got too congested 
after the second attack when approximately 3 000 people were chased from Stofland. The 
displaced were then moved to the Hex Valley sports field less than a kilometre from the central 
business area of De Doorns. 
The decision to move the Zimbabweans to the best equipped and maintained sports field in the 
area was heavily criticised. The critique was based on the following: 
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The sports field is located adjacent to a residential neighbourhood and a school. A little stream 
that flows into the Hex River, a major water source for the sensitive table grape industry, is 
bordering on the northern perimeter of the field. The export of table grapes is subject to strict 
regulations and the farmers feared that the close proximity of the stream to the camp could 
pollute the water with E. coli or other bacteria that may affect the quality of the grapes. Water 
from the showers was flowing into the stream. Camp residents were also washing their clothes 
in the stream. 
At the time of the incident the rugby players were preparing for the new season. In addition to a 
rugby field, the terrain also accommodates tennis courts and the town’s only squash court. In a 
small rural community sport is a very important form of recreation and social interaction. The 
local sports bodies felt betrayed and requested that the camp be moved to another terrain. 
From a humanitarian and safety point of view the sports field was perhaps the best choice for a 
safety camp at the time. The terrain is three kilometres away from the Stofland, Ekuphumleni 
and Hasie Square informal settlements, one and a half kilometre from the police station and 
within walking distance from the shops, municipality and banks. It is fenced off with only one 
entrance to the terrain, which made access control much easier. Water and electricity 
connections were also available. 
From the onset, there was opposition to the location of the camp from the sports fraternity, the 
local ratepayers’ association and the Hex Valley High School. These organisations formed a 
pressure group that demanded early reintegration or the relocation of the camp to another sight. 
Although some politicians as stated allegedly had prior knowledge of the planned attacks, this 
knowledge did not filter through to the management and emergency services of the Breede 
Valley Municipality. As a result, the first attack on 14 November came as a total surprise. 
Fortunately, the emergency services of the Breede Valley Municipality and the Cape Winelands 
District Municipality had some time to recover before the main onslaught on 17 November that 
left 3 000 people displaced. At the time of the second attack, a working relationship had already 
been established between the emergency services of the Municipality, District Municipality and 
the Provincial Disaster Management Team. Although the current Disaster Management Act and 
Framework do not specifically cater for displacement and humanitarian needs caused by civil 
unrest and violence, the local emergency services seemingly experienced fewer problems with 
regard to inter-governmental coordination than was the case during May 2008 (Misago et al., 
2010: 189). Local emergency services also had the advantage of lessons learned from May 
2008 and the experience of the UNHCR, which rendered invaluable support from the start.  
The initial stages of the humanitarian response can be compared with the gold rush during the 
late 1800s on the Witwatersrand. Dozens of people representing a wide range of interest 
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groups converged on De Doorns. The following organisations were represented at the second 
meeting of the Crisis Committee held on 26 November 2009: Breede Valley Municipality, Cape 
Winelands District Municipality, Provincial Disaster Management, Office of the Premier of the 
Western Cape, Department of Labour, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Housing, 
Department of Social Development, South African Police Services, Community services, 
Government Communication and Information System, Community Development Workers, Hex 
Valley Table Grape Association, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, South 
African Human Rights Commission, People Against Suffering, Suppression, Oppression and 
Poverty, United Nations Children’s Fund, Doctors without Borders, Black Sash, South African 
Red Cross, Local Ward Committee, and Women on Farms. 
During the emergency assistance stage the vast majority of the internally displaced at the safety 
site were Zimbabweans. A monitoring report of Black Sash mentioned that there were also six 
Zambians, two Ghanaians and one Burundian staying at the safety site (Igglesden, 2009: 1). On 
26 November 2009 there were 1 200 registered IDPs in the camp (minutes of the Crisis 
Committee meeting held on 26 November 2009). Initially, the internally displaced were 
accommodated in three marquee tents. These tents were dismantled on 26 November and 
replaced by 182 UNHCR family tents. The tents were erected by the Fire and Rescue Services 
of BVM in a record time. The BVM Fire and Rescue Services withdrew from the site on 15 
December 2009 based on: 
• The non-existence of an emergency situation. The Chief Fire Officer said, 
• “The situation is deemed to be in a recovery phase and is now wholly dependent on a 
situation not related to the mandate of the Department.” 
• The nature of emergency response deployment that occurred over the summer holiday 
period and the balance that has to be achieved with the Department’s emergency services 
resources (P.D. Govender, internal BVM e-mail dated 15 December 2009). 
An emergency response presence was still maintained at the camp. Mr Shaun Minnies from the 
CWDM emergency services operated as camp manager from a mobile command centre on the 
camp site. 
Although the unexpectedness of the violence caught everyone off guard, emergency services 
were quick to respond. Observations of activities in the camp at that early stage confirmed that 
with the exception of some minor complaints, water, refuse and sanitation services were 
provided to a satisfactory standard. With regard to the security at the site concerns were raised 
about underlying tensions between Shona and Ndebele speaking Zimbabweans. An 
accreditation system to guarantee privacy and avoid possible exploitation of the displaced was 
also implemented. In general, government’s efforts to stabilise the situation at the emergency 
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assistance phase was met with approval. The UNHCR made mention of the rapid humanitarian 
response of the local authorities and the fact that water, portable toilets and a mobile health 
clinic were provided within hours (South Africa UNHCR, 2009). 
Civil society organisations, representing a wide range of sectors and expertise, contributed to 
the emergency response. Problems experienced during May 2008, such as inexperience and 
coordination hiccups due to fragmentation, also plagued civil society response in the De Doorns 
case. Contributions were at first not well coordinated, resulting in an oversupply of consumer 
items. For instance, two groups – PASSOP and ADRA SA – both donated a total of almost 3 
000 blankets. 
4.6.2 Core phase – providing shelter and welfare assistance 
The core phase of the humanitarian response in many respects presents a communication 
challenge. Initially, communication was somewhat chaotic between the NGOs, UNHCR and 
NGOs and government and NGOs. Due to the unexpectedness of the attacks and inexperience, 
the RTT encountered some teething problems with regard to communicating with each other, 
representatives of the State and NGOs. Van Rooyen responded as follows: 
“Xenophobia did not feature in our communication plan at the time of the attacks. It has 
taken us all by surprise. It took us some time to understand the severity and complexity 
of the situation before we could respond appropriately. The communication response of 
NGOs was far more tuned in at the time. From the third day after the attacks we were 
more prepared. There were a communication person on site and steadily we began to 
roll out communication around the issue – liaison, pamphlets and so on. It was an inter-
departmental approach involving the BVM’s communication unit, CWDM media 
component, GCIS, Office of the Premier and the media sections of other state 
departments” (Van Rooyen). 
According to Kafaar, the work of the Reintegration Task Team, which replaced the Crisis 
Committee as management committee for the camp, was hampered by a lack of decision taking 
powers. He said that: 
“The RTT was well represented and integrated. The communication within the team 
and with the municipality and even the provincial government was very good. However, 
the RTT should have more decision taking powers. Important decisions such as 
obtaining legal opinions were first referred to the municipality and the provincial 
government. In that sense, due to protocol, the RTT was sometimes slow in 
responding. The RTT should be more proactive – the trends should tell the team what 
to expect and they should react instead of waiting for the crisis to develop. Even with 
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the establishment of the camp notwithstanding the benefit of trends, we were slow in 
responding. The amount of work done on xenophobia in this region is limited.” 
It must also be borne in mind that the committees’ efforts focused on the camp situation as well 
as the hostile environment outside the camp. 
The first step was to establish a committee to take charge of the process. A representative 
committee called the Crisis Committee and Reintegration Secretariat consisting of 
representatives of the SAHRC, Department of the Premier of the Western Cape and the BVM 
were established at the initial stages of the humanitarian response. The Reintegration 
Secretariat was established to lead the December 11 reintegration effort. It was later replaced 
be a smaller management committee to cater for the conditions in the camp and to prepare the 
environment for the successful reintegration of the displaced Zimbabweans. Provincial 
government, local government, non-governmental organisations, United Nations agencies, 
farmers, internally displaced persons, the police and trade unions were represented on the 
management committee (M. Van Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 25 November 2009). The 
management committee was then replaced by the RTT (consisting of government officials) to 
negotiate the final stage, the closing of the camp and the reintegration of the displaced people. 
The core phase was characterised by good communication and cooperation between the 
representatives on the RTT who previously served together on the Crisis and Management 
Committees. The RTT was committed to its task. Bearing in mind that the representatives are 
also full-time senior officials in government, the team’s commitment really deserves mentioning. 
Van Rooyen related as follows: 
“When you look at the performance of the RTT one must bear in mind that the 
members were all inexperienced in dealing with xenophobia prior to the November 
2009 incident. Remember, our primary focus is municipal service delivery and the task 
that was thrust on you had to be taken alongside your normal work. Your normal work 
suffered in the process. We succeeded in creating a platform where we could meet 
regularly” (2010). 
4.6.3 Final phase – closing-down and reintegration 
Reintegration options – local reintegration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement – although 
aimed at finalising the process, were part of the humanitarian response from the beginning. 
Most of the issues experienced during the core phase of the De Doorns process were also 
encountered during the final phase. 
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The following is a chronological synopsis of events leading up to the violence, the attacks and 
the activities that have relevance to the stabilisation of the volatile situation, the humanitarian 
response and the push for the reintegration and closing of the camp: 
2008 Somali business in Roodewal residential area of Worcester attacked. 
March Somali shop owners in Zweletemba near Worcester attacked. 
May Seven Zimbabweans killed in an attack in the informal residential area of Stofland near De 
Doorns. 
May Establishment of xenophobia forum to monitor xenophobia activity. 
Aug Media breakfast hosted by the communication unit of the Breede Valley Municipality to 
inform GCIS and local media on xenophobia activity in the Breede Valley. 
2009 
 
Nov 12 60 Zimbabweans were attacked and chased from their homes in the Ekuphumleni informal 
settlement, De Doorns (weekend 12 to 15 November). The displaced were temporarily 
accommodated in the municipal store in the town. 
Nov 17 The violence intensified, spreading to the Stofland and Hasie Square informal settlements 
where a further 3 000 Zimbabweans were displaced. The displaced were accommodated 
on the Voortrekker Sports Field in De Doorns. 
MECs for Social Development and Safety, Ivan Meyer and Lennit Max, visited the scene to 
assess the situation. 
Nov 18 A combined Breede Valley Municipality and Cape Winelands District Municipality rescue 
services command post was established on the sports field and tents, supplied by the 
UNHCR, were erected. 
Task team (Crisis Committee) consisting of representatives from the BVM, Cape 
Winelands District Municipality and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape met 
with role players such as HNHCR, Red Cross, PASSOP and the Human Rights 
Commission. 
Visit by Provincial Police Commissioner, Mzwandile Petros. 
Nov 19 Visit by Ms. Helen Zille, Premier of the Western Cape. 
Visit by Mr Ivan Meyer, MEC: Social Development, Western Cape. 
Visit by Mr Lennit Max, MEC: Community Services. 
Nov 26 Meeting to discuss reintegration. 
Nov 27 RTT meet with stakeholders in De Doorns. 
Meeting with local ward committees. 
Nov 28 Meeting with the Displaced Committee (Zimbabweans). 
BVM Executive Mayor, Cllr. Charles Ntsomi addresses displaced Zimbabweans. 
Nov 29 Mass inter-faith prayer service, De Doorns East. Poorly attended. 
Nov 30 Bail application hearing of arrested locals - De Doorns Magistrate Court. 
Protest march by De Doorns East community. 
RTT meeting with farming community (HTA members) on labour-related matters and 
possible assistance by farmers with the temporary accommodation of Zimbabwean 
workers. 
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Dec 1 Community meeting at De Doorns East. 
Dec 3 Public meeting with local community at De Doorns East. 
Dec 4 BVM Communication Unit meets with Stofland Ward Committee. 
Dec 6 Inter-faith prayer service on De Doorns East sports field. 
Des 13 Walkabout – Executive Mayor and members of Executive Committee accompanied by 
community leaders and NGOs. 
Task team meeting. 
Dec 14 Terrain committee meeting. 
Task team meeting. 
Dec 15 BVM rescue services withdraw from the safety camp due to the non-existence of an 
emergency situation. 
Dec 16 Task team meeting. 
Dec 18 Task team meeting. 
Dec 20 
 Meeting with displacement committee. 
2010 
 
Jan 7 Meeting – RTT and stakeholders with De Doorns Crisis Committee. 
Jan 12 Meeting with Stofland community in Hex Valley People’s Centre. 
Jan 13 Press conference to announce reintegration date postponed. 
Jan 25 National Minister of Labour, Mr Membathisi Mdladlana, meets with stakeholders in 
Worcester and environs. 
Jan 26 Imbizo – Minister Mdladlana addresses community meeting at De Doorns. 
Jan 27 Stakeholder seminar to establish a reintegration strategy for the social conflict in De 
Doorns, presented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution at Nekkies Meer Chalets resort 
near Worcester. 
Task team meeting. 
Feb 3 Interview in Worcester with Ms. Monique Ekoko, Senior UNHCR Project Officer assigned to 
the De Doorns case. 
Visit to De Doorns by the Provincial Portfolio Committee on Human Settlements Western 
Cape. 
Feb 4 Visit to De Doorns by the South African Council of Churches and the South African Catholic 
Bishops Conference. 
Feb 6 Visit to De Doorns by the USA Department of Immigration and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. 
Feb 3-5 Human rights training by the Counter Xenophobia Unit, Immigration Services Department: 
Home Affairs. 
Feb 8-10 Human rights training by the Counter Xenophobia Unit, Immigration Services Department: 
Home Affairs.  
Feb 11  Visit to De Doorns by the Regional Representative of the UNHCF from Pretoria. 
Feb 17 Meeting (RTT) at the Provincial Disaster Management Centre in Cape Town to develop a 
social conflict emergency plan. 
Feb 23 Meeting / interview (Chairperson of Task Team and PRO of the Breede Valley Municipality) 
with Mr Michael Laubscher of the HTA.  
Mar 1 Stakeholder meeting – RTT, Police, local sport clubs, community crisis committee. 
Mar 23 Meeting in Worcester – RTT Chairperson with Black Sash and NGOs. 
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Mar 31 Meeting at BVM Civic Centre – RTT with government role players to discuss reintegration 
and the removal of toilets and security services from safety camp. 
Apr 15 RTT meets with Mr Anton Bredell, MEC: Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning, Western Cape in Cape Town on the reintegration and closing of 
the camp. 
Apr 22 RTT meets with Mr Shahied Esau, Speaker of the Western Cape Provincial Parliament. 
UNHCR Mr Patrick Male Kawuma visits De Doorns. 
Apr 23 District Communicators Forum meeting in Worcester to inform government communicators 
on the reintegration process and to obtain their cooperation. 
April 28 RTT meeting in De Doorns. 
Apr 29 Communication representatives from CWDM, BVM and GCIS meet in Paarl to discuss 
strategies to inform the refugees and community of De Doorns on reintegration process. 
May 3 Communication officers meet in Stellenbosch to work on pamphlet and press release. 
RTT meets with the displaced community in De Doorns. 
May 5 Meeting with camp representatives. 
May 7 Press conference in the office of MEC Bredell in Cape Town to announce the closing of the 
safety sight at De Doorns. 
May 8,9 Verification of the displaced at the sports field. 
Meeting with the displaced at the sports field. 
May 11 Interview with local radio station Valley FM at Worcester. 
May 12 RTT meeting at De Doorns. 
May 13 Chairperson of RTT meets with PASSOP in Cape Town. 
May 14 Chairperson of RTT, Provincial Officials (Dr. Hildegard Fast) meet with PASSOP in Cape 
Town. 
May 16 Distribution of pamphlets at safety site. 
41 people leave camp to go back to Zimbabwe. 
Taking down tents of Zimbabweans that left and removal of some of the mobile toilets. 
May 19 RTT meeting at De Doorns. 
May 20 Procurement of busses to take Zimbabweans to Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and 
Beitbrug border post in Limpopo Province. 
May 25 Legal notice served on BVM and others on behalf of PASSOP and the displaced 
community at the sports field prohibiting the closing of the camp.  
May 27 Stakeholder meeting to prepare for the evening’s meeting with the Stofland community. 
Community meeting to discuss reintegration options. 
June 1 RTT strategy meeting in Paarl. 
June 2 RTT high-level meeting with Dr. Hildegard Fast, Director of the Western Cape Provincial 
Disaster Management Centre in Worcester. 
Distribution of pamphlets in camp, reiterating the closing of the camp, offering assistance 
and informing community that no monetary assistance will be rendered. 
June 3 Meeting with all reintegration volunteers (CDWs, Ukuthwalana Youth Group, social 
workers) at Hex Valley Peoples Centre, De Doorns East. 
June 9 RTT meeting at Worcester. 
Meeting – RTT with HTA Board of Directors on the issue of the continued employment of 
Zimbabweans with the view to convince farmers to accommodate the workers they employ. 
June 14 Meeting at Stellenbosch (CWDM, BVM, RTT, provincial officials) on progress and 
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challenges to the reintegration process. 
June 18 Meeting with Mr Sifiso Mbuyisa, Director: Social Dialogue and Human Right, Department of 
the Premier. 
RTT meeting. 
Meeting – RTT with HTA Board and IOM on funding of reintegration. 
June 30 Meeting – RTT Chairperson with IOM and UNHCR on support for reintegration. 
July 5 Meeting – RTT at Worcester to discuss the attempted invasion of the camp by 
Zimbabweans not affected by the displacement. 
July 14 Meeting – RTT with Andre Topps of De Doorns Wine Cellar on the rehabilitation of the 
Voortrekker sports field after reintegration. 
July 16 Mediators (Equillore) appointed by Province start working with the Zimbabweans and local 
community. 
July 24 Meeting – role players with mediators at Golden Valley Casino, Worcester, on progress 
made with process. 
July 31 Mediation session between RTT, De Doorns Displacement Committee (Zimbabweans) and 
Mr Braam Hanekom of PASSOP. 
Aug 1 Mediation continues – mediated agreement signed subject to ratification by Municipal 
Manager and Council. 
Aug 2 Meeting – BVM delegation (Municipal Manager, Manager: Housing and RTT Convenor) 
with Dr. Hildegard Fast and Sifiso Mbuyisa in Cape Town on progress with reintegration 
process and critical funding constraints. 
Aug 5 Meeting – RTT and Department of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning in Cape Town to discuss the funding of the continued operations of 
the De Doorns camp and reintegration expenditure.  
Aug 17 RTT meeting at De Doorns. 
Aug 19 Mediated agreement ratified at special council meeting of BVM. Date of closing of camp 6 
September 2010. 
Aug 30 Meeting – Convenor of RTT with chief mediator, Mr Stef Snel of Equillore. 
Meeting with MEC Lennit Max, Gen. Mathebula (SAPS Area Commander, Boland), Col. 
Van der Westhuizen (SAPS Station Commander, De Doorns), Jacquiline Pandaram 
(Director: Provincial Disaster Management Centre), HTA, Department Social Development 
(Caesar Sauls), Department of Local Government (Ashraf Kafaar) to lobby for political 
support for SAPS involvement in reintegration process. 
RTT Convenor addresses AGM of HTA on progress and challenges of reintegration. 
Aug 31 Meeting – RTT with Equillore and PASSOP (Braam Hanekom) to discuss challenges with 
mediated agreement and funding. 
Meeting – RTT with Displaced Committee (Zimbabweans) on a request to postpone closing 
of camp by six weeks. 
Sept 1 Meeting – RTT Convenor with Municipal Manager of BVM to obtain mandate for the 
extension request from the Displacement Committee. Provisional extension of one week 
granted pending council approval at special council meeting. New provisional closing date 
– 13 September 2010. 
Sept 2 Joint operation with SAPS at camp – distribution of notices that camp closes on 6 
September. 
Sept 3 Trespassing at camp addressed following advice to SAPS. 
Director Richard Sikakane of the Maitland Refugee Centre: Home Affairs visits safety 
camp. He is briefed by Convenor of RTT on the reintegration process. 
Sept 4 Operation to move Zimbabweans that indicated voluntary relocation to local community. 
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Planned raid at camp by the Department of Home Affairs postponed. 
Sept 6 Closing of camp postponed to 13 September. 
Convenor of RTT meet with Captain May of SAPS Worcester on resources required to 
assist reintegration process. 
RTT meeting at De Doorns. 
Sept 7 Meeting - RTT with Board of Directors of the De Doorns Wine Cellars on the Task Team’s 
request for assistance to finance the reintegration process. The request was declined by 
the Cellar. 
Comments from Provincial Treasury on funding of reintegration. 
Sept 30 RTT meeting at De Doorns to discuss the logistics for the closing of the camp. 
Comments from Provincial Treasury on funding of reintegration. 
Oct 1 Resignation of Convenor of RTT. 
Oct 12 Start of the final closing-down process – Operation Check Out. 
Oct 17 Final closure of the De Doorns camp. 
 
Right from the start of the crisis, government pushed for reintegration. In his reaction to Mayor 
Ntsomi’s comments that authorities were contemplating the reintegration of the foreign nationals 
into the community as soon as possible, PASSOP maintained that, “No community forcefully 
displaced can possibly reintegrate successfully in such as short time without a proper process of 
healing, counselling and negotiations” (Accusations fly over xenophobia, 2009). Notwithstanding 
the concerns of PASSOP, government officials at a meeting on 1 December 2009 stated that 
the crisis had now moved from the emergency assistance phase to the recovery or stabilising 
phase and that the reintegration process will commence on 11 December 2009. At the time, 
only four weeks after 3 000 Zimbabweans were violently chased from the informal settlements, 
strong feelings of anger and resentment persisted against foreign nationals in the community. 
The mood in the affected communities at that stage was totally against reintegration. There 
were also practical obstacles to consider, such as the fact that the structures where the 
displaced lived before the violence, in some cases up to 40 people in a unit, were totally 
demolished. Reintegration at that early stage would have constituted a human rights violation. 
Motivations offered by government for such an early start with the reintegration process 
included the possible accommodation of the displaced workers on the farms of their employers 
and escalating costs to maintain the camp. The BVM was of the opinion that the expenditure on 
the camp could be utilised for community projects. The request to accommodate Zimbabwean 
farm workers on farms was addressed to members of the HTA at a meeting held on 30 
November 2009. 
In addition to the early reintegration and closing-down attempt on 11 December 2009 there 
were also attempts to close down the camp on 13 May 2010, September 2010 and October 
2010. 
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4.7 REINTEGRATION PRESSURES 
A xenophobic situation constitutes an abnormality. The violent attacks in De Doorns not only 
tainted the image of the community but also seriously challenged order and the agricultural-
based economy of the area. It was in the best interest of the BVM to restore normality as soon 
as possible. In addition to the broader challenges the situation also impacted on municipal 
resources and budget. 
The HTA also pushed for early reintegration. At a meeting held on 30 November, attended by 
200 farmers and government representatives, HTA pledged its support for the reintegration 
effort on 11 December 2009 (M. van Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 2 December 2009). It 
was peak season and the sensitive table grape industry could not afford any labour unrest. 
Prominent Hex River Valley farmer, Mr Michael Laubscher, concurred with this view and 
proposed that Zimbabweans be reintegrated into the community as a matter of urgency, with 
the South African National Defence Force monitoring the process (Interview dated 23 February 
2010). 
Pressure also came from the Hex Valley Ratepayers’ Association who claimed that their rights 
and privileges had been violated by the establishment of the camp at the Voortrekker Sports 
Field without proper community consultation beforehand (N.L. Greeff, letter to BVM dated 4 
February 2010). The Ratepayers’ Association proposed that the camp immediately be moved to 
a more suitable terrain. Their claim was also based on the conditions in camp, especially the 
flow of effluent water from the showers into the stream bordering on the northern side of the 
camp. This view was shared by the Hex Valley High School who claimed that the water that 
flows from the camp into the stream is contaminated and poses a health risk for the learners of 
the school (T.A. Scheepers, letter to CWDM dated 19 January 2010).  
The sports sector, supported by the Hex Valley Ratepayers’ Association, claimed their sports 
facility back, demanding a quick reintegration or alternatively that the camp be moved to a more 
appropriate terrain. 
The mere presence of the camp in the once harmonious, sleepy little town served as a constant 
reminder to the people of the Hex Valley that something went terribly wrong – something that 
branded them as perpetrators of violence and seriously challenged their moral fibre. 
Pressures to prolong the reintegration process and not to reintegrate respectively came from 
PASSOP and the De Doorns Crisis Committee (not to be confused with the “Crisis Committee” 
concerned with the early management of the camp) who claimed to represent the communities 
of Ekuphomleni, Hasie Square and Stofland.  
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Notwithstanding numerous assurances from the BVM that basic services in Stofland will be 
improved the community representatives remained adamant not to allow reintegration before 
they receive the services. According to Van Rooyen, local residents were not appeased with the 
Municipality’s efforts because certain individuals use local service delivery issues to fuel hostility 
and oppose reintegration. He said: 
“The current impasse with our reintegration efforts can by and large be ascribed to a 
very successful and popular agitation and mobilisation campaign by the pseudo-
leadership as represented by the De Doorns Crisis Committee. While this standoff 
continues we as the local municipality are bleeding resources at an alarming pace. 
Meanwhile pressures from local tax payers, the sports fraternity and various other role 
players in De Doorns are mounting against the municipality to vacate the rugby field so 
that the process to rehabilitate the pitch can start” (M. Van Rooyen, e-mail to RTT 
dated 24 February 2010). 
According to Van Rooyen the Zimbabweans were willing to reintegrate on condition that their 
safety and security be guaranteed. He asked the RTT to facilitate either the establishment of a 
satellite police station at Stofland for a three to six month period and/or the employment of the 
South African National Defence Force to the informal settlement. This will allow the reintegration 
to proceed with daily monitoring by either the police or army. 
Since service delivery as a possible reason for the attacks only publicly emerged for the first 
time during the controversial community meeting held on 12 January at the Hex Valley People’s 
Centre, a strong suspicion exists among especially government representatives that the 
situation was exploited by local leaders with political motives. Reintegration became a 
bargaining chip for acquiring services from the BVM. 
The advocacy and service group PASSOP, from all the civil society organisations involved with 
the humanitarian crisis in De Doorns, was the most vocal and active campaigners for the rights 
of the Zimbabweans in the safety camp. From the beginning the BVM and PASSOP were 
locked in battle with the former pushing for reintegration and the latter opposing it. The 
animosity between Mayor Ntsomi and Braam Hanekom, founder of PASSOP, came down to a 
screaming match at the safety sight on 17 November 2009. This troubled relationship was also 
evident at the first meetings of the Crisis Committee and continued until the closure of the camp 
on 17 October 2010. Hanekom, for not adhering to the code of conduct for the camp, adopted 
by the Crisis Committee at their meeting held on 26 November 2009, was barred from entering 
the camp. Other organisations with the permission of the camp management could still enter the 
camp. The new Reintegration Committee that was elected on 15 April 2010 resolved to keep all 
third parties, including NGOs, off the site while trying to put the process in action (Black Sash 
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monitoring report 8, 1010: 5). The expulsion from the camp of Hanekom, a key stakeholder in 
the negotiations for reintegration, was perhaps not the best strategy at the time.   
PASSOP in a media statement said it was, “alarmed and insulted” by a remark of BVM Mayor 
Charles Ntsomi that authorities were considering the reintegration of the displaced as soon as 
possible. He also accused the Provincial Government of the Western Cape of advocating 
reintegration in order to avoid further embarrassment (Sapa, 2009: 1). 
The Organisation accused the UNHCR of xenophobia for not treating Zimbabweans the same 
as other refugees in the country. According to Hanekom, Zimbabweans are victims of a form of 
selective assistance by organisations associated with the UNHCR, which refused to help 
Zimbabweans who they accuse of being opportunistic (Bell, 2010). Hanekom said that because 
Zimbabweans are regarded as economic migrants they are not afforded the same rights as 
other refugees and that such prejudice is “just another form of xenophobia”. He accused the 
UNHCR of prejudiced behaviour against the Zimbabweans at the safety sight in De Doorns. 
According to a report from the FMSP at the University of the Witwatersrand, Zimbabweans are 
neither refugees nor economic migrants. The fact that Zimbabweans crossing the border do not 
even bother to apply for refugee status disqualifies them as refugees. Given the dire economic 
situation in their home country Zimbabweans are not considered as voluntary economic 
migrants either. The report suggests that this category of migrants be referred to as forced 
humanitarian migrants who moved for basic survival (Bell, 2010). 
The UNHCR faced similar criticism in 2008 from the Aide Law Project that accused the 
Organisation of standing by while the rights of people who sought its protection had been 
violated (Dunlop, 2008). This was not the case in De Doorns. No mention of any unprofessional 
behaviour by the UNHCR was made in any of the monitoring reports of Black Sash for instance. 
This was also the view of the interviewees. Ms. Monique Ekoko, Senior Regional Project Officer 
of the UNHCR, during an interview also expressed her satisfaction with the cooperation of the 
RTT (2010). 
Hanekom rebuked members of the RTT and the camp manager for trying to alienate him from 
the process. The feud between Hanekom and Van Rooyen turned personal and almost derailed 
the reintegration process. On 1 October 2010, barely two weeks before the final closure of the 
camp site, in an internal communication to the Acting Municipal Manager of the BVM, Van 
Rooyen resigned from the RTT. He stated the unbearable provocation from Hanekom and the 
interference from councillors and/or officials who collude with Hanekom “giving him an edge 
when we go into discussions with the Zimbabweans” as reasons for his resignation (M. Van 
Rooyen, internal BVM e-mail dated 1 October 2010). A few days later, Van Rooyen withdrew his 
resignation. With regard to Hanekom, Sauls maintained: 
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It must be said that although he is difficult in a sense and delayed the process it is 
understandable. As a pressure group PASSOP had the best interest of the Zimbabweans at 
heart. He should have been managed but unfortunately by confronting him openly the Task 
Team played into his hands. The Breede Valley Municipality was on the right track to resolve 
the situation in camp but the intervening and obstruction to the process by Hanekom hampered 
the operation (2010). 
Although it is entirely appropriate for PASSOP to speak out against the possible violation of 
human rights of Zimbabweans in the camp, its critique in the De Doorns case was often 
unbalanced, provocative and sometimes even unfounded. His delaying tactics and 
uncompromising attitude cost the Zimbabweans dearly in sympathy. However, his resolve in 
advocating the plight of the displaced Zimbabweans is commendable. 
PASSOP’s resolve against hasty reintegration was based on its desire to bargain for the best 
options for the displaced Zimbabweans. The volatile feelings in the relevant communities and 
the fact that the displaced did not have a physical location to return to formed the basis of 
PASSOP’s arguments against reintegration (Hanekom, 2011). The Zimbabweans also felt that 
they should be compensated in the form of a relocation/reintegration grant. 
Fortunately for PASSOP, in its fight for the rights of the displaced Zimbabweans and resistance 
to early reintegration, the Organisation’s efforts were boosted by the community’s resistance to 
reintegration. It afforded them the opportunity to bargain for better concessions from 
government. 
The reintegration efforts and process has been covered in the chronological synopsis of events. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
The research focused on government’s involvement in creating an environment conducive to 
social conflict and its efforts to manage the humanitarian and reintegration processes. Reasons 
for the attacks and the interaction between stakeholders – government, the displaced foreign 
nationals, the community, HTA and NGOs received attention. 
Although the De Doorns case shares similarities with other case studies on xenophobic violence 
it is unique in the sense that the attacks were planned and targeted against a specific category 
of foreign nationals, namely Zimbabweans employed as seasonal workers on farms in the area. 
It is also significant that, in comparison to the 2008 incidents, the attacks in De Doorns affected 
the community in its entirety. 
Research on the De Doorns case added a new dimension to reasons for xenophobic violence, 
namely indirect employment. This is the situation where employment is externalised and 
workers employed as intermediaries who in turn are offered to the farmers as labourers. 
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Competition between local and Zimbabwean labour brokers fuelled the contestation for scarce 
resources in the informal communities.  
Although cases of xenophobic violence were reported in other rural settings in the Western 
Cape, such as Riversdale, it is insignificant compared to the scope of the violence and 
displacement experienced in the De Doorns case. The study also illustrates the vulnerability of 
the table grape industry and the potential of labour unrest to upset the equilibrium in employer-
employee relationships. This publicity-sensitive and labour-intensive industry, the main 
employer in the area, cannot afford social conflict on its doorstep. 
Since the aim of the study is to evaluate the BVM’s performance in exercising its developmental 
mandate, Council’s reaction with regard to early warning signs, its involvement in the community 
and its role in managing the reintegration process were investigated. Research results indicate 
that the local government did not heed early warning signs, failed in communicating with the 
communities and was even allegedly involved in instigating the violence. This will be discussed 
in more detail in the chapter dealing with the findings. The section dealing with the Municipality’s 
involvement with the humanitarian response and reintegration efforts also produced valuable 
findings. The De Doorns case, in terms of its uniqueness and approach (from a government 
perspective), makes a valuable contribution towards the existing body of knowledge with regard 
to government’s developmental responsibility to involve the community in governance, the 
involvement of micro politics in instigating xenophobic violence, and the management of 
xenophobic situations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
5.1.1 XENOPHOBIA 
In terms of its definition, observations during the humanitarian response and opinions of 
researchers and interviewees, the De Doorns case did not constitute xenophobia in the 
classical sense. The author agrees with the view of Theron that the term xenophobia in the De 
Doorns case has little explanatory value. According to Theron, referring to the description of 
phobia as an irrational fear, there is nothing irrational about the competition between strata of 
the working class for scarce job opportunities. Theron, who views the case from a labour 
perspective, maintains that in the absence of organised labour to serve the course of farm 
workers in the area, the potential for labour related conflict remains a threat. Van Rooyen 
concurs with Theron that the conflict is rather competition between the different groups for job 
opportunities and maintains that the incidents are not classical xenophobia, rather social 
conflict. The deliberate planning of the attacks, targeting a selected group of people, supports 
the above views.  
On-going observations during the humanitarian phase, with the exception of the initial verbal 
threats shortly after the incidents, detected no harmful behaviour directed at foreign nationals. 
The fact that most of the internally displaced during their stay in the camp continued with their 
work on the farms alongside locals and after hours socialised with the people of the informal 
settlements, is a further indication that elements of fear and hatred for foreigners were less 
obvious in the case of De Doorns. In essence, it was not fear and hatred for foreign nationals 
per se that caused feelings of discontent. Negative feelings against Zimbabweans were based 
on their perceived threat in the struggle for scarce resources. Labour brokers and community 
leaders used the Zimbabweans as scapegoats in pursuance of self-interest. Even the 
community’s opposition towards reintegration was more than anything else, a battle for 
government’s attention to address service delivery shortcomings in the communities. 
5.1.2 PREJUDICE 
In essence, it was not the fear of foreigners that triggered the violence. From the De Doorns 
case, it emerged that even in the absence of strong feelings of fear and hatred, foreigners are 
still prone to collective violence. 
Feelings of prejudice and discontent were stimulated by the following factors: 
• Inequalities in the community. There are few places in the country where inequalities are 
so conspicuous than the Hex River Valley. The affluent white community with their 
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beautiful farms and stately homesteads is in sharp contrast with the struggling informal 
settlements where feelings of depravation reign supreme. Visits to the informal 
settlements Ekupumleni, Hasie Square and Stofland revealed extreme poverty and 
hardship. 
• The large number of Zimbabweans in De Doorns, estimated at between 8 000 and 9 000 
is a worrisome development in terms of contestation for scarce resources – jobs and 
housing. 
• The presence of a Home Affairs satellite office in De Doorns that attracted foreign 
nationals to the area. 
• The preference of foreign workers by local farmers and the belief by community members 
that Zimbabweans steal their jobs. 
• The belief by South African residents that Zimbabweans work for lower wages. 
• Service delivery issues.  
5.1.3 LABOUR AND SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES 
Evidence produced by the study refuted the claims from community members that 
Zimbabweans work for lower wages. Claims by the local community that Zimbabweans steal 
their jobs have also been proved wrong. What is more credible is that the competition between 
labour brokers may have been a contributory cause for the community’s xenophobic conduct. 
Labour brokers are influential figures in the community with their own teams of workers 
depending on them to provide work. These “loyal” workers can be easily mobilised, even for 
selfish political reasons. 
Although service delivery and socio-economic conditions did not feature as reasons for 
discontent at first, it was later during the humanitarian response phase, used as a bargaining 
chip for service delivery in Stofland in exchange for allowing the Zimbabweans to reintegrate 
into the community. 
While these matters could have contributed towards feelings of prejudice, it did not trigger the 
attacks. The research identified interference from labour brokers and micro politics as the main 
contributing factors in fuelling tensions and triggering violence by inciting local communities. 
There was no official response from the authorities with regard to reports on the alleged 
involvement of local political actors. Although observations, allegations and perceptions do not 
constitute evidence, they indicate that there are wide mistrust of councillors and officials. 
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5.1.4 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 
In general the humanitarian response can be regarded as reasonably successful, especially in 
the light of the unexpectedness of the attacks and inexperience of the responsible officials. The 
following challenges in managing the process can benefit similar situations in future: 
• Disaster management. Although the BVMs performance in this regard was laudable, clear 
guidelines from the national government is necessary. 
• Responsibility. The reintegration process was held back by the lack of clear guidelines on 
who is responsible for managing the situation, national, provincial or local government. 
• NGO presence. The consistent battles between members of the RTT and a NGO nearly 
derailed the reintegration process. Guidelines to manage the relationship between officials 
and NGOs should be developed, 
• Camp security. Insufficient camp security caused organizational problems and delays. 
• Leadership. The absence of political leadership during the humanitarian and reintegration 
phases was a great concern. The performance of delegated official and progress was 
severely compromised by the absence of leadership. In the absence of political 
leadership, service delivery demands from the informal settlements were addressed to the 
RTT who did not have the authority to deal with it on a political level. 
• Budget. The fact that no provision was made on the Municipality’s budget for expenditure 
with regard to social conflict also compromised the process. 
• Mediators. The appointment of mediators to assist in the process was a positive step. 
They delivered invaluable support to the RTT, especially in negotiating the closure of the 
camp and in preparing communities for the return and reintegration of the displaced 
foreign nationals. 
5.1.5 COMMUNICATION 
In terms of the BVM’s response to early warning signs, the threat- and outbreak of violence in 
De Doorns, the study shows that the local state indeed failed in its developmental mandate to 
create an environment for public participation on issues that impact on communities. Of special 
significance are: 
• BVM’s reluctance and failure to act on the early warning signs. 
• BVM’s failure to address the labour related tensions that fueled the violence. 
Communication initiatives in the past neglected a very important actor in the Hex River 
Valley namely the commercial farmer, the major employer and creator of wealth in the 
community. The establishment of a Home Affairs office in De Doorns without consulting 
the BVM, alludes to a lack of confidence in the local government’s ability to address 
labour related issues in the agricultural sector. The Municipality’s “absence” and apparent 
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lack of political will to involve the farming community in governance, created a vacuum 
that allowed the HTA to bypass the local authority in its decision to issue asylum papers to 
Zimbabweans in De Doorns. 
• BVM’s failure to engage with the communities in De Doorns. Ward Committees are an 
important means of achieving propper community participation. According to the National 
Policy Framework for Public Participation, ward committees are seen as a vehicle for 
deepening local democracy and an instrument for establishing a vibrant and involved 
citizenry. Ward committees have a crucial role as interface between government and the 
community. At the time of the attacks, no minutes of any ward committee meetings in 
Ward 2 could be produced. No public participation policy could be produced. No one at 
the Municipality could produce the names of the committee members. A CDW working at 
the Municipality said that he was aware of only one official meeting that was held by the 
relevant committee. From discussions with the De Doorns Crisis Committee and 
community members, the lack of knowledge on government activity in the affected areas 
was obvious, which pointed to ineffective communication. The absence of ward 
committees (3 in De Doorns) and councillors to help resolve the crisis was a worrisome 
feature of the reintegration process. The Municipality was accused by the affected 
communities of not consulting with them on their service delivery needs. 
5.1.6 EVALUATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES DURING THE CRISES 
• A major contributory factor to the xenophobic incident was the absence of a 
comprehensive communication strategy to deal with the various developmental 
challenges that faced De Doorns at the time of the crisis. In terms of developmental local 
government, communities must be engaged in governance and consulted on issues that 
affect their lives – they must be part of decision-making. Issues such as the plight of farm 
labourers, living conditions and farm evictions, labour practices, the large number of 
foreign workers and the relations between farmers and the local government and farmers 
and farm labourers should be vigorously debated. Communication in the developmental 
sense is more than a linearly one-way dissemination of information. It is a dialogic process 
based on participation. A communication-based assessment should identify the issues in 
the community that need to be communicated. If that was done, say three years prior to 
the attacks, the De Doorns crisis could have been avoided. 
• Participation of the community in governance prior to the attacks was restricted to an IDP 
meeting once a year. There is no evidence of communication between the HTA and BVM 
on matters related to labour brokers, the conditions on the farms and the influx of foreign 
nationals, prior to the crisis. Stakeholder engagement in communication actions in the 
modern paradigm is of the utmost importance. There is no record of any efforts to engage 
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communities in communicating with local government, other than the IDP meetings. It 
must be stressed that meaningful participation cannot happen without communication. To 
be truly significant and meaningful, participation needs to be based on the application of 
two-way communication principles and practices. All indications are there that the local 
state must still make the paradigm shift towards employing development communication 
in dealing with communities. 
• Communication initiatives at the time of the attacks, and humanitarian and reintegration 
phases included the following: 
MEDIA 
• The attacks on November, 17th were covered in detail by the regional dailies, Die Burger, 
Cape Times, Argus and the local community newspapers Standard and Valleier. The 
articles informed the public of the attacks, criticising the attackers and sympathising with 
the Zimbabweans. Although the reports in general were unbiased, some of the RTT 
members have expressed the opinion that the articles of the Cape Times favoured the 
views of NGOs. It must be mentioned that the BVM at no stage utilised the print media to 
address xenophobia, in either sensitising or educating the public on the issue. In general, 
reporting by the major regional newspapers was informative but lacked an in-depth 
analysis of the causes giving rise to the attacks. It is felt that the Standard as leading 
community newspaper in the region, could have done much more in terms of stimulating 
debate and in sensitising and educating the public on xenophobia. During the eleven 
months of the biggest humanitarian crisis ever in the history of the Breede Valley, the 
Standard carried only five brief articles on the incident.  
• The value of community radio as a means to give a voice to local communities, especially 
the most marginalised ones, and involve them in providing inputs on decisions affecting 
their lives, cannot be underestimated. Although the local community radio Valley FM is 
fully committed to accommodate community issues, a large part of De Doorns falls outside 
its broadcast range.  Notwithstanding this restriction, two recordings were made in the 
safety camp and broadcasted. The chairperson of the RTT was also interviewed in the 
studio. Since many people from De Doorns commute on a daily basis to Worcester where 
they listen to Valley FM in taxis, shops and at the workplace, the effect of the broadcasts 
was not a total loss. The television channel e.tv visited De Doorns on two occasions. A 
news conference on the closing of the safety sight held at the provincial legislature in 
Cape Town, offered opportunity for journalists to ask probing questions on the issue. 
• Although the media informed the public on aspects of the crisis – the attacks and 
conditions in the safety camp - it contributed very little towards explaining the 
phenomenon and offering solutions. 
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COMMUNITY MEETINGS 
• Four community meetings, initiated by the RTT and an imbizo, organised by the 
Department of Labour, were held in the affected communities of Stofland, Hasie Square 
and Ekuphumleni. The meetings were held to inform the communities on aspects of the 
crisis, to explain service delivery issues and to negotiate the safe reintegration of the 
Zimbabweans into Stofland. Although the interacton did not involve dialog in the true 
participatory sense, there was some response from the community, though mostly 
negative and disruptive. Because the issues were not communicated properly to the 
affected communities beforehand, they felt divorced from the process. The meetings and 
imbizo were conducted in a one-way communication approach aimed at increasing 
knowledge and changing attitudes and behaviour.  
STAKEHOLDER MEETINGS 
• Stakeholder meetings is another mode of communication that was used to consult with 
the locals. The RTT and officials of BVM met on three occasions with the HTA – once with 
the members and twice with the board of directors. All three meetings allowed full 
participation. Although reintegration and accommodation for Zimbabwean workers were 
dicussed, BVM at no stage confronted HTA with burning issues on the farms. Meetings 
were also held with the sport groups, the crisis committee representing the affected 
communities and with the committees representing the displaced people in the safety 
camp. The aim of the meetings was to inform the stakeholders on issues and to get their 
cooperation. 
COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS 
• At the beginning of the crisis, pamphlets were distributed by community development 
workers in the affected areas to sensitise people on the issue of xenophobia. Pamphlets 
were also distributed on two occasions to communicate the closing of the safety camp. 
The pamphlets were developed by the Communication Committee of the RTT consisting 
of communication practitioners from BVM, CWDM and GCIS. The Communication 
Committee also developed a communication strategy, prepared media statements and a 
service delivery scorecard that was distributed in the affected areas. Pamphlets to inform 
and persuade stakeholders to change their behaviour are a form of one-way 
communication. It is however very difficult to measure the success of the pamphlets. The 
fact that the pamphlets were only distributed in the affected areas minimised their 
effectiveness and potential to persuade a wider audience to eradicate xenophobic 
behaviour. 
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WALKABOUT 
• A walkabout of stakeholders was held a month after the attacks. This form of grass-roots 
communication offered the Executive Mayor and councillors an opportunity to meet with 
other stakeholders such as NGO’s, community leaders and ordinary citizens living in the 
affected areas. This can be a very effective form of communication to build trust, achieve 
mutual understanding and involve the community in decision-making. The walkabout 
involved only a fraction of the affected communities. To be effective this direct form of 
communication should be sustainable, well planed and focused. 
INTER-FAITH PRAYER MEETINGS 
• Two inter-faith prayer meetings were held. It was however poorly attended. 
Although the Communication Committee played a significant role in the dissemination of 
information and in liaising with the media, it was totally underutilised with regard to building trust 
among stakeholders, assessing the situation, exploring options and seeking broad consensus 
for sustainable change. The committee should have been active from the start. A 
communication strategy was only developed in July 2010, almost seven months after the 
attacks. Instead of a sub-committee, communication should have been represented on the RTT 
from the beginning of the crisis. 
From a communication perspective, the mayor represents the “face” of a municipality. With the 
exception of the walkabout and three community meetings, the mayor and his committee were 
not involved in any dialogue with the affected communities. Council also failed to utilise tools 
such as the media, especially the local community newspaper and radio, to communicate with 
the broader community on the issues leading to the attacks. From the research, interviews and 
observations, it is clear that council demonstrated an unwillingness to get involved in the De 
Doorns crisis.  
The community development workers liaised closely with the Department of Social 
Development, rendering a support service. In terms of communication, the CDWS disseminated 
information and were involved in needs assessments in the safety camp. They also arranged a 
sports event in an effort to build trust between the Zimbabweans and the local community. The 
event, however failed because of a lack of interest by the government institutions. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The situation in De Doorns demands immediate attention. The conditions on farms in the Hex 
Valley over the years have become unbearable with farm workers, contributing to the success of 
the lucrative table grape industry, among the most vulnerable people in South Africa. Earning a 
wage of R60.00 per day, living in harsh conditions on farms and in informal settlements with no 
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union representation, these unfortunate workers now face the threat of loosing their jobs to 
foreign nationals from Zimbabwe. Tragically, farm workers cannot even rely on the protection of 
government, who for many years avoided contact with farmers and labour brokers. The 
problems that farm workers face are not unknown to government and farmers. Farm workers 
however, are not the only people affected by government’s “diplomacy of silence.” Government, 
in not addressing the problems facing the industry, is allowing frustration to build up against 
farmers. If left unattended the status quo will eventually erupt in another bout of violent protest. 
It is recommended that a communication programme based on the World Bank’s widely 
accepted four-phase methodological framework of research, strategy design, implementation 
and monitoring and evaluation be implemented in De Doorns. Since the framework is 
underpinned by the dialogic mode of development communication, programmes, specifically the 
research phase or communication-based assessment, should be guided by the basic principles 
of development communication. The communication-based assessment should be dialogic, 
inclusive, heuristic, analytical, participatory and persuasive. 
The first phase is research and includes a review of secondary sources and a communication-
based assessment to engage stakeholders in the analyses of key issues, in the assessment of 
risks and opportunities and in the definition of priorities facilitating behavioural and social 
change. By involving all relevant stakeholders, the community-based assessment addresses 
the “what”, “who” and “why” of the situation that is being investigated. Although using a number 
of qualitative methods, community-based assessment also includes quantitative methods such 
as surveys and baseline studies to quantify the extent of the initial findings. Qualitative tools 
such as interviews, focus group discussions and the review of secondary sources are used to 
gain knowledge in the community-based assessment phase (Mefalopulos, 2008: 105). Other 
useful tools are questionnaires and opinion polls. Participatory rural communication appraisal is 
used in rural areas. Due to its strong participatory connotation it is ideal for community driven 
development projects  
In the communication-based assessment the first part of the analyses focuses on the “why” of a 
situation using qualitative techniques such as interviews and focus groups. The second part 
addresses the “what” and the “how much” of the circumstances in order to triangulate the initial 
findings and to quantify them. 
The second phase of the approach is strategy design for achieving specific objectives, as 
identified in the research phase. A successful communication strategy design is based on a 
successful analysis of the specific situation. During this phase a strategy and action plan is 
identified that will determine the budget and time, communication approach and related media 
and messages identified for each audience. This phase defines the type of change required and 
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select the most appropriate communication approach for each initiative. These approaches can 
include advocacy, social marketing, diffusion of information or capacity building (Mefalopulos, 
2008: 120). The different approaches can stand alone or can be used in a combination of each 
other. 
The third phase concerns the implementation of the approaches and activities selected in the 
strategy. This phase includes an action plan of activities required to produce the results of the 
strategic design. Actions can include activities such as training, the writing of radio scripts and 
the design of communication materials. 
The fourth phase: This is monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation is the process of determining 
whether and to what extent a certain intervention has produced the intended result 
(Mefalopulos, 2008: 135).  For the success of a project, it is necessary that relevant indicators 
and related measurements be defined at the beginning of the intervention. The effects on the 
impact of diffusion approaches are felt after the implementation phases, whereas in the case of 
participatory approaches the effects can be felt from the beginning. Evaluating the impact of 
diffusion interventions is therefore easier, since there can be a pre- and post-assessment of the 
situation. The difference between these two assessments determines the impact of the 
communication. In the case of participatory assessment, the results are not easily measurable 
due to the explorative scope of the dialogic mode, which implies amongst others a 
measurement of trust, mutual understanding, empowerment and consensus building. Measuring 
the difference between the starting point and the finish is often the only way to measure the 
impact of communication (2008: 144).. 
Based on the aforementioned, it is recommended:  
• That the BVM takes full responsibility for a communication intervention process in De 
Doorns in accordance with the four-phased methodological framework as explained 
above. 
• That the municipality commence with a communication-based assessment as a matter of 
urgency.  
• That CDW’s be utilised to their fullest potential in the communication-based assesment 
and monitoring of processes in the communities. 
• That ward committees be actively involved in the dissemination of information and early 
detection of problems in their wards; that the Speaker of the BVM closely monitor their 
performance. 
• That a development forum linked to the IDP, representing all relevant stakeholders in the 
community, be established to assist the BVM in the assessment of communication needs 
and the identification of project and communication objectives. 
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• That councillors familiarise themselves with issues in the community, analyse situations 
properly and understand all of the crucial issues and perceptions of the various 
stakeholders. 
• That community media be utilised on a much larger scale in the dissemination of 
message, education and analyses of issues in the community. 
With regard to the conflict in the community, the following is recommended: 
• That a series of workshops involving stakeholders such as BVM, HTA, ward committees, 
the Hex Valley Rate Payers Association and the Departments of Agriculture, Labour, 
Home Affairs and Social Development be held to discuss issues of conflict in the 
agricultural sector and the implications of agricultural labour processes on local 
development planning and service delivery. 
• That policies be developed to regulate labour broking and to respond to the influx of 
foreign nationals. 
• That foreign nationals be encouraged to serve on ward committees and forums in the 
community such as the community policing forums. 
• That the inclusion of social conflict issues be a standing item on the agenda of BVM 
council meetings. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
The Breede Valley Municipality for the past couple of years received unqualified audit opinions 
from the Auditor General. The Municipality, also in terms of an IQ evaluation report in 2010 was 
highly rated for creating an environment for development. Notwithstanding these achievements, 
the Municipality failed to prevent a human catastrophe. Notwithstanding a history of labour 
unrest in the table grape industry, protest action and rumours of planned attacks, the 
Municipality failed to take action. The Municipality failed to communicate with the agriculture 
sector on long-standing labour related tensions.  Although the Municipality engaged with the 
relevant communities in terms of the IDP and facilitated development in Stofland, it failed to 
make the people part of the process and to gain their trust. It must be mentioned that at the time 
of the incident the ANC in the Western Cape was divided on a leadership issue. This might 
have contributed to the turmoil in the informal settlements and distracted the ward councillors’ 
attention from the job at hand. In short, critical issues in a labour intensive area, affecting a 
labour sensitive industry that provides employment to thousands of people were neglected by 
the sphere of government closest to the people, creating an environment for community protest 
and xenophobic attacks. 
The table grape industry, competing in a very competitive export market cannot afford bad 
publicity and labour unrest. The potential economic, political and social impact of the violence 
on the industry cannot be underestimated. Given the interrelated nature of the global economy, 
negative sentiments on the table grape export market has the potential to discourage 
investment. It is almost two years after the attacks and nothing has really changed. The 
Zimbabweans are still in De Doorns, labour brokers are still active and even the sports field is 
still unused. 
The outbreak of xenophobia in De Doorns points to an unwillingness on the part of local 
government to address pressing developmental issues in the Hex Valley.  
Two years after the incident there is still no development communication programmes 
implemented. Problems that exist for longer than a decade are still unsolved. The community of 
De Doorns expressed their dissatisfaction by attacking foreign nationals on 11 and 17 
November 2009. Unless local government heed the call and involve the people of De Doorns in 
decision-making, they will find other ways to vent their anger. Given the history of discontent; 
the standoff between the local government and producers (farmers), the friction between 
Zimbabweans and locals, housing shortages, poverty and unemployment, the possibility of a 
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repetition of 2009 is not far fetched; even actions such as the illegal occupation of farms, cannot 
be ruled out. 
The outbreak of xenophobia in De Doorns is largely poverty related. In addressing poverty, 
many developmental problems can be avoided. Poverty is not only about the deprivation of 
basic material needs. It is not simply an income issue. For Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, poverty 
is also about capabilities deprivation and social exclusion. By involving the poor in the 
assessment process of communication interventions and engaging them in decision-making, 
development communication not only can reduce a key element of poverty, namely social 
exclusion, but can also facilitate the process of empowerment. According to Mefalopulos : 
“Using dialog to engage stakeholders in probing and assessing the situation can help break 
the broader vicious circle of poverty, where income cannot be earned without a proper level 
of individual capabilities and individual capabilities cannot be improved while the individual 
remains in conditions of poverty” (2008:56). 
In participation communication, the BVM has the tool to reduce poverty and at the same time 
empower marginalised communities to take charge of aspects that influence their lives. While 
government tends to look at economic solutions to address poverty, dialog unlocks poverty by 
reducing social exclusion. In neglecting its developmental responsibility by not addressing 
burning issues and communicating with stakeholders, local government is in fact encouraging 
poverty. 
With the exception of some initiatives by the Department of Social Development and an initiative 
by GCIS to sensitise schoolchildren about xenophobia, nothing has been done in terms of 
conflict resolution mechanisms and the early detection of problems that can lead to xenophobic 
attacks. With the attacks of 14 and 17 November 2009 still fresh in the mind, another potential 
conflict situation is brooding just a few kilometres west of Stofland on the N1 national road at the 
informal settlement named GG Camp. Although in this case it is not labour related, social 
conflict has the tendency to develop very quickly into something much more sinister, such as 
xenophobia. There are also no visible signs of an increase in councillor involvement in the 
community. With regard to ward committees, a new system has been implemented following the 
local government elections during May 2011. 
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APPENDIX A 
XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE HEX VALLEY TABLE GRAPE ASSOCIATION MS 
ELSA JORDAAN – 22 JULY 2009 
Key objective 
To obtain the participant’s views on: 
• the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic 
situation and the reintegration of the displaced 
• accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the 
violence by underpaying Zimbabweans 
• the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation 
• the conditions in the camp. 
Methodology  
An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to 
conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and 
place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee. 
Profile of interviewee 
Ms. Elsa Jordaan is the Executive Director of the Hex Valley Table Grape Association based in 
De Doorns in the Breede Valley. She is also a DA councilor at the Breede Valley Municipality. 
Questions 
1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De 
Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What 
in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence? 
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and 
indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns? 
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough 
was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue? 
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication 
process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, 
displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO’S, media, government and the residents of De 
Doorns? 
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team? 
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process? 
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Synopses of the interview 
The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview. 
According to Ms. Jordaan minor incidents of prejudice against foreigners in the De Doorns 
area occurred as early as 2007. An incident in 2008 when the ex-boyfriend of a Xhosa girl 
burned down the shack of her Zimbabwean lover, sparked robust police action against “illegal“ 
Zimbabweans. Ms. Jordaan describes the actions of the police as “very sad.” 
Farmers who wanted to register (get asylum papers) their illegal Zimbabwean workers in the 
Cape Town office of Home Affairs could not take them by bus since it is illegal to transport 
Zimbabweans without their asylum papers. The farmers at that stage were faced with a dilemma 
since the demand for workers exceeded the supply due to the following reasons: 
The negative effect of AIDS on the supply of local workers, urbanization, increased production 
(from 2000 boxes per hectare in a season a view years back to the present 6 000 boxes) and 
an increase of serviced agricultural land. To address the problem and to avoid employing illegal 
workers the HTA reach an agreement with Home Affairs that Zimbabwean workers be 
registered locally, first by means of a mobile office, later via an office based at the Hex River 
Post Office. The following process was followed: 
Farmers bring their workers to the HTA office in town where they get a letter of support which 
they take to the office of Home Affairs where the registration process takes place. At some 
stage it came to Association’s knowledge that the process is being manipulated and that others 
who do not work on farms are also receiving their asylum papers at the Office. The arrangement 
was then made that only when the farmer himself or his foreman bring the Zimbabwean workers 
a permit will be issued. But even this arrangement could not prevent that others were also 
registered. When some of the local labour brokers approached the HTA with a plea to employ 
local people, HTA immediately called for the closure of the Home Affairs office. 
To streamline the employment of local labourers an agreement was entered into with the labour 
brokers whose papers were in order. An organization, Hex Valley Contractors was then 
established and a code of conduct approved. But the performance of these contactors, catering 
for the local labour market, were not up to standard and they were told that as long as people 
do not turn up for work, farmers will have to rely on Zimbabweans to do the work. The 
contractors could however not reach agreement on the code of conduct. At that stage only 16 of 
the original 50 registered at the HTA remained. The effort was then abandoned and the status 
quo continued. Apparently new efforts to revive the Association have been initiated. 
Local Cllr. Poyi Lubisi, as also confirmed by media reports, is believed to be an instigator of 
the violence. Apparently Cllr. Lubisi promised a section of the community that they will receive 
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electrification. When that didn’t materialise his political career was in jeopardy. It is believed 
that when locals complained about unemployment he seized the opportunity to mobilize the 
community against the Zimbabweans. Attacks on Zimbabweans followed almost immediately 
after meetings (which councilor Lubisi also attended) with the community. The majority of the 
aggressors were mainly youth from Xhosa origin. People from Lesotho were not attacked 
because they were prepared to defend themselves. After the attacks the Zimbabweans were at 
first accommodated at the municipal store and later moved to the sports-grounds. The police 
presence during the attacks was disappointing – no provision for extra manpower was made 
and the police stood idly watching as the drama unfolds. 
The HTA took a decision that all media liaison, including press statements be dealt with by Agri 
Western Cape. Ms. Jordaan referred to accusations of illegal labour practices by Labour 
Minister Membathisi Mdladlana – of farmers underpaying their Zimbabwean workers. She says 
there is no truth in these accusations and invited Western Cape Members of Parliament, Meyer, 
Van Rensburg and Max who assisted her on this matter. HTA attended the Reintegration Task 
Team meetings on a regular basis. The Mayor, Deputy Mayor and others of the BVM for 
political reasons refused to accept HTA’S explanation that workers are not underpaid – that 
they are in fact paid more than the minimum wage. This attitude was detrimental to employer/ 
employee relations and with the assistance of the Speaker of BVM and Task Team a meeting 
between members of HTA and government representatives was held. When the Mayor, Deputy 
and other politicians persisted with their attitude she asked the Municipal Manager to intervene 
in the matter, which he did with positive results. After that there was a better understanding of 
the HTA’S position. An investigation by the Department of Labour into the wage matter could 
not proof underpayment by the producers (farmers). The focus then shifted to the labour brokers  
and the temporary office of Home Affairs in De Doorns. Ms Jordaan maintains that the office 
was opened by the ANC not the DA. They (HTA) insisted that the office be closed. She explains 
the wage issue as follows: 
The farmer pays the labour broker R60.00 per day for the worker and an additional R5.00 fee 
for administrative costs. What happens is that Zimbabweans is willing to work for less than the 
locals and labour brokers exploit their vulnerability by offering employment for less than the 
farmers paid them. This is the cause of all the trouble. 
Ms. Jordaan feels that media reports was unfair and discredited the HTA and farmers 
unnecessary. She is also of the opinion that Agri Western-Cape could have been more 
aggressive in their response to media allegations. 
With regard to their participation in the process HTA was involved from the start on. The 
directors attended the meetings and offered their fullest cooperation. In contrast, the BVM 
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councillors, with the exception of Cllr. Jordaan, played a very low-key role, causing a 
leadership vacuum. This absent leadership has a negative influence on the proceedings and 
put pressure on the officials dealing with the issue. She agrees that in the De Doorns case there 
is also a lack of political will. 
The communication process is not effective enough, especially with regard to the Stofland 
community.  The officials of the Municipality are doing their best but their efforts lack the backing 
of their councillors. Although there was confusion regarding, who is in charge of the process, 
Ms. Jordaan is of the opinion that the BVM is in chare. In defence of the Municipality it must be 
said that nobody really new what to do. 
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APPENDIX B 
XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH 
MR ASHRAF KAFAAR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WORKER COORDINATOR FOR THE 
CAPE WINELAND DISTRICT – 27 JULY 2010 
Key objective 
To obtain the participant’s views on: 
• the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic 
situation and the reintegration of the displaced 
• accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the 
violence by underpaying Zimbabweans 
• the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation 
• the conditions in the camp. 
Methodology  
An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to 
conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and 
place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee. 
Profile of interviewee 
Mr Ashraf Kafaar is the Provincial Coordinator of the Community Worker Program for the Cape 
Winelands District in the Western Cape. He coordinates the CDW presence at the De Doorns 
refugee camp which includes monitoring of camp activity and logistics. 
Questions 
1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De 
Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What 
in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence? 
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and 
indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns? 
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough 
was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue? 
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication 
process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, 
displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO’S, media, government and the residents of De 
Doorns? 
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team? 
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6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process? 
Synopses of the interview 
The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr Kafaar. The 
interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the 
questions were asked). 
The interviewee identifies a lack of knowledge as one of the main contributory factors leading 
to xenophobic behaviour. The community do not understanding the cultural practices of the 
Zimbabweans and why they are here. Because locals do not know them they fear them and feel 
inferior to them, constantly measuring them against the foreign nationals. 
Political interference may have played a role but in the case of the De Doorns discussions 
about the growing number of foreign nationals surfaced long before November 2009. 
Traditionally over the December period most of the people, including youth that finished school, 
worked on the farms for an extra income. Now this opportunity must be shared with 5000 
foreign nationals. This created a platform for locals to manoeuvre against the Zimbabweans. 
There is a perception that the only way to get government’s attention is to create a crisis. The 
same can be said of service delivery protests. These actions don’t just happen – the lack of 
communication created a vacuum. Locally and nationally not much has been done by 
government to communicate xenophobia. 
Commitment to the problem and a lack of political will to get involved are also matters of 
concern. For instance, a sport event to bring the foreign nationals and community closer 
together, to create a platform for dialog was arranged to take place on Reconciliation Day, 16 
December 2009. It was quite disappointing when the organisers were told a day before the 
event that most of the role-players were away on holiday. We were in the middle of a crisis with 
2000 people displaced. It was important to create a sense of normality. Again the political will 
was absent. Only the Departments of Social Development and Health were still involved in the 
camp at that stage. 
Initially it was said that the Zimbabweans take the work of locals because they were paid less 
by the farmers. However, an inquiry into the labour practices of farmers, ordered by the Minister 
of Labour, revealed that the farmers meet the basic conditions of employment. 
With regard to service delivery it can be said that the RTT (Reintegration Task Team) took to 
long to present the Stofland community with a scorecard of services rendered to the community 
by the local municipality.  
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With regard to crime there is no evidence that there is a drop in criminal activity since the 
displacement of the Zimbabweans. 
In a situation like this, perceptions play an important role – the challenge is how to rectify these 
perceptions in the community, how do you address the perceptions. To a great extent the same 
reasons for xenophobia identified in 2008 – economy, crime, housing, resources, were also 
identified in 2009. 
In De Doorns there are also Sothos and they were not attacked. A possible reason is that the 
Zimbabweans compete in the same labour market as the locals. They were seen as a softer 
target as the Sothos. You will also find that Nigerians for instance live in the suburbs, not in 
townships. 
It is difficult to get to the root of the problem. There are accusations such as the involvement of 
politicians, but it is difficult to prove. In the townships there exists a culture of not splitting on 
each other. This is the kind of things we must start to address in programs if you want to speak 
to xenophobia. 
When it comes to housing there is no evidence that a Zimbabwean owns property in Stofland. 
The so-called “hotels” in Stofland where locals sub-let accommodation to Zimbabweans also 
cannot be a reason for xenophobia because the local people benefit from it. These hotels are a 
source of income for locals during the off-season. 
The large number of Zimbabweans is a cause for concern but it can’t be controlled by the 
municipality. It rests with the national government to manage influx control – to regulate our 
borders. Unofficially it can be done. There is for instance a township in a neighbouring 
municipality who had a zero population growth over the past few years due to informally and 
unofficially controlling the flow of incoming people. They realise the importance of catering only 
for this amount of people on this piece of land. In this specific case there was a continuous 
communication between local leaders and the community. 
Although the farmers were cleared of blame it can be argued that the local registration of 
Zimbabweans on their request to work on the farms can be viewed as an insult to the local 
labourers. Also the fact that the farmers presently do not enter Stofland but instead pick up and 
drop their workers at the safety camp is cause for concern. Even though many of them work on 
citrus farms in Ceres, HTA committed them to take responsibility for the farmers’ actions and 
can’t shed this responsibility by saying the specific farmers is not from De Doorns. The RTT was 
slow to communicate this matter to HTA. At the end of the season the farmers drop their 
Zimbabwean workers at the camp. The farmers are part of the problem and should make 
provision for their workers. 
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Dialog is a very important part of the reintegration process, dialog with all role-players. In all the 
deliberations one of the major stakeholders, the community was neglected.  All our energy and 
resources were focused on the safety camp.  
The RTT was well represented and integrated. The communication within the team and to the 
municipality and even the provincial government was very good.  However the RTT should have 
more decision taking powers. Important decisions such as obtaining legal opinions were first 
referred to the municipality and the provincial government. In that sense, due to protocol the 
RTT was sometimes slow in responding.  The RTT should be more proactive – the trends 
should tell the team what to expect and they should react instead of waiting for the crisis to 
develop. Even with the establishment of the camp not withstanding the benefits of trends, we 
were slow in responding. The amount of work done on Xenophobia in this region is limited. 
We should make the fight against xenophobia inclusive. We have a ward committee system 
and should involve foreign nationals on this forum. They can contribute to sub-committees such 
as business and youth. In De Doorns the most resistance came from the f section where the 
young men were accommodated. There is no difference between the Zimbabwean youth in the 
camp and our own youth. The history of apartheid is not important for our youth – they want 
jobs, a car, they want a taste of the better life. 
It is important that we make the foreign nationals part of our system. We need to involve them in 
our ward committees. For example in Zwelethemba township in Worcester there is a close 
relationship between the CPF (Community Policing Forum) and the foreign nationals. In 2008 
before the outbreak of the countrywide xenophobia there were already rumours in Zwelethemba 
that it was going to happen. The CPF was proactive in that sense. In 2008 with the outbreak of 
the xenophobic violence Zwelethemba experienced no incidents of violence against foreigners. 
Yet, pre 2008 two cases of violence were recorded in Worcester, one in Zwelethemba and one 
in Roodewal. Considering this history it was expected that Zwelethemba would have been a hot 
spot. The ward committees will also provide a platform to discuss these and other issues 
concerning foreign nationals. 
Leonardo Goosen of the Human Rights Commission was the first Chairperson of the 
Committee. Sifiso was the next Chairperson. Because the Committee at that stage operated 
reactively there was not a coordinated approach. Many gaps occurred. PASSOP for instance 
donated 3000 blankets. At the end of the day, although Province played a facilitating role, the 
buck always stop with the local municipality. Municipalities should have units that deal with 
matters of conflict such as xenophobia and service delivery protests. The unit must process 
information they receive from CDW’S and other sources. The big challenge is we do not prepare 
ourselves, we are too reactionary. 
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The difference between the attacks of 2008 and 2010 is that it is now more sporadic and 
targeted, aimed for instance against shop owners, which makes it very difficult to monitor. 
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APPENDIX C 
XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH 
MR CAESAR SAULS DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT – 
27 JULY 2010  
Key objective 
To obtain the participant’s views on: 
• the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic 
situation and the reintegration of the displaced 
• accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the 
violence by underpaying Zimbabweans 
• the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation 
• the conditions in the camp. 
Methodology  
An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to 
conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and 
place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee. 
Profile of interviewee 
Mr Caesar Sauls is a Deputy Director at the Department of Social Development in Worcester. 
He represents the Department on the Reintegration Task Team at De Doorns. 
Questions 
1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De 
Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What 
in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence? 
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and 
indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns? 
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough 
was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue? 
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication 
process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, 
displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO’S, media, government and the residents of De 
Doorns? 
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team? 
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process? 
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Synopses of the interview 
The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr Sauls. The 
interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the 
questions were asked). 
The interviewee offered the following reasons for the xenophobic violence at De Doorns: 
• The Zimbabweans are favoured when it comes to work opportunities. 
• The Zimbabweans pose a threat to work opportunities for school children who 
traditionally work on the farms during the school holidays for an additional income for their 
families. 
• Service delivery issues – the focus shifted from employment opportunities to service 
delivery short comings by the Breede Valley Municipality. This was refuted at a meeting 
between Mayor Ntsomi and the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley 
Organisation. Also at a community meeting held at the Hex Valley Community Centre. A 
scorecard of service delivery projects in the area distributed by the Municipality also 
proved the accusations wrong. 
• The fears of the local people – the Zimbabweans may be criminals. 
• The Zimbabweans are here to take the women of the local men. 
• The rumours that a politician (s) incited the violence is a possibility but difficult to proof. 
• The preference of Zimbabweans by farmers can contribute to scapegoating. 
• Numbers – the fear of being swamped by the numbers of the Zimbabweans. 
What is very worrisome is the absence of ward committees and councillors to help resolve the 
issue. In discussions with the Interim Representatives of the Breede Valley Committee the lack 
of knowledge on local government activity in the area was evident which pointed to the 
ineffectiveness of the communication structures of the politicians. Right in the beginning of the 
crisis the presence of councillors was obvious at the steering committee meetings but all a 
sudden they were nowhere. It is almost as if they were told to back off and let the officials do the 
job. 
With regard to Braam Hanekom it must be said that although he is difficult in a sense and 
delayed the process it is understandable. As a pressure group PASSOP had the best interest of 
the Zimbabweans at heart. He should have been managed but unfortunately by confronting him 
openly the Task Team played into his hands. BVM (Breede Valley Municipality) was on the right 
track to resolve the situation in camp but the intervening and obstruction to the process by 
Hanekom hampered the operation. 
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The large number of Zimbabweans in the Valley – some estimates put it at 8000, is reason for 
concern. Influx control can help to solve this problem. Informants said that prior to the attack 
there was a warning out in the community that the Zimbabweans will be attacked in two weeks 
time. This might have reduced the number of Zimbabweans to a certain extent. Fear of the 
numbers of the Zimbabweans, of being swamped by the numbers is real. 
Policy aspects are challenged. One is labour – local versus migrant labour, another influx 
control. There is a relaxation for Zimbabweans in our immigration policies of which South 
Africans, especially the local people do not approve off. The Valley can offer only so much job 
opportunities and if most of them are taken up by Zimbabweans you can expect problems. Our 
demography informs us that the area can cater only for a certain amount of jobs. A proposal 
must go to HTA (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) to consider absorbing the local labour 
market first, the percentage positions left must then be offered to Zimbabweans in the camp. 
The farmers must also accommodate these seasonal workers on the farm till the end of the 
season. HTA should also be requested to help monitor the influx of Zimbabweans and provide 
the statistics to BVM. The fact that some come with their families intensifies the situation and 
must also be addressed. If farmers experience alcohol related problems from local workers 
there are safety nets, they must report it to Social Services and the Health Department. 
Initiatives to communicate xenophobia: 
• Early warning signs workshop for fieldworkers. 
• Provincial framework that explains the role of the different departments regarding 
xenophobia 
• Initiatives of the Social Development 
It is important that an understanding of these matters be impressed on scholars, especially at 
primary level. Local churches can also play a more active role in sensitising their members on 
matters of xenophobia. We must make the foreigners part of our community, include them in 
community activities. The RTT should also be more flexible in its approach. Instead of just 
wanting to get rid of the foreign nationals as quickly as possible, try to work on a relationship 
with them. 
It is my dream that when the sports field is fully rehabilitated a soccer match between the locals 
and the Zimbabweans be hosted. 
With regard to the RTT it must be said that communication was open, information shared, no 
hidden agendas and no gate keeping experienced.  
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APPENDIX D 
XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE DE DOORNS NOVEMBER 2009: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH 
MR MANFRED VAN ROOYEN CHAIRPERSON OF THE DE DOORNS REINTEGRATION 
TASK TEAM – 11AUGUST 2010 
Key objective 
To obtain the participant’s views on: 
• the reasons for the attack, the process that was followed in managing the xenophobic 
situation and the reintegration of the displaced 
• accusations that the Hex Valley Table Grape Association (HTA) contributed to the 
violence by underpaying Zimbabweans 
• the communication process that was followed in managing the xenophobic situation 
• the conditions in the camp. 
Methodology  
An open-ended interview that allows the participant to express her views freely. Permission to 
conduct the interview and to use a tape recorder was obtained in advance. The date, time and 
place of the interview were cleared with the interviewee. 
Profile of interviewee 
Mr Manfred van Rooyen represents the Breede Valley Municipality on the RTT (Reintegration 
Task Team. He is the current Chairperson of the RTT. 
Questions 
1. Various reasons are given for the xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in De 
Doorns such as poverty and unemployment, labour practices, political agendas, etc. What 
in your opinion triggered the violence/ serve as stimulus for the violence? 
2. Politicians are accused in the media and research reports of a lack of political will and 
indifference in dealing with xenophobia. Is it also the case in De Doorns? 
3. Incidents of xenophobia are not uncommon to the Breede Valley. Do you think enough 
was done in terms of public participation/ communication to address the issue? 
4. With regard to the present situation in De Doorns, how do you rate the communication 
process in terms of consultation with various role players – the Stofland community, 
displaced Zimbabweans, HTA, NGO’S, media, government and the residents of De 
Doorns? 
5. How do you rate the performance of the Reintegration Task Team? 
6. In your opinion who is in charge of the reintegration process? 
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Synopses of the interview 
The interviewer introduces himself and explains the purpose of the interview to Mr van Rooyen. 
The interviewee responded as follows on the questions (not necessary in the sequence the 
questions were asked). 
In my view there is not one single reason that triggered the violence. The following are all 
reasons/triggers: 
• The contestation for scarce resources during the harvest season in De Doorns. Six 
thousand people, mostly South Africans are ordinarily employed permanently on the farms 
outside the season. With the commencement of the season 9000 positions become 
available on the farms. In De Doorns the unemployment figure during off-season is 40%. 
The figure for the Breede Valley area varies between 18% and 21%. The new season 
creates expectations of work for these poor people. What happens in De Doorns is that 
there are labour brokers who deliberately recruit Zimbabweans for the farms. They also 
provide them with accommodation in the local Townships of Hasie Square, Ekuphumleni 
and Stofland. 
• As the term of office of the currant council is coming to a close (2011 is local government 
elections) opportunistic elements took the issue of the presence of foreign nationals and 
under the guise of xenophobia raised service delivery issues in De Doorns. There are 
elements in De Doorns who have political agendas who want to use the xenophobia to 
highlight their campaigns – they want to contest for positions at the coming elections. 
• Labour brokers. Zimbabweans are part of a special dispensation as asylum seekers. 
They can not be repatriated. There is a international agreement which states that if a 
Zimbabwean are caught without the necessary papers they have 30 days to go to the 
nearest Home Affairs office where they can apply for the necessary documentation. The 
Municipality has no involvement in this sudden influx of foreign nationals to the region. 
The HTA (Hex Valley Table Grape Association) should have had the foresight to discuss 
this issue with the Municipality, Department of Labour and the Department of Home 
Affairs before the start of the season. The HTA on their own applied (facilitated) for a point 
in the Valley where Zimbabweans could apply for asylum papers. That also created to the 
greater numbers who went there to register. 
• Local people used their accommodation to raise income. Names have been listed of 
Zimbabweans who had a number of stands/plots which they obtained mainly illegally. 
They have no proof of ownership. It is municipal land earmarked for housing projects and 
it cannot be sold. Locals also provided accommodation at R20 toR40 per person per week 
to the foreign nationals. 
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• In a small geographic space it is a fairly high number of foreign nationals. This is a huge 
presence in a small rural community. It is in your face on a daily basis. 
• The main issues are the economic contestation for job opportunities during season and 
the opportunistic element that exploits the issue to further their own aims and to contest 
the 2011 local government elections. That is why I say it is not classical xenophobia – 
other foreign nationals were left untouched. It was focused primarily against 
Zimbabweans. If you look at the police reports it was a peaceful march of Zimbabweans 
taking their belongings. There were only 12 structures demolished and not burned down, 
not violently taken down. The Zimbabweans with the police monitoring them walked 
towards available transport – almost peacefully leaving the area. 
• The case in 2008 when a shack was burned down by locals, killing eight Zimbabweans, is 
not Xenophobia related. it is more a case of social conflict. Two people were chased by a 
group. They took refuse in a shack that was occupied by Zimbabweans. The shack was 
then set alight by the people that chased the two men. Nov 2009 was the other violence. 
A case was opened for public violence and malicious damage to property. 
• I do not think there is political indifference. I Think politicians has understood and 
correctly analysed the question and then correctly left it to the administration and other 
government role-players to manage the process. The MEC for Local Government in the 
Province (Bredell) was quite involved. In March when we met in Cape Town to discuss 
matters concerning the newly created Task Team the MEC and other politicians showed 
leadership in their support. It is politicians outside normal government business, who is 
not in Council, that has been campaigning around this issue. There has been regular visits 
by local politicians to the site. 
• With regard to communication around issues of xenophobia I think more needs to be 
done about educating the community. There is also room for a popular campaign around 
human rights. 
• Xenophobia did not feature in our communication plan at the time of the attacks. It has 
taken us all by surprise. It took us some time to understand the severity and complexity of 
the situation before we could respond appropriately. The communication response of the 
Ngo’s were far more tuned in at the time. From the third day after the attacks we were 
more prepared. There were a communication person on site and steadily we began to roll 
out communication around the issue – liaison, pamphlets and so on. It was an inter-
departmental approach involving the BVM’S communication unit, Cape Winelands’ media 
component, GCIS, Office of the Premier and the media sections of other departments. We 
now need to build in xenophobia and human rights issues into our IDP, communication 
policy and strategies so that we can proactively address matters. GCIS has already 
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started to roll out a program at schools. The young people do not understand the historical 
connection. It is the young people who are more at fore front, the more militant around 
this issue. Communication must focus on the young people. Our communication 
successes have been met with counter mobilisation and counter communication from 
these political opportunists. Particularly with our public engagement where we tried to 
have prayer meetings , walkabouts and public meetings, these counter activities  tried to 
derail our efforts. For instance these people were driving around and threaten people over 
public address systems if they go the meetings. They were very strong counter 
mobilisation to our communication messages. 
• Braam Hanekom is Passop. Clearly he has very good media connections such as Cape 
Times and the Argus. I always maintained that we are not opposed to NGO’S that is part 
of the process, subject to them agreeing that this is a government program and adhere to 
the camp’s code of conduct as well as the code of conduct for sexual contact we took 
from UNISEF. PASSOP made a lot of noise. Rather than contributing towards peace and 
playing a supportive role PASSOP played more a lobbyist and advocacy role. We 
represent separate constituencies. Our mandate is a legal mandate that is informed by the 
Constitution and by applicable legislation. In resent times with the mediation that has 
being going on to bring a final solution to the issue we met and had discussions. He 
represents the Zimbabwean De Doorns Committee. It is almost a marriage of 
convenience scenario. He has been very difficult. 
• With regard to the possible inclusion of SANCO as an important stakeholder on the RTT it 
must be stressed that SANCO was not operational when the violence broke out. SANCO 
was formed two/three months after the attacks. SANCO also has a different campaign. 
The organisation focused on service delivery and on creating a platform to contest the 
local government elections. We should have involved the churches on the RTT. Another 
oversight is not to speak to the trade unions as well as the farm worker structures that 
exist. There is value in it to be as inclusive as possible. 
• When you look at the performance of the RTT one must bear in mind that the members 
were all inexperienced in dealing with xenophobia prior to the November 2009 incident. 
Remember our primary focus is municipal service delivery and the task that was thrust on 
you had to be taken alongside your normal work. Your normal work suffered in the 
process. We succeeded in creating a platform where we meet regularly. I am still 
struggling with the question of who is ultimately the responsible party. There is no 
reference at all in the Constitution to a municipality’s mandate but in a broader 
developmental definition of a municipality of course there is a role. However in the first 
weeks from a disaster management legislative perspective I think there is a role for 
municipalities. Home Affairs in processing applications has a role. Foreign Affairs who 
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negotiated the special dispensation with Home Affairs with regard to the Zimbabweans 
has a role. There is also a responsibility at provincial level. In our Province the Office of 
the Premier has a Social Dialog and Human Rights section. I think it resides there. I think 
the Municipality is the default participant from the perspective that we deliver services and 
also that the land they occupy belongs to the municipality. But primarily I would argue, 
simply from a legal perspective, in terms of the White Paper on Local Government and the 
broader developmental local government definition of course there is always a role a 
municipality must play. Therefore we should now include the issue of human rights in our 
IDP to make provisions for expenditure in this regard. If it is not in the IDP it will not be 
entertained in the budget and you won’t be able to spend. Therefore we were obliged to 
bring a item to council to condone all irregular unforeseen expenditure that arise from this 
issue since November 2009. Because we may run the risk in future, unless there is 
approval by council, that any expenditure in this regard may be seen as fruitless 
expenditure which will have consequences for the Municipal Manager and officials. 
• The media attention to this issue captured firmly in the public eye. I think the media 
reported fairly on these issues. From the RTT’S point of view I think the media gave more 
attention to the rights of the foreign nationals than the government’s response and the 
complexity of the situation. It could have been more balanced in that regard. 
• I think we have done very well as a local municipality. If think of the physical violence 
meted out in other municipalities in 2008 and elsewhere. The liaison with other role-
players – UNHCR, IOM, Black Sash Schalebrini and others were good with the exception 
of PASSOP. 
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